学术动态
Husserl’s Transcendental Subjectivity, Transcendental Person, and the World
（胡塞尔超越论主体性、超越论人格和世界）
张俊国
（南开大学 哲学院）
发表期刊：International Journal of Philosophical Studies （AHCI）
作者简介
张俊国，南开大学哲学院副教授；研究方向：现象学，现象学的交叉与运用研究（现象学医学、现象学精神病理学和社会认知等）；在《哲学动态》、《世界哲学》、《现代哲学》、Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences、Human Studies、 Psychopathology、 Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy、Studies in East European Thought和International Journal of Philosophical Studies等中英文期刊上发表学术论文十余篇；主持完成国家社科基金青年项目《扬·帕托契卡著作的编译与研究》。
文章摘要
In this article, we attempt to explore Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity and its relation to the world. Our focus is on the question of whether Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity can be seen as transcendental ‘being-in-the-world,’ in response to critical examinations made by philosophers such as Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Patočka, and Biemel. While their critiques have complex implications and are subject to debate, they contribute to our understanding of the intricate relationship between transcendental subjectivity and the world. It is important to clarify that this article aims to defend Husserl’s perspective rather than provide an exhaustive analysis of the critiques. We argue that, according to Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, transcendental subjectivity is, in fact, integrated within the world’s transcendental structure. This argument is sup- ported by three main points. Firstly, Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity and its internal consciousness are not secluded but remain open and intentionally related to the external world. Secondly, Husserl clarifies the sense of transcendental ‘being-in-the-world,’ with subjective constitution revealing its sense. Lastly, Husserl proposes the notion of transcendental person as an attempt to address how transcendental subjectivity exists concretely in the life-world. This holistic perspective sought to provide a comprehensive understanding of transcendentally grounded subjectivity and its embodied existence in the world with the essential state of ‘being-in-the world.’
内容简介
在本文中，笔者尝试探讨胡塞尔的超越论主体性及其与世界的关系。笔者关注的具体问题是胡塞尔的超越论主体性是否可以被视为超越论的“在世存在”，并以此回应海德格尔、梅洛-庞蒂、帕托契卡和比梅尔等哲学家对他的批评。笔者认为，根据胡塞尔的超越论现象学，超越论主体性具有“在世存在”的独特意蕴。尽管胡塞尔没有像海德格尔一样明确使用这一表述，且二者对此理解存在差异，但是笔者认为前者试图表明超越论主体性不是脱离世界的存在，而是“在世”的——这一点尤其体现在他关于“超越论人格”的论述。为此，本文主要从三个方面展开：首先，胡塞尔的超越论主体性不是封闭的，而是对外部世界保持开放并与其保持意向性联系。其次，胡塞尔澄清了超越论的“在世存在”的意义，并通过超越论主体的构造揭示了其内涵。最后，胡塞尔提出了“超越论人格”这一概念，以尝试解决超越论主体性如何在生活世界中具体存在的问题。总的来说，本文旨在阐述超越论主体性在生活世界中的具身存在，并以超越论的“在世存在”为后续重新评价海德格尔和梅洛-庞蒂等人对胡塞尔的批评以及他们的关系提供新的视角和理路。
关键词：“在世存在”；“超越论人格”；生活世界；超越论主体性；胡塞尔
排版：徐昊玮
责编：张斯琦
编辑：马可
校对：马可
审核：张俊国
来源：哲学院研究生会学术交流部
哲学院融媒体中心 宣
