弗朗西斯·福山:自由主义在美国的衰败 | 中英文对照

文摘   2024-11-11 14:41   美国  


Fukuyama, F. (2024, November 8). What Trump unleashed means for America. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/f4dbc0df-ab0d-431e-9886-44acd4236922

The blowout victory of Donald Trump and the Republican party on Tuesday night will lead to major changes in important policy areas, from immigration to Ukraine. But the significance of the election extends way beyond these specific issues, and represents a decisive rejection by American voters of liberalism and the particular way that the understanding of a “free society” has evolved since the 1980s.


唐纳德·特朗普和共和党在周二晚上的压倒性胜利将导致在重要政策领域的重大变化,从移民到乌克兰。但此次选举的意义远远超出了这些具体问题,代表了美国选民对自由主义及自1980年代以来“自由社会”理解方式的明确拒绝。


When Trump was first elected in 2016, it was easy to believe that this event was an aberration. He was running against a weak opponent who didn’t take him seriously, and in any case Trump didn’t win the popular vote. When Biden won the White House four years later, it seemed as if things had snapped back to normal after a disastrous one-term presidency.


当特朗普在2016年首次当选时,很容易相信这一事件是一个异常。他当时的对手很弱,没人认真对待他,而且无论如何特朗普也没有赢得普选票。四年后拜登赢得白宫,看起来在一个灾难性的单任期总统之后,事情似乎恢复了正常。


Following Tuesday’s vote, it now seems that it was the Biden presidency that was the anomaly, and that Trump is inaugurating a new era in US politics and perhaps for the world as a whole. Americans were voting with full knowledge of who Trump was and what he represented. Not only did he win a majority of votes and is projected to take every single swing state, but the Republicans retook the Senate and look like holding on to the House of Representatives. Given their existing dominance of the Supreme Court, they are now set to hold all the major branches of government.


在周二的投票之后,现在看来拜登的总统任期是一个异常,而特朗普正在开启美国政治乃至整个世界的新纪元。美国人投票时充分了解特朗普是谁以及他代表什么。他不仅赢得了大多数选票,预计还将赢得每一个摇摆州,共和党重新夺回了参议院,并有望保住众议院。鉴于他们对最高法院的现有支配地位,他们现在将掌控政府的所有主要分支。


But what is the underlying nature of this new phase of American history?


但这美国历史新阶段的根本性质是什么?


Classical liberalism is a doctrine built around respect for the equal dignity of individuals through a rule of law that protects their rights, and through constitutional checks on the state’s ability to interfere with those rights. But over the past half century that basic impulse underwent two great distortions. The first was the rise of “neoliberalism”, an economic doctrine that sanctified markets and reduced the ability of governments to protect those hurt by economic change. The world got a lot richer in the aggregate, while the working class lost jobs and opportunity. Power shifted away from the places that hosted the original industrial revolution to Asia and other parts of the developing world.


古典自由主义是一种基于尊重个人平等尊严的原则,通过保护个人权利的法治,以及通过宪法对国家干预权力的制衡来构建的教义。但在过去半个世纪中,这一基本冲动经历了两次严重的扭曲。首先是“新自由主义”的兴起,这是一种神圣化市场并减少政府保护那些因经济变化而受害者能力的经济教义。总体上世界变得更富裕,而工人阶级则失去了工作和机会。权力从最初工业革命的发源地转移到了亚洲和其他发展中国家。


The second distortion was the rise of identity politics or what one might call “woke liberalism”, in which progressive concern for the working class was replaced by targeted protections for a narrower set of marginalised groups: racial minorities, immigrants, sexual minorities and the like. State power was increasingly used not in the service of impartial justice, but rather to promote specific social outcomes for these groups.


第二次扭曲是身份政治的兴起,或者可以称之为“觉醒自由主义”,其中对工人阶级的进步关注被对一小部分边缘群体的有针对性的保护所取代:族裔少数群体、移民、性少数群体等。国家权力越来越多地不再用于公正正义,而是用于促进这些群体的特定社会成果。


In the meantime, labour markets were shifting into an information economy. In a world in which most workers sat in front of a computer screen rather than lifted heavy objects off factory floors, women experienced a more equal footing. This transformed power within households and led to the perception of a seemingly constant celebration of female achievement.


与此同时,劳动力市场正在向信息经济转变。在一个大多数工人坐在电脑屏幕前而不是在工厂地板上搬运重物的世界里,女性享有了更平等的地位。这改变了家庭内部的权力结构,并导致了对女性成就似乎在不断庆祝的看法。


The rise of these distorted understandings of liberalism drove a major shift in the social basis of political power. The working class felt that leftwing political parties were no longer defending their interests, and began voting for parties of the right. Thus the Democrats lost touch with their working-class base and became a party dominated by educated urban professionals. The former chose to vote Republican. In Europe, Communist party voters in France and Italy defected to Marine Le Pen and Giorgia Meloni.


这些扭曲的自由主义理解的兴起推动了政治权力社会基础的重大转变。工人阶级觉得左翼政党不再维护他们的利益,开始投票支持右翼政党。因此,民主党失去了与工人阶级基础的联系,成为一个由受过教育的城市专业人士主导的政党。前者选择投票给共和党。在欧洲,法国和意大利的共产党选民转而支持玛丽娜·勒庞和乔治娅·梅洛尼。


All of these groups were unhappy with a free-trade system that eliminated their livelihoods even as it created a new class of super-rich, and were unhappy as well with progressive parties that seemingly cared more for foreigners and the environment than their own condition.


所有这些群体都对自由贸易体系感到不满,尽管它消除了他们的生计,却创造了一个新的超级富豪阶层,他们也对进步党感到不满,因为这些党派似乎更关心外国人和环境,而不是他们自己的状况。


These big sociological changes were reflected in voting patterns on Tuesday. The Republican victory was built around white working-class voters, but Trump succeeded in peeling off significantly more Black and Hispanic working-class voters compared with the 2020 election. This was especially true of the male voters within these groups. For them, class mattered more than race or ethnicity. There is no particular reason why a working-class Latino, for example, should be particularly attracted to a woke liberalism that favours recent undocumented immigrants and focuses on advancing the interests of women.


这些重大的社会学变化反映在了周二的投票模式中。共和党的胜利是建立在白人工人阶级选民基础上的,但与2020年大选相比,特朗普成功地吸引了更多的黑人和西班牙裔工人阶级选民。对于这些群体中的男性选民尤其如此。对他们来说,阶级比种族或族裔更重要。例如,没有特别的理由说明一个工人阶级的拉丁裔为什么会特别被偏爱最近非法移民并关注妇女利益的觉醒自由主义所吸引。


It is also clear that the vast majority of working-class voters simply did not care about the threat to the liberal order, both domestic and international, posed specifically by Trump.同样清楚的是,绝大多数工人阶级选民根本不关心特朗普对国内外自由秩序构成的威胁。


Donald Trump not only wants to roll back neoliberalism and woke liberalism, but is a major threat to classical liberalism itself. This threat is visible across any number of policy issues; a new Trump presidency will not look anything like his first term. The real question at this point is not the malignity of his intentions, but rather his ability to actually carry out what he threatens. Many voters simply don’t take his rhetoric seriously, while mainstream Republicans argue that the checks and balances of the American system will prevent him from doing his worst. This is a mistake: we should take his stated intentions very seriously.


唐纳德·特朗普不仅想要回滚新自由主义和觉醒自由主义,他本身也是对古典自由主义的重大威胁。这种威胁在许多政策问题上都很明显;新的特朗普总统任期将与他的第一个任期截然不同。目前真正的问题不是他意图的恶意,而是他实际执行其威胁的能力。许多选民根本不当真他的言辞,而主流共和党人则认为美国制度的制衡机制将阻止他做出最坏的事情。这是一个错误:我们应该非常认真地对待他所宣称的意图。


Trump is a self-proclaimed protectionist, who says that “tariff” is the most beautiful word in the English language. He has proposed 10 or 20 per cent tariffs against all goods produced abroad, by friends and enemies alike, and does not need the authority of Congress to do so.


特朗普自称是保护主义者,他说“关税”是英语中最美丽的词汇。他提出对所有国外生产的商品,无论是朋友还是敌人,都征收10%或20%的关税,并且不需要国会的授权来这样做。


As a large number of economists have pointed out, this level of protectionism will have extremely negative effects on inflation, productivity and employment. It will be hugely disruptive of supply chains, which will lead domestic producers to request exemptions from what amount to heavy taxes. This then provides the opportunity for high levels of corruption and favouritism as companies rush to get on the president’s good side. Tariffs on this level also invite equally massive retaliation by other countries, setting up a situation in which trade (and therefore incomes) collapse. Perhaps Trump will back off in the face of this; he may also respond as former Argentine president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner did by corrupting the statistical agency reporting the bad news.


正如大量经济学家所指出的,这种程度的保护主义将对通货膨胀、生产力和就业产生极其负面的影响。它将极大地扰乱供应链,导致国内生产商要求从重税中获得豁免。这为公司急于讨好总统提供了高水平腐败和偏袒的机会。这种程度的关税也会引发其他国家同样大规模的报复,造成贸易(因此收入)的崩溃。也许特朗普会在面对这种情况时退缩;他也可能像前阿根廷总统克里斯蒂娜·费尔南德斯·德基什内尔那样,通过腐败报告不利消息的统计机构来应对。


With regard to immigration, Trump no longer simply wants to close the border; he wants to deport as many of the 11mn undocumented immigrants already in the country as possible. Administratively, this is such a huge task that it will require years of investment in the infrastructure needed to carry it out — detention centres, immigration control agents, courts and so on.


在移民方面,特朗普不再只是想关闭边境;他想尽可能驱逐国内已有的1100万非法移民。在行政上,这是一项如此庞大的任务,需要多年投资于执行所需的基础设施——拘留中心、移民控制人员、法院等等。


It will have devastating effects on any number of industries that rely on immigrant labour, particularly construction and agriculture. It will also be monumentally challenging in moral terms, as parents are taken away from their citizen children, and would set the scene for civil conflict, since many of the undocumented live in blue jurisdictions that will do what they can to prevent Trump from getting his way.


这将对依赖移民劳动力的许多行业,尤其是建筑和农业,产生毁灭性的影响。在道德层面上,这也将是巨大的挑战,因为父母被从他们的公民子女身边带走,并且这将为内战冲突设置舞台,因为许多非法移民生活在蓝区,他们会尽一切努力阻止特朗普达成他的目的。


With regard to the rule of law, Trump during this campaign has been singularly focused on seeking revenge for the injustices he believes he has suffered at the hands of his critics. He has vowed to use the justice system to go after everyone from Liz Cheney and Joe Biden to former Joint Chiefs of Staff chair Mark Milley and Barack Obama. He wants to silence media critics by taking away their licences or imposing penalties on them.


在法治方面,特朗普在此次竞选中极度关注为他认为自己在批评者手中遭受的不公正寻求报复。他发誓要利用司法系统追捕包括丽兹·切尼、乔·拜登、前参谋长联席会议主席马克·米利和巴拉克·奥巴马在内的所有人。他想通过取消媒体批评者的执照或对他们施加处罚来让他们沉默。


Whether Trump will have the power to do any of this is uncertain: the court system was one of the most resilient barriers to his excesses during his first term. But the Republicans have been working steadily to insert sympathetic justices into the system, such as Judge Aileen Cannon in Florida, who threw out the strong classified documents case against him.


特朗普是否有能力做到这一点尚不确定:在他的第一个任期内,法院系统是对他过度行为最有弹性的屏障之一。但共和党人一直在稳步地在系统中插入同情的法官,例如佛罗里达州的艾琳·坎农法官,她驳回了对他的强硬机密文件案件。


Some of the most important changes will come in foreign policy and in the nature of the international order. Ukraine is by far the biggest loser; its military struggle against Russia was flagging even before the election, and Trump can force it to settle on Russia’s terms by withholding weapons, as the Republican House did for six months last winter. Trump has privately threatened to pull out of Nato, but even if he doesn’t, he can gravely weaken the alliance by failing to follow through on its Article 5 mutual defence guarantee. There are no European champions that can take the place of America as the alliance’s leader, so its future ability to stand up to Russia and China is in grave doubt. On the contrary, Trump’s victory will inspire other European populists such as the Alternative for Germany and the National Rally in France.


一些最重要的变化将出现在外交政策和国际秩序的性质上。乌克兰无疑是最大的输家;在选举前,对抗俄罗斯的军事斗争已经疲软,特朗普可以通过扣留武器迫使其按照俄罗斯的条件解决,正如共和党众议院去年冬天那样。特朗普私下里威胁要退出北约,但即使他不这样做,他也可以通过未能执行其第5条相互防卫保证来严重削弱该联盟。没有欧洲的领袖能够取代美国成为联盟的领导者,因此其未来站稳对抗俄罗斯和中国的能力令人严重怀疑。相反,特朗普的胜利将激励其他欧洲民粹主义者,如德国的“德国选择”和法国的“国民集会”。


East Asian allies and friends of the US are in no better position. ________. Trump seems congenitally averse to the use of military power and is easily manipulated, but one exception may be the Middle East, where he is likely to be wholeheartedly supportive of Benjamin Netanyahu’s wars against Hamas, Hizbollah and Iran.


美国的东亚盟友和朋友们的处境也不见好转。________。特朗普似乎天生不喜欢使用军事力量,且容易被操纵,但中东可能是一个例外,他可能会全力支持本杰明·内塔尼亚胡对抗哈马斯、真主党和伊朗的战争。


There are strong reasons for thinking that Trump will be much more effective in accomplishing this agenda than he was during his first term. He and the Republicans have recognised that policy implementation is all about personnel. When he was first elected in 2016, he did not come into office surrounded by a coterie of policy aides; rather, he had to rely on establishment Republicans.


有充分的理由认为,特朗普在实现这一议程方面将比他第一个任期更为有效。他和共和党人已经认识到,政策的实施完全取决于人员安排。2016年首次当选时,他并没有被一群政策顾问包围;相反,他不得不依赖建制派共和党人。


In many cases, they blocked, deflected or slow-walked his orders. At the end of his term, he issued an executive order creating a new “Schedule F” that would strip all federal workers of their job protections and allow him to fire any bureaucrat he wanted. A revival of Schedule F is at the core of the plans for a second Trump term, and conservatives have been busy compiling lists of potential officials whose main qualification is personal loyalty to Trump. This is why he is more likely to carry out his plans this time around.


在许多情况下,他们阻碍、偏转或拖延了他的命令。在他的任期结束时,他签署了一项行政命令,创建了新的“F类计划”,这将剥夺所有联邦工作人员的工作保护,并允许他解雇任何他想解雇的官僚。恢复“F类计划”是特朗普第二个任期计划的核心,共和党保守派一直在忙于编制潜在官员的名单,这些官员的主要资格是对特朗普的个人忠诚。这就是他这次更有可能实施他的计划的原因。


Prior to the election, critics including Kamala Harris accused Trump of being a fascist. This was misguided insofar as he was not about to implement a totalitarian regime in the US. Rather, there would be a gradual decay of liberal institutions, much as occurred in Hungary after Viktor Orbán’s return to power in 2010.


在选举前,包括卡马拉·哈里斯在内的批评者指责特朗普是个法西斯。这是错误的,因为他并不打算在美国实施极权政权。相反,自由制度将会逐渐衰败,就像2010年维克托·欧尔班重返权力后在匈牙利发生的情况一样。


This decay has already started, and Trump has done substantial damage. He has deepened an already substantial polarisation within society, and turned the US from a high-trust to a low-trust society; he has demonised the government and weakened belief that it represents the collective interests of Americans; he has coarsened political rhetoric and given permission for overt expressions of bigotry and misogyny; and he has convinced a majority of Republicans that his predecessor was an illegitimate president who stole the 2020 election.


这种衰败已经开始,特朗普造成了实质性的损害。他加深了社会中已经相当严重的两极分化,使美国从一个高信任度社会转变为低信任度社会;他妖魔化了政府,削弱了人们对政府代表美国人集体利益的信念;他粗俗化了政治言辞,并允许公开表达偏执和厌女情绪;他让大多数共和党人相信他的前任是一个窃取2020年选举的非法总统。


The breadth of the Republican victory, extending from the presidency to the Senate and probably to the House of Representatives as well, will be interpreted as a strong political mandate confirming these ideas and allowing Trump to act as he pleases. We can only hope that some of the remaining institutional guardrails will remain in place as he takes office. But it may be that things will have to get a lot worse before they get better.


共和党胜利的广度,从总统职位延伸到参议院,可能还包括众议院,将被解读为一个强有力的政治授权,确认了这些理念并允许特朗普随心所欲地行事。我们只能希望,在他就任后,剩余的一些制度性保护措施仍然存在。但也可能在情况好转之前,事情必须变得更糟糕。


Francis Fukuyama is a senior fellow at Stanford’s Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, and author most recently of ‘Liberalism and Its Discontents’.

弗朗西斯·福山是斯坦福大学民主、发展与法治中心的高级研究员,最近的著作是《自由主义及其不满》。


知经Knowecon
北京大学经济学金融学统计学考研核心速通。
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