【新刊速递】《冲突解决杂志》（JCR），Vol.68, No.10 Novemebr 2024｜国政学人

作者：Edward Goldring，澳大利亚墨尔本大学社会与政治科学学院的比较政治学讲师；Austin S. Matthews，美国东卡罗来纳大学政治科学系的助理教授

摘要：研究表明，独裁者在政变后清洗（军事）精英，而其他研究工作则表明，分析个人层面的精英清洗以了解专制国家的内部运作是有用的。因此，本文提出疑问：政权更迭的政变后，独裁者要清洗谁？本文认为，独裁者清洗谁取决于与两个因素相关的成本和收益。首先，清除具有强制能力的精英需要更高的成本，因为他们为独裁者提供了应对外部威胁的帮助。其次，独裁者从清洗帮助他们夺取政权的精英中受益;这些精英们明显愿意推翻现任总统，这威胁到独裁者及其巩固权力的能力。本文从 1948 年至 2000 年间 32 个专制统治机构的 289 名精英的原始定量数据中找到了支持本文论点的证据。本文的研究结果对于研究政权更迭政变所产生的大部分专制政权具有重要意义，特别是关于生存和国家暴力的话题。

Research shows that dictators purge (military) elites following coups, while other work shows the utility of analyzing individual-level elite purges to understand the inner workings of autocracies. We therefore ask: Who do regime change coup-entry dictators purge? We argue that who dictators purge depends on costs and benefits relating to two factors. First, purging elites with coercive capacity entails higher costs due to the assistance they provide dictators in navigating outsider threats. Second, dictators benefit from purging elites who helped them seize power; the demonstrable willingness of these elites to overthrow an incumbent threatens the dictator and his ability to consolidate power. We find support for our argument from original quantitative data on 289 elites in 32 autocratic ruling institutions between 1948 and 2000. Our findings have important implications for the study of the large proportion of autocracies born of regime change coups, particularly topics on survival and state violence.

作者：Patrick Hunnicutt, 美国俄勒冈大学规划、公共政策与管理学院的环境管理助理教授

摘要：是什么解释了在政府难以制定和执行规则的国家能力有限的地区抗议动员？本文采用现有理论，通过比较的角度来解释抗议动员，并首先提出，在国家能力有限的领域调解公民与政府互动的非正式政治精英代表了一个关键但未被充分研究的政治机会来源。本文特别指出，非正式的政治精英是公民和国家之间的有效中介，在个人层面上调节了不满和抗议之间的关系。在利比里亚六个月的实地考察证实了这一说法。利用原创的高频住户面板数据集，本文展示了被称为“社区主席”的非正式政治精英如何调节公共服务短缺与抗议之间的正相关性。通过焦点小组和访谈收集的定性数据进一步证明了非正式政治精英如何在国家薄弱的环境中塑造抗议动员。

What explains protest mobilization in areas of limited statehood, where the government struggles to make and enforce rules? We adapt existing theory to explain protest mobilization through a comparative perspective, beginning with the proposition that informal political elites who mediate citizens’ interactions with the government in areas of limited statehood represent a crucial but understudied source of political opportunity. We specifically argue that informal political elites who are effective intermediaries between citizens and the state moderate the relationship between grievances and protest at the individual-level. Six months of fieldwork in Liberia substantiates this claim. Leveraging an original, high-frequency household panel dataset, we demonstrate how informal political elites called “community chairpeople” moderate the otherwise positive association between public service shortages and protest. Qualitative data collected through focus groups and interviews provide further evidence of how informal political elites shape protest mobilization in settings where the state is weak.

作者：Feyaad Allie，哈佛大学政府系助理教授

摘要：宗教时代如何以及何时成为社区暴力的焦点？在印度的印度教-穆斯林骚乱的背景下，本文认为，一种宗教仪式与另一种宗教仪式不一致（例如，祭祀牛或参加盲目崇拜的游行）的不相容的仪式节日有助于解释神圣时间对宗教骚乱的正相关性。仪式不相容的节日提供了教义差异，使骚乱的可能性更大。这些类型的假期可以被暴动发起者用来煽动暴力，也可以独立提高个人参与暴力的意愿。本文通过分析100年来印度教-穆斯林骚乱的数据来支持这一论点。本文通过额外的分析和研究历史上和当今节日发生的骚乱案例来研究这些机制。通过关注宗教内容，本文展示了特定的宗教节日如何为精英们提供煽动宗教暴力的潜在条件。

How and when can religious times become focal points for communal violence? In the context of Hindu-Muslim riots in India, I argue that incompatible ritual holidays where one religion’s rituals are at odds with another (e.g., sacrificing cows or engaging in processions with idolatry) help explain the positive effect of sacred time on religious rioting. Holidays with incompatible rituals provide doctrinal differences that make riots more likely. These types of holidays can be used by riot entrepreneurs to incite violence or can independently raise an individual’s willingness to engage in violence. I provide support for this argument by analyzing data on Hindu-Muslim riots across 100 years. I investigate the mechanisms through additional analysis and examining historical and present-day cases of riots that occurred on holidays. By focusing on the content of religion, this paper demonstrates how particular religious holidays can provide the underlying conditions that elites use to incite religious violence

作者:Stephen Bagwell，美国密苏里大学圣路易斯分校政治科学系的助理教授；Matthew Rains，美国惠特沃斯大学政治科学系国际关系助理教授；Meridith LaVelle，美国乔治亚大学政治学与国际事务专业博士候选人

摘要：为什么国家及其代理人会侵犯公民？传统解释侧重于抗争政治、政制的存在和国际压力。尽管如此，在这种侵犯的背景下剖析国家及其代理人的叙述在很大程度上仍然是理论性质的。本文通过关注国家领导人及其与更广泛的政制和职能的关系，为国家内部对侵犯人权的描述提供了一个突破。本文认为，个人专断行领导人与促进人权尊重的机关有着根本不同的关系，并认为依靠自身优点和品质的领导人不太可能激活或操纵那些对侵犯人权负责的制度。使用 1991 年至 2019 年的数据，本文表明，领导人在个人人格框架内合法化的存在可能会使人权状况恶化。

Why do states and their agents abuse citizens? Traditional explanations focus on contentious politics, the presence of institutions, and international pressures. Despite this, accounts dissecting the state and its agents in this context of abuse remain largely theoretic in nature. This article offers a breakthrough for within-the-state accounts of human rights abuses by focusing on state leaders and their relationship to broader government institutions and function. We posit that personalist leaders have fundamentally different relationship with institutions that foster human rights respect, arguing that leaders relying on their own merits and qualities are less likely to either activate or manipulate institutions of accountability for human rights abuses. Using data from 1991 to 2019, we show that the presence of leaders legitimizing themselves within personalist framing can worsen human rights conditions.

作者：Nicholas Emery-Xu, 加州大学洛杉矶分校经济学系博士生；Andrew Park, Uber公司数据科学家；Robert Trager, 牛津大学布拉瓦特尼克政府学院高级研究员

摘要：一个正式的模型揭示了信息环境如何影响国际间进行有关实施一项强大而危险的新军事技术的竞赛，这可能会造成一种影响所有国家的“灾难”。实施该技术的国家面临着技术安全性和竞争表现之间的权衡。各国面临有关功能的未知、私有和公共信息。更具决定性的竞争，其中小的绩效领先会产生较大的胜利概率，通常更危险。此外，披露有关竞争对手能力的信息对风险有两个相反的影响：国家要么发现它们在能力上相差很大，竞争较少，要么发现它们在能力上接近并大大降低了获胜的安全性。因此，除非在高果断性下，公共信息场景的风险低于私人信息场景。最后，无论信息如何，最终失败者相对于最终获胜者对安全的影响越大，比赛就越危险。

A formal model reveals how the information environment affects international races to implement a powerful, dangerous new military technology, which may cause a “disaster” affecting all states. States implementing the technology face a tradeoff between the safety of the technology and performance in the race. States face unknown, private, and public information about capabilities. More decisive races, in which small performance leads produce larger probabilities of victory, are usually more dangerous. In addition, revealing information about rivals’ capabilities has two opposing effects on risk: states discover either that they are far apart in capability and compete less or that they are close in capability and drastically reduce safety to win. Therefore, the public information scenario is less risky than the private information scenario except under high decisiveness. Finally, regardless of information, the larger the eventual loser’s impact on safety relative to the eventual winner’s, the more dangerous is the race.

作者：Bryan R. Early, 纽约州立大学奥尔巴尼分校政治学教授；Timothy M. Peterson, 亚利桑那州立大学政治与全球研究学院的副教授

摘要：有证据表明，公司经常过度遵守美国的制裁——这一过程也称为“去风险”。本文认为，美国对其经济制裁的执行导致了这一现象，以至于可以观察到美国制裁执行与美国制裁目标的第三方贸易之间存在系统性关系。具体来说，本文推测，美国对违反制裁者实施制裁处罚的频率和严重程度越高，与美国制裁目标的第三方贸易就会减少得越多。通过分析 2003 年至 2015 年的数据，本文发现，美国的制裁执法行动与第三方国家与美国制裁目标之间的双边贸易的大幅下降相关，即使执法行动针对的是该成对组以外的各方。这表明，美国实施制裁放大了美国制裁对目标经济体造成的伤害。

Evidence suggests that firms frequently over-comply with U.S. sanctions—a process also known as “de-risking.” We argue that U.S. enforcement of its economic sanctions has contributed to this phenomenon to the extent that we can observe a systematic relationship between U.S. sanctions enforcement and third-party trade with U.S. sanction targets. Specifically, we theorize that, the greater the frequency and severity of sanctions enforcement penalties imposed by the U.S. against sanctions violators, the more third-party trade with U.S. sanction targets will decline. Analyzing data from 2003 to 2015, we find that U.S. sanctions enforcement actions correlate with significant declines in dyadic trade between third-party states and U.S. sanctions targets, even when enforcement actions target parties external to that dyad. This suggests that the U.S.’s enforcement of its sanctions magnifies the harm that U.S. sanctions inflict on target economies.

作者：Jonathan A. Chu, 加州大学洛杉矶分校政治学系的博士候选人；Carrie A. Lee, 空军战争学院安全研究系的副教授

摘要：公众对武装人道干预的支持是否取决于它试图拯救的人的种族和宗教信仰？社会认同理论预测，人们更喜欢帮助与他们有相同身份的陌生人，但家长式和世界主义的规范可以缓和这种偏袒。本文通过对具有全国代表性的美国人样本进行的调查实验来检验这些命题，这些样本在假设的内战中将外国人的种族和宗教特征进行随机化。数据显示，美国人（尤其是基督徒）更愿意代表基督徒而不是穆斯林进行干预。内群体亲和力而不是外群体伊斯兰恐惧症解释了这种影响。与此同时，美国人在种族方面表现出的偏见不太一致。最后，虽然学者们发现家长式规范会影响对经济援助的态度，但本文发现军事干预没有类似的效果。然而，世界主义心态的美国人表达的基于身份的偏见较少。本文得出的结论是，人们根据他们基本的社会心理本能行事，但规范可以减轻这些偏见。

Does public support for armed humanitarian intervention depend on the race and religion of those it seeks to save? Social identity theory predicts that people prefer helping strangers with whom they share an identity, but norms of paternalism and cosmopolitanism could moderate such favoritism. We test these propositions via survey experiments administered to a nationally representative sample of Americans that randomized the racial and religious characteristics of foreigners in a hypothetical civil war. The data reveal that Americans, especially Christians, prefer to intervene on behalf of Christians over Muslims. Ingroup affinity rather than outgroup Islamophobia explains this effect. Meanwhile, Americans exhibit less consistent prejudice along racial lines. Finally, while scholars find paternalist norms affect attitudes toward economic assistance, we find no similar effect for military intervention. Cosmopolitan Americans, however, express less identity-based bias. We conclude that people act on their basic socio-psychological instincts, but norms could attenuate these biases.

作者：Richard A.I. Johnson, 斯特拉斯克莱德大学政府与公共政策学院高级讲师；Aaron P. Shreve, 兰道夫学院（Randolph College）政治学系的助理教授

摘要：主要武器系统进口的重要性在于，它们对国内和国际安全很有用。然而，除了国家“所需”的武器外，各国还经常进口它们“所求”的武器。一种解释是，国家进口不必要的武器来获得地位。本文认为，遭受更高程度的负面地位不一致国家进口的彰显地位象征的武器的比例更大。为了解释不同的安全动机，本文还将非民主政权类型——强人、军政府、老板和核心机构——分开，因为它们的国际冲突倾向和国内稳定性各不相同。由于这些政权之间的差异，本文进一步认为，非民主的个人主导政权将进口更多身份象征武器。通过分析1965-1999 年的数据，本文发现负面地位不一致的政权进口更多的彰显地位象征的武器。

Major weapon system imports are significant as they are useful for domestic and international security. However, states regularly imported weapons they want in addition to weapons they need. One explanation is that states import unnecessary weapons to gain status. We argue that states suffering from higher levels of negative status inconsistency (SI) import a greater proportion of status symbol weapons. To account for differing security motives, we also separate non-democratic regime types – strongman, junta, boss, and machine – as they vary in their international conflict propensity and domestic stability. Due to the differences across these regimes, we further argue that non-democratic personalist regimes will import more status symbol weapons. Using data covering 1965–1999, we find that negatively status inconsistent regimes import more status symbol weapons.

审校 | 赖永祯

排版 | 王静怡