期刊名称：Journal of Political Economy
本期期卷：Volume 132,Number 11
刊出日期：November 2024
目录
01 Growth Off the Rails: Aggregate Productivity Growth in Distorted Economies
Richard Hornbeck and Martin Rotemberg
02 Safe Assets
Markus K. Brunnermeier,Sebastian Merkel, and Yuliy Sannikov
03 Private Monopoly and Restricted Entry—Evidence from the Notary Profession
Frank Verboven and Biliana Yontcheva
04 Efficient Allocation of Indivisible Goods in Pseudomarkets with Constraints
Faruk Gul,Wolfgang Pesendorfer, and Mu Zhang
05 Inferring Trade-Offs in University Admissions: Evidence from Cambridge
Debopam Bhattacharya and Julia Shvets
06 Cadasters and Economic Growth: A Long-Run Cross-Country Panel
Michelle D’Arcy,Marina Nistotskaya, and Ola Olsson
07 Regulation of Organ Transplantation and Procurement: A Market-Design Lab Experiment
Alex Chan and Alvin E. Roth
08 The Network Origins of Entry
Arthur Campbell,Philip Ushchev, and Yves Zenou
# 01 #
Title：
Growth Off the Rails: Aggregate Productivity Growth in Distorted Economies
Author：
Richard Hornbeck and Martin Rotemberg
Abstract：
We examine aggregate economic gains in the United States as the railroad network expanded in the nineteenth century. Using data from the Census of Manufactures, we estimate relative increases in county aggregate productivity from relative increases in county market access. In general equilibrium, we find that the railroads substantially increased national aggregate productivity. By accounting for input distortions, we estimate much larger aggregate economic gains from the railroads than previous estimates. Our estimates highlight how broadly-used infrastructure or technologies can have much larger economic impacts when there are inefficiencies in the economy.
# 02 #
Title：
Safe Assets
Author：
Markus K. Brunnermeier,Sebastian Merkel, and Yuliy Sannikov
Abstract：
The price of a safe asset reflects not only the expected discounted future cash flows but also future service flows, since retrading allows partial insurance of idiosyncratic risk in an incomplete markets setting. This lowers the issuers’ interest burden. As idiosyncratic risk rises during recessions, so does the value of the service flows bestowing the safe asset with a negative β. The resulting exorbitant privilege resolves government debt valuation puzzles and allows the government to run a permanent (primary) deficit without ever paying back its debt, but the government faces a debt Laffer curve.
# 03 #
Title：
Private Monopoly and Restricted Entry—Evidence from the Notary Profession
Author：
Frank Verboven and Biliana Yontcheva
Abstract：
We study entry restrictions in a private monopoly: the Latin notary system. Under this widespread system, the state grants notaries exclusive rights to certify important economic transactions, including real estate. To uncover the current policy goals behind the geographic entry restrictions, we develop an empirical entry model that incorporates a spatial demand model and a multioutput production model. We find that the entry restrictions serve primarily producer interests and give only a small weight to consumer surplus. We show how reform would generate considerable welfare improvements and imply a substantial redistribution toward consumers without threatening geographic coverage.
# 04 #
Title：
Efficient Allocation of Indivisible Goods in Pseudomarkets with Constraints
Author：
Faruk Gul,Wolfgang Pesendorfer, and Mu Zhang
Abstract：
We provide conditions under which a market mechanism can be used to allocate indivisible goods efficiently. We consider an economy with no transfers and show the existence and efficiency of Walrasian equilibria in the corresponding pseudomarket with stochastic consumption. We demonstrate that constraints on minimum and maximum levels of individual consumption and aggregate constraints of the kind that are relevant in combinatorial allocation problems can be accommodated either by incorporating these constraints into individual preferences or by specifying a suitable production technology.
# 05 #
Title：
Inferring Trade-Offs in University Admissions: Evidence from Cambridge
Author：
Debopam Bhattacharya and Julia Shvets
Abstract：
How do elite universities balance diversity and academics during admissions? We develop a theory-based empirical framework to identify and quantify this potential trade-off, using postentry outcomes. We apply this to matched admission and exam-performance data from Cambridge. Comparing first- versus second-round admits from different demographic groups yields bounds on the trade-off magnitude, which (a) hold irrespective of whether we observe all applicant characteristics and (b) require no information on rejected applicants. We find robust evidence of trade-off between gender balance and future performance in math-intensive subjects but not for state/private school students or for gender in competitive nonmathematical disciplines.
# 06 #
Title：
Cadasters and Economic Growth: A Long-Run Cross-Country Panel
Author：
Michelle D’Arcy,Marina Nistotskaya, and Ola Olsson
Abstract：
Cadasters are public records of land ownership that facilitate clear assignment of property rights and land demarcation, thereby reducing transaction costs for economic agents and strengthening the state’s capacity to tax. Macro-level research on the evolution of formal land registration has largely been lacking. Using a novel dataset on the emergence and development of state-administered cadasters in 159 countries over the past millennium, we analyze empirically the association between the development of cadastral institutions and long-run economic growth. Our findings suggest a substantive positive effect of the introduction of cadasters on modern per capita income levels.
# 07 #
Title：
Regulation of Organ Transplantation and Procurement: A Market-Design Lab Experiment
Author：
Alex Chan and Alvin E. Roth
Abstract：
We conduct a lab experiment that shows that current rules regulating transplant centers (TCs) and organ-procurement organizations (OPOs) create perverse incentives that inefficiently reduce both organ recovery and beneficial transplantations. We model the decision environment with a two-player multiround game between an OPO and a TC. In the condition that simulates current rules, OPOs recover only the highest-quality kidneys and forgo valuable recovery opportunities, and TCs decline some beneficial transplants. Alternative regulations that reward TCs and OPOs together for health outcomes in their entire patient pool lead to behaviors that increase organ recovery and appropriate transplants.
# 08 #
Title：
The Network Origins of Entry
Author：
Arthur Campbell,Philip Ushchev, and Yves Zenou
Abstract：
We develop a model of market entry under social learning through word of mouth (WOM). The success of an entrant depends on consumer awareness generated via WOM, modeled as a percolation process on a random graph. The likelihood of an entrant gaining significant awareness depends on network structure, characterized by the first three factorial moments of the degree distribution. We identify three pricing equilibria: blockaded, deterred, and accommodated entry. The model demonstrates that increased network density can shift equilibria from blockaded to deterred and eventually to accommodated entry. Numerical simulations suggest that consumer surplus may be nonmonotonic with respect to network density. Additionally, if incumbents can charge personalized prices based on consumers' connectivity, they may optimally set lower prices for highly connected consumers.
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