Journal of Political Economy JPE 2024年 12月刊 目录与摘要

刊发卷期：Volume 132,Number 12

刊发时间：December 2024

期刊等级：ABS 4*

出版厂商：University of Chicago Press

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目录

1.The Bank of Amsterdam and the Limits of Fiat Money

Wilko Bolt, Jon Frost, Hyun Song Shin, and Peter Wierts

2.Detecting Drivers of Behavior at an Early Age: Evidence from a Longitudinal Field Experiment

Marco Castillo, John A. List, Ragan Petrie, and Anya Samek

3.Selective-Memory Equilibrium

Drew Fudenberg, Giacomo Lanzani, and Philipp Strack

4.Heterogeneity and Aggregate Fluctuations

Minsu Chang, Xiaohong Chen, and Frank Schorfheide

5.The Intertemporal Keynesian Cross

Adrien Auclert, Matthew Rognlie, and Ludwig Straub

6.(Near-)Substitute Preferences and Equilibria with Indivisibilities

Thành Nguyen and Rakesh Vohra

7.The Impact of Divorce Laws on the Equilibrium in the Marriage Market

Ana Reynoso

摘要

1.The Bank of Amsterdam and the Limits of Fiat Money

Wilko Bolt, Jon Frost, Hyun Song Shin, and Peter Wierts

Central banks can operate with negative equity, and many have done so in history without undermining trust in fiat money. However, there are limits. How negative can central bank equity be before fiat money loses credibility? We address this question using a global game approach motivated by the fall of the Bank of Amsterdam (1609–1820). We solve for the unique break point where negative equity and asset illiquidity render fiat money worthless. We draw lessons on the role of fiscal support and central bank capital in sustaining trust in fiat money.

2.Detecting Drivers of Behavior at an Early Age: Evidence from a Longitudinal Field Experiment

Marco Castillo, John A. List, Ragan Petrie, and Anya Samek

We investigate how skills developed when children are 3–5 years old drive schooling outcomes in middle childhood and adolescence. We find that skills map onto three distinct factors—cognitive skills, executive functions, and economic preferences. Importantly, each of the three factors predict later schooling outcomes. While early executive function skills and cognitive scores are linked to future behavioral patterns and other key student outcomes, economic preferences have an independent effect: children who are impatient in early childhood have more disciplinary referrals. Finally, random assignment to preschool impacts grades and disciplinary referrals through changes to cognitive skills and executive functions.

3.Selective-Memory Equilibrium

Drew Fudenberg, Giacomo Lanzani, and Philipp Strack

We study agents who are more likely to remember some experiences than others but update beliefs as if the experiences they remember are the only ones that occurred. To understand the long-run effects of selective memory, we propose selective-memory equilibrium. We show that if the agent’s behavior converges, their limit strategy is a selective-memory equilibrium, and we provide a sufficient condition for behavior to converge. We use this equilibrium concept to explore the consequences of several well-documented biases. We also show that there is a close connection between selective-memory equilibria and the outcomes of misspecified learning.

4.Heterogeneity and Aggregate Fluctuations

Minsu Chang, Xiaohong Chen, and Frank Schorfheide

We develop a state-space model with a transition equation that takes the form of a functional vector autoregression (VAR) and stacks macroeconomic aggregates and a cross-sectional density. The measurement equation captures the error in estimating log densities from repeated cross-sectional samples. The log densities and their transition kernels are approximated by sieves, which leads to a finite-dimensional VAR for macroeconomic aggregates and sieve coefficients. With this model, we study the dynamics of technology shocks, GDP (gross domestic product), employment, and the earnings distribution. We find that spillovers between aggregate and distributional dynamics are generally small, that a positive technology shock tends to decrease inequality, and that a shock that raises earnings inequality leads to a small and insignificant GDP response.

5.The Intertemporal Keynesian Cross

Adrien Auclert, Matthew Rognlie, and Ludwig Straub

We generalize the traditional, static Keynesian cross by deriving an intertemporal Keynesian cross for the dynamic output response to government spending and taxes in microfounded general equilibrium models. Intertemporal marginal propensities to consume (iMPCs) are sufficient statistics for this response, with fiscal multipliers depending only on the interaction between iMPCs and public deficits. We provide empirical estimates of iMPCs and argue that they are inconsistent with representative agent or two-agent models but can be matched by certain heterogeneous agent models. Models that match empirical iMPCs imply larger and more persistent output responses to deficit-financed fiscal policy, with cumulative spending multipliers above 1.

6.(Near-)Substitute Preferences and Equilibria with Indivisibilities

Thành Nguyen and Rakesh Vohra

An obstacle to using market mechanisms to allocate indivisible goods is the lack of competitive equilibria (CEs). Arrow and Hahn introduced social-approximate equilibria: price vectors with “small” excess demands. We define preferences called Δ-substitutes, where social-approximate equilibria exist with good-by-good excess demand bounded by 2(Δ−1), independent of economy size. For Δ=1, CEs exist even with income effects. A Δ greater than 1 allows for richer substitutability and complementarity patterns, broadening the scope for market mechanisms to allocate indivisible goods.

7.The Impact of Divorce Laws on the Equilibrium in the Marriage Market

Ana Reynoso

Does easier divorce affect who marries whom? I exploit time variation in the adoption of unilateral divorce across the United States and show that it increases assortative matching among newlyweds. To unravel the underlying mechanisms, I estimate a novel life-cycle equilibrium model of marriage, labor supply, consumption, and divorce under the baseline mutual consent divorce regime. By solving the model under unilateral divorce, I find that, consistent with the data, assortative matching increases. Effects are largely due to changes in choices when risk sharing and cooperation within marriage decrease, which highlights the importance of considering equilibrium effects when evaluating family policies.