Journal of Accounting Research 2024年第3期论文 目录与摘要

01 Fraud Power Laws

EDWIGE CHEYNEL,  DAVIDE CIANCIARUSO,  FRANK S. ZHOU

02 Relative Performance Evaluation and Strategic Peer-Harming Disclosures

MATTHEW J. BLOOMFIELD,  MIRKO S. HEINLE,  OSCAR TIMMERMANS

03 Innovation and Financial Disclosure

HUI CHEN,  PIERRE JINGHONG LIANG,  EVGENY PETROV

04 What Role Do Boards Play in Companies with Visionary CEOs?

XU JIANG,  VOLKER LAUX

05 Economics of Information Search and Financial Misreporting

JUNG MIN KIM

06 The Impact of Information Frictions Within Regulators: Evidence from Workplace Safety Violations

ANEESH RAGHUNANDAN,  THOMAS G. RUCHTI

07 Bridging Theory and Empirical Research in Accounting

MATTHIAS BREUER,  EVA LABRO,  HARESH SAPRA,  ANASTASIA A. ZAKOLYUKINA

Title：

Fraud Power Laws

Author：

EDWIGE CHEYNEL,  DAVIDE CIANCIARUSO,  FRANK S. ZHOU

Abstract：

Using misstatement data, we find that the distribution of detected fraud features a heavy tail. We propose a theoretical mechanism that explains such a relatively high frequency of extreme frauds. In our dynamic model, a manager manipulates earnings for personal gain. A monitor of uncertain quality can detect fraud and punish the manager. As the monitor fails to detect fraud, the manager's posterior belief about the monitor's effectiveness decreases. Over time, the manager's learning leads to a slippery slope, in which the size of frauds grows steeply, and to a power law for detected fraud. Empirical analyses corroborate the slippery slope and the learning channel. As a policy implication, we establish that a higher detection intensity can increase fraud by enabling the manager to identify an ineffective monitor more quickly. Further, nondetection of frauds below a materiality threshold, paired with a sufficiently steep punishment scheme, can prevent large frauds.

Title：

Relative Performance Evaluation and Strategic Peer-Harming Disclosures

Author：

MATTHEW J. BLOOMFIELD,  MIRKO S. HEINLE,  OSCAR TIMMERMANS

Abstract：

Many firms use relative stock performance to evaluate and incentivize their CEOs. We document that such firms routinely disclose information that harms their peers' stock prices, and sometimes explicitly mention the harmed peers, by name, in these disclosures. Consistent with deliberate sabotage, peer-harming disclosures appear to be aimed at peers whose stock price depressions are most likely to benefit the disclosing firms' CEOs. The pricing effect of these disclosures does not reverse, suggesting that the disclosures contain legitimate information regarding peers' prospects. In sum, our results suggest that relative performance evaluation in CEO pay motivates CEOs to internalize the externalities of their disclosures, and strategically disclose information that harms peers' stock prices, in order to improve their firms' relative standing within their peer group.

Title：

Innovation and Financial Disclosure

Author：

HUI CHEN,  PIERRE JINGHONG LIANG,  EVGENY PETROV

Abstract：

We examine how financial disclosure policy affects a firm manager's strategy to innovate within a two-period bandit problem featuring two production methods: an old method with a known probability of success, and a new method with an unknown probability. Exploring the new method in the first period provides the manager with decision-useful information for the second period, thus creating a real option that is unavailable under exploiting the old known production method. Voluntary disclosure of the firm's financial performance provides the manager with another option to potentially conceal initial failure from the market. The interaction of these two options determines the manager's incentive to explore. In equilibrium, a myopic manager who cares about the interim market price may over- or under-explore compared to the optimal exploration strategy that maximizes firm value. Our analysis shows that firms operating in an environment with voluntary disclosure early in the trial stage and mandated requirement later are most motivated to explore, while firms subject to early mandated disclosure and late voluntary disclosure are least likely to do so. We also provide empirical predictions about the link between the disclosure environment and the intensity and efficiency of corporate innovation.

Title：

What Role Do Boards Play in Companies with Visionary CEOs?

Author：

XU JIANG,  VOLKER LAUX

Abstract：

Visionary CEOs have strong beliefs about the right course of action for their firms. How should a board of directors that does not necessarily share the visionary CEO's confidence advise and monitor the CEO? We consider a model in which the board can acquire costly information about the firm's optimal strategic direction. The board not only advises the CEO on strategy, but also must approve it, and the CEO exerts effort to implement the strategy. We find that the board gathers less information when the CEO believes more strongly in his vision. Further, depending on the strength of the CEO's belief bias, the board either plays an advisory role, a monitoring role, or a rubberstamping role. The model predicts that in firms that are led by highly visionary CEOs, boards are passive in that they acquire little information and rubberstamp the visionary's proposal. Nevertheless, shareholders prefer the visionary over an unbiased manager in industries in which obtaining information about the correct course of action is difficult and costly.

Title：

Economics of Information Search and Financial Misreporting

Author：

JUNG MIN KIM

Abstract：

I examine how investors’ search for different types of information affects managers’ reporting decisions. I distinguish investors’ search for information about firm fundamentals (“fundamental search”) from their search for information about managers’ incentives (“incentive search”). Based on a parsimonious model of misreporting, I predict that fundamental search reduces the earnings response coefficient, which reduces managers’ benefits from misreporting, resulting in less misreporting. In contrast, incentive search increases the earnings response coefficient, which increases the benefits from misreporting, resulting in more misreporting. I test these predictions using an empirical technique that classifies EDGAR downloads as fundamental search or incentive search. Consistent with my theoretical predictions, I find that fundamental (incentive) search is negatively (positively) related to the earnings response coefficients and intentional restatements. I confirm my findings in two distinct empirical settings where the costs of information search exogenously changed: the adoption of XBRL and the electronic filing mandate of Form 4s. Collectively, the results show that investors’ information demand can shape managers’ reporting decisions, and its effects can vary depending on the type of information investors search for.

Title：

The Impact of Information Frictions Within Regulators: Evidence from Workplace Safety Violations

Author：

ANEESH RAGHUNANDAN,  THOMAS G. RUCHTI

Abstract：

Accepted by Valeri Nikolaev. For helpful comments and suggestions, we thank an anonymous referee as well as Jason Allen, Daniel Aobdia, Salman Arif, Tim Baldenius, John Barrios, Jeremy Bertomeu, Anne Beyer, Gauri Bhat, Neil Bhattacharya, Thomas Bourveau, Bob Bowen, Matthias Breuer, Andy Call, Judson Caskey, Jivas Chakravarthy, Zhenhua Chen, Jung Ho Choi, Matt Cobabe, Hemang Desai, Lisa De Simone, Geert Dhaene, Vivian Fang, Hila Fogel-Yaari, Henry Friedman, Josh Gunn, Nicholas Hallman, Michelle Harding, Mirko Heinle, Vicky Hoffman, John Howard, Allison Koester, Eva Labro, Shelley Li, Yingru Li (discussant), Lisa Liu, Serena Loftus, Patrick Martin, Michal Matějka, Charlie McClure, Jeremy Michels (discussant), Mario Milone, Don Moser, Venky Nagar, Jim Naughton, Bugra Ozel, Reining Petacchi, Martin Quinn (discussant), Richard Saouma, Jason Schloetzer, Bin Srinidhi, Anup Srivastava, Kristin Stack (discussant), Lorien Stice-Lawrence (discussant), Siew Hong Teoh, Sorabh Tomar, Ayung Tseng, Ramgopal Venkataraman, Malcolm Wardlaw, Katrin Weiskirchner-Merten, Erina Ytsma, and Rong Zhao. We also thank workshop and conference participants at the 2023 JAR conference, Chapman University, Columbia University, Dartmouth College, Georgetown University, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Indian School of Business, Kingston University, LSE, McMaster University, University of Minnesota, Singapore Management University, Southern Methodist University, UCLA, UC Riverside, University of Calgary, University of Pittsburgh, University of San Diego, UT Arlington, Virginia Tech, the AES Webinar, the 2021 AAA Annual Meeting, the Early Insights in Accounting Webinar, the 2021 Zurich ARW, the 2021 International Industrial Organization Conference, the 2021 Annual Conference for Managerial Accounting Research, the 2023 Management Accounting Section Midyear Meeting, and the 2021 UNT Accounting Research Conference. We thank Rich Puchalsky for assistance in matching OSHA data to Compustat. For institutional insight, we would like to give special thanks to six current and former OSHA compliance officers, including the former director of a state OSHA office, who wish to remain anonymous. This project was approved by LSE's Research Ethics Committee (Ref: 29570). Any errors are our own.

Title：

Bridging Theory and Empirical Research in Accounting

Author：

MATTHIAS BREUER,  EVA LABRO,  HARESH SAPRA,  ANASTASIA A. ZAKOLYUKINA

Abstract：

Formal theory and empirical research are complementary in building and advancing the body of knowledge in accounting in order to understand real-world phenomena. We offer thoughts on opportunities for empiricists and theorists to collaborate, build on each other's work, and iterate over models and data to make progress. For empiricists, we see room for more descriptive work, more experimental work on testing formal theories, and more work on quantifying theoretical parameters. For theorists, we see room for theories explicitly tied to descriptive evidence, new theories on individuals' decision making in a data-rich world, theories focused on accounting institutions and measurement issues, and richer theories for guiding empirical work and providing practical insights. We also encourage explicitly combining formal theory and empirical models by having both in one paper and by structural estimation.

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