翻译｜陆铭茗 同济大学法学院 LL.B.

一审｜曾梓栩 外交学院 LL.B. 

二审｜ LYJ   NUS LL.M.

编辑｜郑梓萱 澳门科技大学LL.B.

         Izzy   美国西北大学LL.M.

责编｜冯雨萱 北京大学J.D.&J.M.

GIF V. SYL and LBL

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF THE HIGH COURT OF HONG KONG [2024] HKCFI 1324 

香港高等法院原讼法庭判决书 [2024] HKCFI 1324判决书[1]：

香港法院基于多份合同之间互不兼容的仲裁条款撤销仲裁裁决

判决时间：2024年5月19日

Before me is an Originating Summons dated 11 August 2023 (“Originating Summons”) issued by the 1st Plaintiff (“P1”) and the 2nd Plaintiff (“P2”) (together “Ps”) against the Defendant (“D”).

在本庭面前的是第一原告（“P1”）和第二原告（“P2”）（统称“二原告”）于2023年8月11日对被告（“D”）发出的原诉传票（“原诉传票”）。

By the Originating Summons, Ps apply to set aside an interim arbitral award dated 6 July 2023 (“Interim Award”) made by the arbitral tribunal (“Tribunal”) in an arbitration administered by the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (“Arbitration”).

二原告通过原诉传票申请撤销仲裁庭（“仲裁庭”）于2023年7月6日在香港国际仲裁中心受理的一宗仲裁（“仲裁”）中作出的临时仲裁裁决（“临时裁决”）。

The Interim Award arose out of Ps’ jurisdiction challenge, which Ps unsuccessfully made before the Tribunal. Dissatisfied with the Interim Award, Ps made this application pursuant to Sections 34 and 81 of the Arbitration Ordinance (Cap 609).

临时裁决源于二原告对管辖权提出的异议，二原告向仲裁庭提出异议未果。由于对该临时裁决不满，二原告根据《香港仲裁条例》（第609章）第34和81条[2]提出了本申请。

Unsurprisingly, D, who successfully persuaded the Tribunal to conclude that it had jurisdiction, opposes Ps’ application.

不出所料，成功说服仲裁庭认定其具有管辖权的被告反对二原告的申请。

1、案例链接：https://jusmundi.com/en/document/decision/pdf/en-gif-v-syl-and-lbl-judgment-of-the-court-of-first-instance-of-the-high-court-of-hong-kong-2024-hkcfi-1324-sunday-19th-may-2024

2、法条链接：https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/cap609

The subject dispute arises out of the following three agreements (collectively the “Three Contracts”):

(1) A Loan Agreement dated 1 January 2020 (as amended and restated on 1 June 2020, and further supplemented on 6 July 2020 by way of a Side Agreement) entered into between D as the “Lender” and Ps as the “Borrowers” (“Loan Agreement”).

(2) A Security Deed dated 1 January 2020 entered into between D as the “Mortgagee”, P2 as the “Mortgagor”, and P1 and P2 as the “Obligors” (“January Deed”).

A Security Deed dated 6 July 2020 entered into

between D as the “Mortgagee” and Pl together with two other companies (“Other Mortgagors”) as the “Mortgagors” (“July Deed”).

本案争议源于以下三份协议（统称“三份合同”）：

(1) 本案被告作为“放款人”与二原告作为“借款人”于2020年1月1日签订的贷款协议（于2020年6月1日修订重述，并于2020年7月6日通过附加协议进一步补充）（“贷款协议”）。

(2) 被告作为“抵押权人”、第二原告作为“抵押人”、第一原告和第二原告作为“义务人”于2020年1月1日订立的担保协议（“1月担保协议”）。

(3) 被告作为“抵押权人”、第一原告连同另外两家公司（“其他抵押人”）作为“抵押人”于2020年7月6日订立的担保协议（“7月担保协议”）。

Each of the Three Contracts contains a dispute resolution clause:

(1) Clause 7.1 of the Loan Agreement provides that:

“...Each of the parties hereto irrevocably...agrees that any dispute or controversy arising out of, relating to, or concerning any interpretation, construction, performance or breach of this Agreement, shall be settled by arbitration to be held in Hong Kong which shall be administered by the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (“HKIAC”) in accordance with the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre Administered Arbitration Rules...There shall be three (3) arbitrators, with one arbitrator to be appointed by the Borrowers and one arbitrator to be appointed by the Lender. If the aforesaid two arbitrators fail to agree on the third arbitrator, the HKIAC Council shall select the third arbitrator, who shall be qualified to practice law in Hong Kong...” (emphasis added).

(2) Clause 19.2 of the January Deed and the July Deed are identical. They both provide that: 
“The dispute resolution provision in the Loan Agreement applies mutatis mutandis to this Deed.” (collectively referred to as the “Arbitration Agreements”)

三份合同均包含争议解决条款：

(1) 贷款协议第7.1条规定：

“......本协议各方不可撤销地......同意，由本协议引起的、与本协议有关的或涉及本协议的任何解释、履行或违反本协议的任何争议或纠纷，应在香港通过仲裁解决，仲裁应由香港国际仲裁中心（“港仲”）根据《香港国际仲裁中心机构仲裁规则》进行受理。仲裁应由三名仲裁员组成，其中一名仲裁员由借款人指定，另一名仲裁员由放款人指定。如果上述两名仲裁员未能就第三名仲裁员达成一致意见，港仲理事会应选定第三名仲裁员，该仲裁员应具有在香港执业的法律资格......”（着重强调）。

(2) 1月担保协议和7月担保协议的第19.2条完全相同。两者均规定：

“贷款协议中的争议解决条款比照适用于本协议。”（统称“仲裁协议”）

（图片来源于网络）

Relying on the Arbitration Agreements, by a Notice of Arbitration dated 15 October 2021 (“NOA”), D commenced the Arbitration against Ps under the auspices of the HKIAC pursuant to the HKIAC Administered Arbitration Rules 2018 (“HKIAC Rules”). 

根据仲裁协议，在港仲的主持下，被告依据《2018香港国际仲裁中心机构仲裁规则》（“港仲规则”）对二原告提起仲裁，于2021年10月15日发出仲裁通知书（“NOA”）。

Under the NOA, D asked for a single arbitration under multiple contracts pursuant to Article 29 of the HKIAC Rules. D also indicated that it would nominate its arbitrator (whose nomination was eventually approved).

根据NOA，被告要求根据港仲规则第29条就多份合同进行单个仲裁。被告还表示将提名仲裁员（其提名最终获得批准）

Ps objected to having a single arbitration under multiple contracts. Ps wrote to the HKIAC, informing the HKIAC that it did not agree to have the Three Contracts resolved in a single Arbitration.

二原告反对根据多份合同进行单个仲裁。二原告致函港仲，告知其不同意将三份合同交由单个仲裁解决。

Further correspondence ensued between Ps, D and the HKIAC.

随后，二原告、被告和港仲之间进一步沟通。

On 10 January 2022, the HKIAC decided that the Arbitration was, prima facie, validly commenced under Article 29. The HKIAC also indicated that any jurisdiction challenge would be dealt with after the Tribunal was constituted. The HKIAC invited Ps to jointly designate an arbitrator with the Other Mortgagors.

2022年1月10日，根据港仲规则第29条的规定，港仲裁定，仲裁的初步证据确凿。港仲还表示，任何管辖权异议将在仲裁庭组成后处理。港仲邀请二原告与其他抵押人共同指定一名仲裁员。

On 9 February 2022, Ps filed an Answer to the NOA. Ps expressly reserved the right to challenge jurisdiction. Ps also nominated a second arbitrator (“Ps’ Nominated Arbitrator”).

2022年2月9日，二原告提交了对NOA的答复。二原告明确保留其对管辖权提出异议的权利。二原告还提名了第二名仲裁员（“二原告提名的仲裁员”）。

The Other Mortgagors did not file any Answer to the NOA. There was therefore no nomination from the Other Mortgagors.

其他抵押人并未对NOA提交任何答复。因此，其他抵押人并未提名。

After further rounds of correspondence, the HKIAC decided not to appoint Ps’ Nominated Arbitrator. By a letter dated 16 February 2022, the HKIAC noted that there was an absence of joint designation of arbitrator by Ps and the Other Mortgagors. The HKIAC further represented that in view of the above, it would proceed to appoint a second arbitrator.

经过多轮沟通后，港仲决定不任命二原告提名的仲裁员。港仲在2022年2月16日的信函中指出，二原告和其他抵押人并未共同指定仲裁员。港仲进一步表示，鉴于上述情况，其将着手指定第二名仲裁员。

（图片来源于网络）

Eventually, on 30 May 2022, the HKIAC appointed the second arbitrator, who was not Ps’ Nominated Arbitrator.

最终，港仲于2022年5月30日任命了第二名仲裁员，其并不是二原告提名的仲裁员。

On 25 July 2022, the HKIAC wrote to the parties and indicated that the two wing arbitrators had jointly nominated the presiding arbitrator.

2022年7月25日，港仲致函各方，表示两名边席仲裁员已共同提名首席仲裁员。

On 2 August 2022, the HKIAC wrote to the parties and confirmed the constitution of the Tribunal.

2022年8月2日，港仲致函各方，确认了仲裁庭的组成。

On 31 October 2022, Ps issued an application to challenge the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Ps also asked for bifurcation of the proceedings between jurisdiction and merits.

2022年10月31日，二原告提出申请对仲裁庭管辖权的异议。二原告还要求将程序分流为管辖权和实体两个部分。

On 11 April 2023, the Tribunal directed that the jurisdiction challenge would be dealt with by way of a preliminary question.

2023年4月11日，仲裁庭指示以先决问题的方式处理管辖权异议。

This led to the Interim Award dated 6 July 2023, by which the Tribunal dismissed the jurisdiction challenge.

因此，仲裁庭于2023年7月6日做出临时裁决，驳回了对管辖权的异议。

Dissatisfied with the results, Ps filed the Originating Summons on 11 August 2023. Ps applied for an order or declaration that the Interim Award be set aside and that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction in the Arbitration.

由于对结果不满，二原告于2023年8月11日提交了原诉传票。二原告申请一项命令或声明，要求撤销临时裁决、以及确定仲裁庭对仲裁无管辖权。

（图片来源于网络）

In gist, Ps advance two grounds of complaint (which were made before the Tribunal):

(1) First, Ps contend that the Arbitration Agreements are incompatible with one another. Hence, Ps say that the Arbitration should not have been commenced under Article 29 of the HKIAC Rules as a single arbitration under multiple contracts (“Compatibility Ground”).

(2) Second, Ps contend that the composition of the Tribunal was defective since it was not done in accordance with parties’ agreement under the Three Contracts (“Agreement Ground”).

简而言之，二原告提出了两项申诉的论证（已在仲裁庭上提出）：

(1)首先，二原告认为仲裁协议相互不兼容。因此，二原告称，根据港仲规则第29条，不应启动多份合同下的单个仲裁（“基于兼容性的论证”）。

(2)其次，二原告认为仲裁庭的组成有缺陷，因为它并未按照三份合同下各方的协议组成（“基于仲裁协议的论证”）。

D does not disagree that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain challenges concerning the constitution and composition of the Tribunal. D also fairly accepts that the Court deals with such a challenge de novo and is not bound by the findings of the Tribunal. The Court will review the evidence and make its own decision as to whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction. D, however, submits that the grounds of challenge have not been made out.

被告不反对本法院有权受理对仲裁庭的组成和构成提出的异议。被告也完全同意，法院将从头开始处理这种异议，且不受仲裁庭裁决的约束。法院将审查证据，并自行决定仲裁庭是否具有管辖权。但被告认为，异议的论证不充分。

To fully understand Ps’ Compatibility Ground, it is necessary to consider the Three Agreements in further detail.

要充分理解二原告的“兼容性论证”，有必要考虑以下三项协议的细节。

In the present case, the parties to the Loan Agreement are Ps as the “Borrowers” and D as the “Lender”. As noted in paragraph 6(1) above, Clause 7.1 of the Loan Agreement expressly provides that the “Borrowers” (ie Ps) can designate a wing arbitrator in the event of dispute. It is hence rather clear that had an arbitration been commenced solely based on the Loan Agreement, Ps could have designated one of the arbitrators in the Arbitration. Ps needed not consult any other parties for such purposes.

在本案中，贷款协议的当事方是作为“借款人”的二原告和作为“放款人”的被告。正如上文第6(1)段所述，贷款协议第7.1条明文规定，“借款人”（即二原告）可在出现争议时指定一名边裁。因此，如果仅根据贷款协议启动仲裁，二原告明显可以在仲裁中指定一名仲裁员。二原告无需为此目的咨询任何其他方。

The appointment procedures under the January Deed and July Deed are less straightforward. As noted in paragraph 6(2) above, the January Deed and July Deed contain identical provisions. On the face, the identical Clause 19.2 seeks to apply, “mutatis mutandis”, the dispute resolution provision in the Loan Agreement to the January Deed and July Deed.

1月担保协议和7月担保协议规定的委任程序则并非如此简单。如上文第6(2)段所述，1月担保协议和7月担保协议的条文完全相同。从表面上看，相同的第19.2条旨在“比照(mutatis mutandis)”贷款协议中的争议解决条款，以适用于1月担保协议和7月担保协议。

（图片来源于网络）

In English terms, “mutatis mutandis” mean all necessary changes having been made or with the necessary changes. But what are the “necessary” changes to be effected to the January Deed and July Deed?

在英语中，“mutatis mutandis”的意思是所有必要的改动都已作出或作出了必要的改动。但1月担保协议和7月担保协议的“必要”修改是什么呢？

In relation to the January Deed, the results are relatively more straightforward:

25. (1) The January Deed was entered into by the same parties as in the Loan Agreement, with D as the “Mortgagee” and P2 as the “Mortgagor”. Ps were also defined together as the “Obligors”.

(2) Ps suggest that read in context, “mutatis mutandis” could mean three things: -

(a) First, it could mean that there is no change at all, and the right is still vested in the “Borrowers”.

(b) Second, it could mean that the word “Borrowers” is replaced by the word “Obligors”.

(c) Third, it could also mean that the word “Borrowers” is replaced by the word “Mortgagor”.

关于1月担保协议，结果相对更简单明了：

(1) 1月担保协议是由贷款协议中的相同当事人订立的，被告为“抵押权人”，第二原告为“抵押人”。二原告也被共同定义为“义务人”。

(2) 二原告认为，从上下文来看，“比照(mutatis mutandis)”可能有三种含义：

(a) 首先，它可能意味着没有任何变化，权利仍然属于“借款人（Borrowers）”。

(b) 其次，这可能意味着“借款人（Borrowers）”一词被“义务人（Obligors）”一词所取代。

(c) 第三，也可以用“抵押人（Mortgagor）”取代“借款人（Borrowers）”。

(3) For present purposes, it is not necessary for me to resolve this apparent conflict because: -

(a) If Ps’ first suggestion is correct, the “Borrowers”, ie Ps, would have the right to designate an arbitrator.

(b) If Ps’ second suggestion is correct, the “Obligors” would have the right to designate an arbitrator. As Ps were defined as the “Obligors”, there would be no change in substance to the right of designation.

(c) If Ps’ third suggestion is correct, it would be the “Mortgagor” who would have such a right. This means that P2 would have the right to designate an arbitrator.

(4) Thus, on any of these readings, Ps (or at least P2, whose view on the choice of arbitrator does not differ from P1’s for present purposes) would have the right to designate an arbitrator, without the need to consult, or to obtain consent from, any other parties.

(3) 就目前而言，本庭并无必要解决这一明显的矛盾，因为：

(a) 如果二原告的第一个建议是正确的，“借款人”，即二原告，将有权指定一名仲裁员。

(b) 如果二原告的第二个建议是正确的，“义务人”将有权指定一名仲裁员。由于二原告被界定为“义务人”，指定仲裁员的权利实质上不会改变。

(c) 如果二原告的第三项建议是正确的，那么拥有这一权利的将是“抵押人”。这意味着二原告将有权指定一名仲裁员。

(4) 因此，根据上述任何一种理解，二原告（或至少是第二原告，其关于选择仲裁员的看法就目前而言与第一原告并无不同）将有权指定一名仲裁员，而无需与任何其他当事人协商或征得他们的同意。

However, the same cannot be said for the July Deed:

(1) Under the July Deed, the “Mortgagee” is D. The “Mortgagors” are P1 and the Other Mortgagors. The “Obligors” are also P1 and the Other Mortgagors.

(2) P2 is not a party to the July Deed.

(3) Applying the same analysis as set out above, there are, once again, three ways in which “mutatis mutandis” can be interpreted:

(a) First, it could mean that there is no change at all, and the right remains vested in the “Borrowers”.

(b) Second, it could mean that the word “Borrowers” is replaced by the word “Obligors”.

(c) Third, it could mean that the word “Borrowers” is replaced by the word “Mortgagors”.

(4) However, unlike the situation in respect of the January Deed, there will be some significant differences and repercussions arising from the three interpretations:

(a) First, if there is no change in the appointment procedure, the “Borrowers”, ie Ps, would remain to be the ones vested with the right to designate an arbitrator under the July Deed.

(b) Second, if the reference to the “Borrowers” in the Loan Agreement is to be replaced by a reference to the “Obligors”, it would mean that it is P1 and the Other Mortgagors who have a right to designate an arbitrator.

(c) Likewise, on the third possibility, if the reference to the “Borrowers” in the Loan Agreement is replaced by the “Mortgagors”, it would also be P1 and the Other Mortgagors who have a right to designate an arbitrator.

然而，7月担保协议的情况却并非如此：

(1) 根据7月担保协议，“抵押权人”是被告。抵押人是第一原告和其他抵押人。义务人也是第一原告和其他抵押人。

(2) 第二原告不是7月担保协议的当事人。

(3) 根据上述同样的分析，“比照(mutatis mutandis)”再次有三种解释方式：

(a) 首先，它可能意味着没有任何变化，权利仍然属于“借款人（Borrowers）”。

(b) 其次，这可能意味着“借款人（Borrowers）”一词被“义务人（Obligors）”一词所取代。

(c) 第三，也可以用“抵押人（Mortgagor）”取代“借款人（Borrowers）”。

(4) 然而，与1月担保协议的情况不同，这三种解释会产生一些重大的差别和影响：

(a) 首先，如委任程序不变，根据7月担保协议，“借款人”（即二原告）仍有权指定仲裁员。

(b) 其次，如果贷款协议中对“借款人”的提法被对“义务人”的提法所取代，这意味着有权指定仲裁员的是第一原告和其他抵押人。

(c) 同样，关于第三种可能性，如果将贷款协定中提及的“借款人”改为“抵押人”，则有权指定仲裁员的也将是第一原告和其他抵押人。

(5) In my view, the more likely and commercially sensible interpretation of the July Deed is the second and third interpretations, ie that the parties given the right to designate an arbitrator are P1 and the Other Mortgagors, and they could do so to the exclusion of P2.

(6) In coming to this view, I have regard to the following:

(a) This is the most natural interpretation. It sits well with the nature and purpose of the July Deed.

(b) Particularly, P1 and the Other Mortgagors are the counterparties of the July Deed. It would be commercially sensible to suppose that the Other Mortgagors would have wanted some rights to designate an arbitrator, should a dispute eventually arise between the parties.

(c) On the other hand, there is no reason why the parties to the July Deed would vest the right to designate an arbitrator with P2, who is not a party to the July Deed.

(d) Likewise, there is also little reason to believe that the Other Mortgagors who are parties to the July Deed would have been given no right to designate an arbitrator.

(7) In the circumstances, I reject the first interpretation, which suggests that there is no change in the appointment procedure, whereupon the “Borrowers” or Ps retain the right to designate an arbitrator.

(8) For completeness, I should add that it is unnecessary for me to resolve the conflict between the second and third interpretations. In both cases, P1 and the Other Mortgagors would have a joint right of designation.

(5) 在本庭看来，对7月担保协议更有可能以及在商业上更合理的解释是第二种和第三种解释，即有权指定仲裁员的当事方是第一原告和其他抵押人，而不包括第二原告。

(6) 在得出这一观点时，本庭考虑了以下几点：

(a) 这是最自然的解释。它符合7月担保协议的性质和目的。

(b) 特别之处是，第一原告和其他抵押人是7月担保协议的对手方。从商业角度看，如果双方最终发生争议，其他抵押人可能会希望获得一些指定仲裁员的权利。

(c) 另一方面，7月担保协议的当事方并无理由将指定仲裁员的权利赋予不是7月担保协议当事方的第二原告。

(d) 同样，也并无理由相信作为7月担保协议的其他抵押人无权指定仲裁员。

(7) 在这种情况下，本庭拒绝第一种解释，即委任程序并未改变，“借款人”或二原告保留指定仲裁员的权利。

(8) 为完整起见，需补充说明，本庭并无必要解决第二种和第三种解释之间的冲突。在这两种情况下，第一原告和其他抵押人都有共同的指定权。

（图片来源于网络）

I accordingly hold that the Arbitration Agreements should be given the meanings as stated in paragraphs 25, 28(4) and 29(5) above.

因此，本庭认为仲裁协议应具有上文第25、28(4)和 29(5)段所述的含义。

Thus viewed, there is a clash in the appointment procedure in the Loan Agreement and the January Deed on the one hand, and the July Deed on the other hand:

(1) Under the Loan Agreement and the January Deed, Ps would have the right to designate an arbitrator. The Other Mortgagors have no say.

(2) However, under the July Deed, it is P1 and the Other Mortgagors who would have the right to designate an arbitrator. P2 has no say.

由此可见，贷款协议、1月担保协议与7月担保协议在委任程序上存在冲突：

(1) 根据贷款协议和1月担保协议，二原告有权指定一名仲裁员。其他抵押人并无发言权。

(2) 然而，根据7月担保协议，第一原告和其他抵押人有权指定一名仲裁员。而第二原告并无发言权。

The question then is whether this would render the Arbitration Agreements “incompatible” such that Article 29 cannot be engaged. This is the most contentious issue before me, and I shall address this in what follows.

接下来的问题是，这是否会使仲裁协议“互不兼容(incompatible)”，从而无法适用第29条。这是摆在本庭面前最有争议的问题，本庭将在下文中讨论这个问题。

Article 29 of the HKIAC Rules provides that:

“Claims arising out of or in connection with more than one contract may be made in a single arbitration, provided that:

(a) a common question of law or fact arises under each arbitration agreement giving rise to the arbitration; and

(b) the rights to relief claimed are in respect of, or arise out of, the same transaction or a series of related transactions; and

(c) the arbitration agreements under which those claims are made are compatible.” (emphasis added)

港仲规则第29条规定：

“源于或涉及多于一份的合同的请求可在单个仲裁

中提出，但须满足以下条件：

(a) 导致仲裁的各仲裁协议涉及共同的法律或事实问题；且

(b) 请求救济的权利均涉及或源于同一交易或同一系列相关联的交易；且

(c) 请求所依据的仲裁协议彼此兼容。”（强调）

Reading Article 29 as a whole, it is apparent that “compatibility” is an independent and separate requirement. In other words, all three limbs under sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) need to be satisfied before Article 29 is engaged.

从第29条的整体来看，“兼容性”显然是一个独立和单独的要求。换言之，(a)、(b)和(c)分段的所有三项要求都必须得到满足，第29条才能适用。

（图片来源于网络）

As to what is meant by “compatible”:

(1) I have been referred to the meaning of the word “compatible” in the Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 6th ed. Essentially, it means an ability to exist or be used together without causing problems.

(2) In A Guide to the HKIAC Arbitration Rules, 2nd ed, §10.125, the learned authors explain the meaning of “compatibility” as follows:

“The arbitration agreements need not be identical in.  order to meet this criterion. They must, however, be substantively compatible. Any differences must be surmountable by the parties, the tribunal, and HKIAC. Consolidation will be ordered when it will make no practical difference if the consolidated case proceeds on the basis of one or the other underlying arbitration agreements. Where, for example, two arbitration clauses provide for different rules, different seats, or a different number of arbitrators, it will be difficult in practice to consolidate the arbitrations without significantly changing those aspects in one of the cases. In these circumstances, HKIAC will typically find the agreements to be incompatible, unless the parties can agree an acceptable compromise.”

(3) The learned authors then set out in §10.126 a number of factors relevant to the determination of compatibility:

(a) Any preconditions to the commencement of arbitration.

(b) Any required qualifications of the arbitrators (eg that an arbitrator be qualified in a particular law or discipline, or speak a particular language).

(c) The procedure for appointing arbitrators.

(d) The language of the arbitrations.

(e) The governing law of the arbitration agreements.

(f) The method for determining the fees and expenses of the tribunal.

(4) Counsel for Ps have also referred me to Article 8.1(c) of the Arbitration Rules of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre, which contains a similar requirement of “compatibility”. According to Arbitration in Singapore (2nd Ed, 2018) at §7.150:

“Parties should however, bear in mind that arbitration agreements across a suite of related contracts should be ‘compatible’ in order to maximise the chances of effective joinder and/or consolidation (where this is desired). Clauses will be considered incompatible if the difference relates to a fundamental element of the arbitration agreement: the institutional or ad hoc nature of the arbitration, the seat, the number of arbitrators, or the appointment procedure. If, on the other hand, the difference relates to a secondary element (law applicable to the merits, steps to be taken before the commencement of the procedure, etc.), the clauses will generally be considered compatible.”

至于“兼容”的含义：

（1）本庭借鉴了《牛津高阶词典》第6版中“兼容”一词的含义。从根本上说，它的意思是能够一起存在或一起使用而不产生问题。

（2）在《港仲规则指南》第二版第10.125节中，博学的编撰人对“兼容性”的含义作了如下解释：

“仲裁协议不一定要完全相同才能符合这一标准。但是，它们必须在实质上兼容。任何分歧都必须是当事人、仲裁庭和港仲可以克服的。如果合并后的案件根据其中一份或另一份基础仲裁协议进行审理并无实际区别，则会下令合并。例如，如果两份仲裁条款规定了不同的仲裁规则、不同的仲裁庭所在地或不同的仲裁员人数，实际上很难在不对其中一个案件的这些方面作出重大改变的情况下合并仲裁。在这种情况下，除非当事各方能达成可接受的折衷方案，港仲通常会认为这些协议互不兼容。”

（3）博学的编撰人随后在第10.126节中列出了与确定兼容性有关的若干因素：

(a) 启动仲裁的先决条件。

(b) 对仲裁员资格的要求（例如仲裁员必须具备特定法律或行业的资历，或懂得特定语言）。

(c) 委任仲裁员的程序。

(d) 仲裁的语言。

(e) 仲裁协议的准据法。

(f) 仲裁庭收费的决定方式。

（4）二原告方的律师还向本庭提及《新加坡国际仲裁中心仲裁规则》第8.1(c)条，其中载有类似的“兼容性”要求。根据《新加坡仲裁》（2018年第2版）第7.150节：

“然而，当事人应牢记，一系列相关合同中的仲裁协议应‘兼容’，以最大限度地增加有效合并和/或合并的机会。如果分歧涉及仲裁协议的基本要素：机构仲裁或临时仲裁、仲裁地、仲裁员人数或委任程序，则条款将被视为不兼容。反之，如果分歧涉及次要因素（适用于实体的法律、程序开始前应采取的步骤等），则这些条款通常被认为是兼容的。”

Applying these observations to the present case, my view is that since the Loan Agreement and the January Deed on the one hand and the July Deed on the other hand provide for different appointment procedures, the Arbitration Agreements are not compatible with each other.

本庭的观点是，将上述意见应用于本案，由于贷款协议、1月担保协议与7月担保协议规定了不同的委任程序，仲裁协议彼此不兼容。

My view is based on the following.

本庭的观点基于以下几点。

First, it infringes party autonomy to impose on the parties a single arbitration when the underlying Arbitration Agreements adopt different appointment procedures. This offends the cornerstone of modern international arbitration, namely, the primacy of consent as enshrined in section 3(2) of the Arbitration Ordinance. In the present case, as I have found:

(1) Under the Loan Agreement and the January Deed, Ps have contracted for the right to designate an arbitrator should any dispute arise between the parties.

(2) Had D chose to commence an arbitration under the Loan Agreement and the January Deed only, Ps could have designated Ps’ Nominated Arbitrator.

(3) In my view, Ps’ willingness to arbitrate was only premised upon Ps having a right to designate an arbitrator of their choice. Without such a right, Ps could not be said to have consented to arbitrate.

首先，在相关仲裁协议采用不同委任程序的情况下，强行采取单个仲裁会侵犯当事人的意思自治。这违反了现代国际仲裁的基石，即《仲裁条例》第3(2)条所规定的合意优先原则。在本案中，本庭发现：

(1) 根据贷款协议和1月担保协议，二原告约定，如果双方发生争议，有权指定一名仲裁员。

(2) 如果被告仅选择根据贷款协议和1月担保协议提起仲裁，那么二原告可以指定二原告提名的仲裁员。

(3) 在本庭看来，二原告愿意进行仲裁的前提是二原告有权指定自己选择的仲裁员。如果缺乏了这种权利，就不能说二原告同意仲裁。

Second, it also infringes the parties’ contractual rights:

(1) After all, the Arbitration Agreements are contracts of their own right. The parties have negotiated for and obtained such rights as they considered that would best fit their commercial interests. Having so bargained and agreed, they must be bound by their choices, whether they eventually liked it or not.

(2) In the present case, Ps have bargained for and obtained a right to designate an arbitrator under any intended arbitration arising from the Loan Agreement and the January Deed. Ps’ right is not a right shared with the Other Mortgagors, as would be the case under the July Deed.

(3) As a matter of principle, the right to designate an arbitrator cannot be curtailed by a unilateral decision on the part of a counterparty (such as D) to commence a single arbitration based on multiple contracts.

(4)  The deprivation of Ps’ contractual right is in and of itself prejudice, which is a serious issue impacting upon the integrity and sanctity of the Arbitration.

其次，单个仲裁还侵犯了当事人的合同权利：

(1) 毕竟，仲裁协议本身就是合同。双方当事人通过谈判获得了他们认为最符合其商业利益的权利。他们既然进行了讨价还价并达成了协议，那么无论最终喜欢与否，他们必须受其选择的约束。

(2) 在本案中，二原告通过讨价还价获得了在贷款协议和1月担保协议引起的任何预期仲裁中指定一名仲裁员的权利。二原告的权利并不是与其他抵押人共享的权利，但根据7月担保协议则是如此。

(3) 原则上，指定仲裁员的权利不能因交易方（如被告）单方面决定根据多份合同启动单个仲裁而受到限制。

(4) 剥夺二原告的合同权利本身就是一种损害，是影响仲裁完整性和神圣性的严重问题。

Third, there are valid concerns over whether D may gain an unfair advantage in the Arbitration by refusing Ps a right to designate an arbitrator of Ps’ choice:

(1) In this Arbitration, it is not disputed that D successfully retained the arbitrator of its own choice.

(2) Again, in the counterfactual scenario where separate arbitrations were commenced, Ps could have designated Ps’ Nominated Arbitrator. In such circumstance, Ps would have been given the same right, and hence an equal opportunity, to influence the constitution of the Tribunal.

(3) However, when D chose to commence a multiple contract arbitration, it also deprived Ps’ right to designate an arbitrator of Ps’ choice. In this sense, the parties are no longer treated equally.

(4) In my view, this gives rise to justifiable concerns over whether this would give D an unfair advantage. This impeaches the integrity of the Arbitration.

第三，有理由担心被告可藉限制二原告指定一名仲裁员的权利，以获得不公平的利益：

(1) 在本仲裁中，被告成功地保留了自己选任的仲裁员，这一点不存在争议。

(2) 同样，在分别启动仲裁的反事实情况下，二原告可以指定其提名的仲裁员。在这种情况下，二原告本应享有同样的权利，并也有同等机会影响仲裁庭的组成。

(3) 然而，当被告选择启动多重合同仲裁时，也剥夺了二原告指定自己选择的仲裁员的权利。从这个意义上说，双方不再受到平等对待。

(4) 在本庭看来，这有理由让人担心是否会给被告带来不公平的优势。这有损于仲裁的公正性。

（图片来源于网络）

In the course of arguments, D has raised a number of points against Ps’ case on the incompatibility of the Arbitration Agreements. For reasons given below, I am not convinced by these points and they do not alter my views as expressed above.

在辩论过程中，被告针对二原告关于仲裁协议彼此不兼容的理由提出了一些观点。基于以下理由，本庭对这些观点并不信服，也不会改变本庭的上述观点。

First, D contends that Ps do not in fact enjoy an absolute right of appointment under the HKIAC Rules. They merely had a right to designate an arbitrator, and this was always subject to the confirmation of the HKIAC. Whilst I agree that as a matter of general rule, parties do not have an absolute right to have their nominated arbitrator appointed, it does not mean that their express right to designate an arbitrator can be ignored, particularly in circumstances where the situation was caused by the counterparty choosing to commence a single arbitration based on multiple contracts.

首先，被告辩称，根据港仲规则，二原告事实上并不享有绝对的指定权。他们只是有权指定一名仲裁员，而这始终需要得到港仲的确认。虽然本庭同意，作为一般规则，当事人并不享有指定其提名的仲裁员的绝对权利，但这并不意味着他们指定仲裁员的明确权利可以被忽视，特别是在由于交易方选择根据多份合同启动单个仲裁而造成的情况之下，指定仲裁员的权利更不应该被忽视。

Second, it is said that Ps did not simply agree to an ad hoc arbitration. Instead, Ps agreed to an institutional arbitration to be conducted in accordance with the HKIAC Rules. D contends that provided that HKIAC has acted within its power under the rules, the parties' consent has been fully respected. However:

(1) This begs the question of whether the arbitration agreements are compatible in the first place. It is only when the arbitration agreements are compatible with each other that the parties can opt for a single arbitration under multiple contracts.

(2) For reasons given above, I consider that the Arbitration Agreements are not compatible with each other.

(3) Accordingly, it was not appropriate for D to commence a single Arbitration based on the Three Contracts in the first place. As the HKIAC Rules have not been fully observed, the parties' consent have not been fully respected.

其次，据称二原告并未简单地同意临时仲裁。相反，二原告同意按照港仲规则进行机构仲裁。被告辩称，只要港仲根据规则在其权力范围内行事，双方的合意就得到了充分尊重。然而：

(1) 这首先提出了仲裁协议是否相互兼容的问题。只有当仲裁协议相互兼容时，当事人才能在多份合同下选择单个仲裁。

(2) 基于上述论证，本庭认为仲裁协议彼此不兼容。

(3) 因此，由于港仲规则未得到充分遵守，当事人的合意也未得到充分尊重，被告首先根据三份合同提起单个仲裁并不合适。

Third, D contends that the Three Contracts are interrelated, so that parties can be taken to expect that if there were disputes, they could be resolved by the same set of dispute resolution mechanism. In relation to this:

(1) Whilst I am well aware of the possible risk of fragmentation of proceedings, and the undesirability of there being inconsistent awards, I do not consider that these case management considerations would constitute sufficient justifications to override what a party has negotiated for by way of contract.

(2) Moreover, the fact that the parties have entered into the Three Contracts which contain separate Arbitration Agreements suggests that they did not agree to have a “one stop shop” if disputes arise. As arbitration is a consensual dispute resolution mechanism, the parties must be bound by their negotiated deals. Indeed, courts have recognised the paramount importance of private consent in arbitration and warned against overzealous consolidation of arbitrations for the sake of administrative convenience (see for eg Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada & Ors v The Lincoln National Life Insurance Company [2004] EWCA Civ 1660 at §68 per Mance LJ).

(3) In any event, the fact that the Three Contracts relate to the same transaction does not necessarily mean that the Arbitration Agreements are compatible. It is trite law that arbitration agreements represent separate agreements from their underlying contracts. Hence, the fact that the Three Contracts arise from the same factual matrix is neither here nor there.

第三，被告认为，三份合同是相互关联的，因此可以认为，如果出现争议，各方当事人都希望通过同一套争议解决机制来解决。关于这一点：

(1) 虽然本庭很清楚可能会出现程序支离破碎的风险，也不希望出现裁决不一致的情况，但本庭并不认为这些案件管理方面的考虑足以构成推翻当事人通过合同谈判达成的协议的理由。

(2) 此外，双方签订的三份合同中分别包含了仲裁协议，这一事实表明，他们并未同意在出现争议时“一站式”解决”。由于仲裁是一种协商一致的争议解决机制，双方当事人必须受其协商达成的协议的约束。事实上，法院已经认识到私人合意在仲裁中的重要性，并警告不要为了行政上的便利而过分热衷于合并仲裁（例如Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada & Ors v The Lincoln National Life Insurance Company [2004] EWCA Civ 1660 at §68 per Mance LJ）。

(3) 无论如何，三份合同涉及同一交易这一事实并不一定意味着仲裁协议是兼容的。仲裁协议是独立于其基础合同的协议，这是一条老生常谈的定律。因此，三份合同产生于同一事实矩阵的事实并不相关。

Fourth, D also seeks to rely on Article 8.2(a) of the HKIAC Rules. This rule relevantly provides that where there are more than two parties to the arbitration and the dispute is to be referred to three arbitrators, then unless the parties have agreed otherwise, the group of respondents shall designate an arbitrator. D’s reliance on this rule is misplaced. The core question here is whether the threshold requirement under Article 29 has been satisfied. As explained above, it has not.

第四，被告还试图援引港仲规则第8.2(a)条。该规则的相关规定是，如果仲裁有两方以上当事人，争议将提交三名仲裁员，除非当事人另有约定，否则应由被申请人集体指定一名仲裁员。被告对这一规则的依赖是错误的。这里的核心问题是第29条规定的最低要求是否得到满足。如上文所述，并未满足。

（图片来源于网络）

Fifth, D argues that Ps should be taken to have waived their right to designate their arbitrator. In support, D has referred me to Article 28.8 of the HKIAC Rules, which provides that “[w]here HKIAC decides to consolidate two or more arbitrations, the parties to all such arbitrations shall be deemed to have waived their right to designate an arbitrator...”. However:

(1) Article 28.8 is a sub-article within Article 28. Article 28 concerns consolidation of two or more arbitrations. This is not the scenario here because the Arbitration was commenced under Article 29 as a single arbitration under multiple contracts.

(2) In any event, the waiver of rights argument does not provide a valid answer to the threshold requirement as to whether Article 29 is satisfied. Unless the Court is satisfied that the arbitration agreements are “compatible”, Article 29 is not engaged.

第五，被告辩称，二原告应被视为放弃了指定其仲裁员的权利。作为支持，被告向本庭提及港仲规则第28.8条，其中规定“当港仲决定合并两个或多个仲裁，所有这些仲裁的当事人应视为已放弃提名仲裁员的权利......”。但是：

(1)第28.8条是第28条的分条。第28条涉及两项或多项仲裁的合并。这里的情况并非如此，因为本仲裁是根据第29条作为多份合同下的单个仲裁启动的。

(2) 无论如何，放弃权利的论点并不能有效地回答是否满足第29条的门槛要求。除非法院确信仲裁协议是“兼容的”，否则第29条不适用。

In the circumstances, despite arguments to the contrary by D, I consider that the Arbitration Agreements, which contain differences as to a fundamental aspect of how the Arbitration should be conducted, are not “compatible” within the meaning of Article 29.

在这种情况下，尽管被告提出了相反的论点，但本庭认为，仲裁协议在进行仲裁的基本方面存在分歧，因此不属于第29条意义上的“兼容”。

As one of the threshold requirements under Article 29 has not been satisfied, I find that D was not entitled to commence the Arbitration in the present form as a single Arbitration based on multiple contracts. On this basis, the Interim Award is liable to be set aside.

由于第29条规定的门槛要求并未得到满足，本庭认为被告无权以目前的形式启动基于多份合同的单个仲裁。据此，临时裁决应予撤销。

Following from my ruling on the Compatibility Ground above, the Agreement Ground must also succeed.

据上述本庭对基于兼容性的论证的裁决，基于仲裁协议的论证也必然成立。

In my opinion, the composition of the Tribunal was defective. D should not have commenced a single Arbitration on the basis of multiple contracts in the first place. The Tribunal purportedly constituted under Article 29 was hence not composed in accordance with the parties' agreement.

本庭认为，仲裁庭的组成存在缺陷。被告本来就不应该在多份合同的基础上启动单个仲裁。因此，所谓根据第29条组成的仲裁庭并不符合双方的协议。

In view of the above, it is not strictly necessary for me to come to any concluded view as to whether, assuming that the July Deed should be interpreted in accordance with the first interpretation as set out in paragraph XXXX 29(4)(a) above, the Arbitration was nonetheless defective.

有鉴于此，假设7月担保协议应参考上述第XXXXX条29(4)(a)段的第一种解释，那么关于仲裁是否仍存在缺陷的问题，已无必要再作出结论性意见。

However, had it been necessary, I would have held that even in this scenario, the Arbitration is still problematic:

(1) As mentioned above, if the July Deed was not intended to change the appointment procedure, the “Borrowers” or Ps would remain to be the ones vested with the right to designate one arbitrator.

(2) In this case, consultation with, and consent from, the Other Mortgagors would not have been necessary. The Other Mortgagors’ silence would hence have been neither here nor there.

(3) In the present case, the composition of the Tribunal was made on, amongst others, the ground that the Other Mortgagors did not jointly designate an arbitrator with Ps. Accordingly, the composition of the Tribunal was not conducted in accordance with the parties’ agreement.

但是，即使有必要，本庭会认为，即使在这种情况下，仲裁仍然是有问题的：

(1) 如上所述，如果7月担保协议无意改变选任程序，那么“借款人”或二原告仍然有权指定一名仲裁员。

(2) 在这种情况下，与其他抵押人协商并征得他们的同意是没有必要的。因此，其他抵押人的沉默就不相关。

(3) 在本案中，仲裁庭是在其他抵押人并未与二原告共同指定仲裁员的情况下组成的。因此，仲裁庭的组成并未按照双方的协议进行。

For the reasons given above, I set aside the Interim Award.

基于上述论证，本庭撤销了临时裁决。

At the end of the hearing, I enquired with Counsel as to the proposed order to be made. Ps indicated that should they be successful, they would ask for an order in terms of the Originating Summons. D indicated that it had no comment on the wordings of the orders sought.

庭审结束时，本庭向律师询问了拟作出的命令。二原告表示，如果他们胜诉，他们会要求根据原讼传票作出命令。被告并未对所请求的命令的措辞表示意见。

In the premises, I make an order in terms of paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Originating Summons.

在此前提下，本庭根据原讼传票第1和第2段下达命令。

I also make a costs order nisi that the costs of and incidental to the Originating Summons (including the hearing on 9 January 2024 and all costs reserved) be paid by D to Ps with Certificate for 2 Counsel, such costs to be taxed if not agreed. The costs order nisi shall become absolute 14 days from the date of handing down of this judgment.

本庭还发出一项临时讼费令，原讼传票的讼费及附带讼费（包括2024年1月9日的庭审及所有保留讼费）由被告支付给二原告，并附有2名律师的证明书，如未达成一致，则对该等讼费进行评定。临时讼费令在本判决书下达之日起14天后生效。

I thank all Counsel for their able assistance.

感谢所有律师的得力协助。