Ray Dalio 最新雄文：论大国成败与债务大周期，国家是如何破产的！How Countries Go Broke

文章全文对译如下，大家拨冗垂阅。

导言

Are there limits to a country’s’ debt and debt growth?

一个国家的债务和债务增长是否有限度？

What will happen to interest rates and all that they affect if government debt growth isn’t slowed?

如果政府债务增长不放缓，利率及其影响会发生什么变化？

Can a big, important country that has a major reserve currency like the US go broke—and, if so, what would that look like?

像美国这样拥有主要储备货币的重要大国会破产吗？

Is there such a thing as a “Big Debt Cycle” that we can track that will tell us when to worry about debt and what to do about it?

有没有一种 "大债务周期 "可以让我们追踪，告诉我们何时该担心债务问题，以及该如何应对？

These aren’t just academic questions for academic economists. They are questions that investors, policy makers, and most everyone must answer because the answers will have huge effects on all our well-beings and what we should do. But definitive answers don’t currently exist.

这些问题不仅仅是经济学家的学术问题。它们是投资者、政策制定者和大多数人都必须回答的问题，因为答案将对我们所有人的福祉和我们应该做什么产生巨大影响。但目前还没有确切的答案。

At this time, some people believe that there isn't any limit to government debt and debt growth, especially if a country has a reserve currency. That’s because they believe that the central bank of a reserve currency country that has its money widely accepted around the world can always print the money to service its debts. Others believe that the high levels of debt and rapid debt growth are harbingers of a big debt crisis on the horizon, but they do not know exactly how and when the crisis will come—or what its impacts will be.

目前，有些人认为政府债务和债务增长没有任何限制，尤其是如果一个国家拥有储备货币。这是因为他们认为，一个储备货币国家的中央银行，如果其货币被全世界广泛接受，就可以随时印制钞票来偿还债务。

另一些人则认为，高额债务和债务的快速增长预示着一场巨大的债务危机即将来临，但他们并不清楚这场危机将以何种方式、在何时爆发，也不知道它将带来怎样的影响。

And what about the big, long-term debt cycle? While the “business cycle” is widely acknowledged and some people recognize that it is driven by a short-term debt cycle, that is not true for the big, long-term debt cycle. Nobody acknowledges it or talks about it. I couldn’t find any good studies or descriptions of it in textbooks, and even the world’s leading economists—including those who are now running, or in the past ran, central banks and government Treasuries—didn’t have much to say about this critically important subject when I explored it with them. That is why I did this study and am passing it along.

那么，长期的大债务周期呢？虽然 "商业周期 "已得到广泛认可，一些人也认识到它是由短期债务周期驱动的，但长期大债务周期却并非如此。

没有人承认它，也没有人谈论它。我在教科书中找不到关于它的任何好的研究或描述，甚至世界顶尖的经济学家--包括那些现在或过去管理中央银行和政府国库的经济学家--在我与他们探讨这个至关重要的问题时，他们也没有太多的发言权。

这就是为什么我做了这项研究，并把它传递给大家。

Before I get into all that, I should begin by explaining where I’m coming from. I don’t come to this subject as an economist. I come as a global macro investor who for over 50 years has been through many debt cycles in many countries and has had to navigate and understand them well enough to bet on how they would go. I have carefully studied all the big debt cycles over the last 100 years, and superficially studied many more from the past 500 years, so I believe that I understand how to navigate them. Because I am now deeply concerned, I feel a responsibility to pass along this study for others to assess for themselves.

在谈这些之前，我首先要解释一下我的出发点。我不是以经济学家的身份来谈这个问题的。

50 多年来，我作为一名全球宏观投资者，经历了许多国家的多次债务周期，对这些周期有了足够的了解和把握，从而可以对这些周期的走势下注。

我仔细研究了过去 100 年的所有大债务周期，并肤浅地研究了过去 500 年的更多债务周期，因此我相信我了解如何驾驭这些周期。因为我现在深感忧虑，所以我觉得有责任把这项研究传递给其他人，让他们自己去评估。

To gain my understanding, I look at many cases like a doctor studies many cases, examining the mechanics behind them to understand the cause/effect relationships that drive their progressions. I also learn from being in these experiences, reflecting on what I learn, writing it up, and having smart people read and challenge it. Then I build systems to place my bets on what I learned and have new experiences. I do that over and over and will do it until I die because I love it. Because my game has been to bet on the markets and because the debt markets drive just about everything, I have been obsessed with studying debt dynamics for decades. I believe that if you understand these dynamics, you can do very well as an investor, businessperson, or policy maker, and if you don’t, you ultimately will be hurt by them.

为了获得我的理解，我像医生研究许多病例一样研究许多病例，检查它们背后的机理，以了解推动它们发展的因果关系。

我还从这些经历中学习，反思我学到的东西，把它写出来，让聪明人阅读并提出质疑。然后，我建立系统，把赌注押在我学到的东西上，并获得新的体验。我一次又一次地这样做，直到我死去，因为我喜欢这样做。

因为我的游戏就是在市场上下注，而且债务市场几乎驱动了一切，所以几十年来我一直痴迷于研究债务动态。我相信，如果你了解这些动态，作为投资者、商人或政策制定者，你就能做得很好；如果你不了解，你最终会受到这些动态的伤害。

Through my research, I discovered that there are big, long-term debt cycles that have unfailingly led to big debt bubbles and busts. I saw that only about 20% of the roughly 750 currency/debt markets that have existed since 1700 remain and that all these remaining ones have been severely devalued through the mechanistic process I am going to describe in this study. I saw how this big, long-term debt cycle was described in the Old Testament, how it repeatedly played out in Chinese dynasties over thousands of years, and how time and again it has foreshadowed the fall of empires, countries, and provinces.

通过研究，我发现存在着长期的债务大循环，这些循环无一例外地导致了巨大的债务泡沫和破产。

我看到，自 1700 年以来存在的大约 750 个货币/债务市场中，只有大约 20% 还存在，而所有这些剩余的市场都通过我将在本研究中描述的机制过程严重贬值。

我看到了《旧约全书》是如何描述这种长期的债务大循环的，几千年来它是如何在王朝中反复上演的，以及它是如何一次又一次地预示着帝国、国家和省份的衰落。

These Big Debt Cycles have always worked in timeless and universally consistent ways that are not well understood but should be. In this study, I hope to explain how they work with such clarity that my description will serve as a template that can be used to see what is going on with, and what is likely to happen to, money and debt. While I recognize that the Big Debt Cycle template I will describe has not previously been vetted, I am confident it exists because I have made a lot of money using it to bet on how things would go. I am passing it along because I am now at a stage of life in which I want to share what I have learned that I have found of value. You can do what you like with it.

这些 "大债务周期 "总是以永恒的、普遍一致的方式发挥作用，虽然人们还不太了解，但应该了解。

在本研究中，我希望能够清晰地解释它们的运作方式，使我的描述能够成为一个模板，用于了解金钱和债务正在发生什么以及可能发生什么。

虽然我知道我所描述的大债务周期模板以前没有经过审核，但我相信它是存在的，因为我用它来赌事情会如何发展，赚了很多钱。我把它传给大家，是因为我现在正处于人生的一个阶段，我想分享我学到的、我认为有价值的东西。你们可以随意使用它。

Why do I think I understand something that others don’t? I theorize that this is for a few reasons. First, this dynamic is not widely understood because big, long-term debt cycles typically last about one lifetime—roughly 80 years (give or take 25 years)—so we don’t get to learn about them through experience. Second, because we focus so much on what is happening to us at the time it is happening, people overlook the big picture. I also think there are biases against being concerned about too much debt because most people like the spending ability that credit gives them, and it is also true that there have been many warnings about pending debt crises that never happened. Memories of big debt crises like the 2008 global financial crisis and the European debt crisis of the PIIGS countries (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain) have faded, and since we have gotten past them, many people assume that policy makers learned how to manage them rather than view these cases as early warnings of bigger crises on the horizon. But whatever the reason, it doesn’t matter exactly why these dynamics are overlooked. I am going to paint a picture of what happens and why, and if there is enough interest in what I’m saying, my template will be assessed and will live or die on its merits.

为什么我认为我理解的东西别人不理解？

我认为有几个原因。

首先，这种动态并没有被广泛理解，因为长期的大债务周期通常持续一生--大约 80 年（25 年左右）--所以我们没有机会通过经验来了解它们。

其次，由于我们过于关注当时发生在我们身上的事情，人们忽略了全局。

我还认为，人们对债务过多的担忧存在偏见，因为大多数人都喜欢信贷赋予他们的消费能力，而且也确实有许多关于债务危机即将来临的警告从未发生过。人们对 2008 年全球金融危机和欧洲 PIIGS 国家（葡萄牙、意大利、爱尔兰、希腊和西班牙）债务危机等大型债务危机的记忆已经淡去，而且由于我们已经度过了这些危机，许多人认为决策者学会了如何管理这些危机，而不是将这些案例视为更大危机即将来临的预警。

但不管是什么原因，这些动态被忽视的确切原因并不重要。我要描绘的是发生了什么以及为什么会发生，如果人们对我说的话有足够的兴趣，我的模板就会得到评估，并将根据其优缺点决定生死。

That leads me to a principle:

这让我想到了一个原则：

If we don’t agree on how things work, we won’t be able to agree on what’s happening or what is likely to happen. For that reason, I need to lay out my picture of how the machine works and try to triangulate with you and other knowledgeable people about it before moving on to look at what’s happening and what might happen.

如果我们不能就事物的工作原理达成一致，我们就无法就正在发生的事情或可能发生的事情达成一致。

因此，我需要先阐述我对机器工作原理的理解，并尝试与您和其他知识渊博的人进行多方讨论，然后再探讨正在发生的事情和可能发生的事情。

At a time when government debt is large and increasing rapidly, it seems to me dangerously negligent to assume that this time will be different from other times without first studying how other cases transpired. It would be like assuming that we will never have a civil war or world war again because they haven’t happened before in our lifetimes without studying the mechanics that brought them about in the past. (By the way, I believe that both the civil war and world war dynamics are also going on today.) As in my other books,[1] I will create a description of the archetypical dynamic and then look at how and why different cases transpired differently so that one can track current cases relative to the template and put into context what’s happening and what’s likely to happen. In that way, you will both see many cases of this happening and get a peek into the future. Comparing what is happening with that template leads me to believe that we are heading into one of those cases in which central governments and central banks will “go broke” in the ways that have happened hundreds of times before and have had big political and geopolitical consequences.

在政府债务庞大且快速增长的今天，如果不首先研究其他情况是如何发生的，就认为这次与以往不同，在我看来是一种危险的疏忽。这就好比我们在没有研究过去发生内战或世界大战的机理之前，就认为在我们有生之年不会再发生内战或世界大战。(顺便说一句，我相信内战和世界大战的动力在今天也同样存在）。

就像我在其他书中一样，我将对原型动态进行描述，然后研究不同的案例是如何以及为什么会有不同的结果，这样人们就可以根据模板追踪当前的案例，并将正在发生的事情和可能发生的事情纳入背景之中。这样，你既能看到许多正在发生的案例，又能窥见未来。

将正在发生的事情与该模板进行比较，我相信我们正在进入中央政府和中央银行将 "破产 "的情况之一，这种情况以前已经发生过数百次，并造成了重大的政治和地缘政治后果。

This brings me to an important point. The Big Debt Cycle is just one of several interrelated forces that together make up what I call the overall Big Cycle. For example, 1) Big Debt Cycles influence and are affected by largely coinciding 2) big cycles of political and social harmony and conflict within countries that are both affected by and affect 3) big cycles of geopolitical harmony and conflict between countries. These cycles in turn are affected by both 4) big acts of nature, like droughts, floods, and pandemics and 5) developments of big new technologies. Combined, these five forces make up the overall Big Cycle of peace and prosperity and conflict and depression. Because these forces affect each other and practically everything, they must be thought of together. How these forces have worked and interacted and are working and interacting now is covered in much greater detail in my book and video titled Principles for Dealing with the Changing World Order and to a lesser extent in Chapter 17 of this study, which is the concluding chapter. In this study, I will be mostly focusing on the Big Debt Cycle, though we will see many references to the ways in which the Big Debt Cycle interacts with the other forces to create the path that we are on.

这让我想到一个重要的问题。大债务周期只是几种相互关联的力量之一，它们共同构成了我所说的整体大周期。

例如，1）大债务周期影响各国内部的政治和社会和谐与冲突，并受其影响；2）各国内部的政治和社会和谐与冲突的大周期既受各国之间地缘政治和谐与冲突的大周期影响，又受其影响；3）各国之间地缘政治和谐与冲突的大周期。这些循环反过来又受到 4) 干旱、洪水和大流行病等大自然行为和 5) 大型新技术发展的影响。

这五种力量共同构成了和平与繁荣、冲突与萧条的大循环。由于这些力量相互影响，实际上影响着一切，因此必须把它们放在一起考虑。

在我的著作和视频《应对不断变化的世界秩序的原则》（Principles for Dealing with the Changing World Order）中，以及在本研究报告的第 17 章（也就是最后一章）中，对这些力量过去是如何发挥作用和相互作用的，以及现在是如何发挥作用和相互作用的，都有更详细的介绍。

在本研究中，我将主要关注大债务循环，尽管我们会看到很多关于大债务循环与其他力量相互作用以创造我们现在所走道路的方式。

This study consists of four parts and 17 chapters. Part 1 describes the Big Debt Cycle, at first very simply, then in a more complete and mechanical way, and then with some equations that show the mechanics and help with making projections of what is likely to happen. Part 2 shows what has actually happened across 35 Big Debt Cycle cases, laying out in a detailed template the typical sequence of events that signifies how a cycle is transpiring and shows symptoms that can help identify how far the cycle has progressed. Part 3 reviews the most recent Big Debt Cycle, which started when the new monetary and world orders began in 1944 at the end of World War II and brings it up to the present. In that part, in addition to looking at the Big Debt Cycle and the overall Big Cycle with a focus on the US (because it has been the world’s major reserve currency country and the world’s leading power, thus making it the world’s leading shaper of what one might call the American world order since 1944), I also very briefly describe the Big Cycles of both China and Japan, showing them from the 1860s until now. This will give you a more complete picture of what has happened in the world since 1944 and provide two other Big Debt Cycle cases to look at. Finally, in Part 4, I will peek into the future, looking at what my calculations say about what is required for the US to manage its debt burden, and how the five big forces might unfold in the years ahead.

本研究报告由四个部分和 17 个章节组成。

第 1 部分描述了大债务周期，起初非常简单，然后以一种更完整、更机械的方式进行了描述，最后用一些方程式来显示其机械原理，并帮助预测可能发生的情况。

第 2 部分展示了 35 个大债务周期案例中实际发生的情况，以详细的模板列出了表明周期如何发展的典型事件序列，并显示了有助于识别周期发展程度的症状。

第 3 部分回顾了最近的大债务周期，它始于 1944 年第二次世界大战结束时新的货币和世界秩序开始之时，并将其延续至今。在这一部分中，除了以美国为重点（因为自 1944 年以来，美国一直是世界主要储备货币国和世界头号强国，因此它是世界上所谓的美国世界秩序的主要塑造者）来审视大债务周期和整体大周期之外，我还非常简要地描述了中国和日本的大周期，展示了它们从 19 世纪 60 年代至今的情况。这将让您更全面地了解自 1944 年以来世界上发生了什么，并提供另外两个大债务周期案例供您参考。

最后，在第 4 部分中，我将展望未来，看看我的计算结果如何说明美国需要如何管理其债务负担，以及五大力量在未来几年可能会如何发展。

Because I recognize that there are different readers who have different levels of expertise and want to give different amounts of time to this and I want to help you get what you want out of this, I put the most important points in bold so you can read just the most essential stuff and optionally dive into the details that interest you. I put what I believe are timeless and universal principles in italics. If you are a professional or aspiring professional who is really into economics and markets, I recommend that you read the whole thing because I believe that it will give you a unique perspective that you will enjoy and will help you to be successful in your job. If you are not, I recommend that you just read what is in bold. Also, because I’d love to have a two-way conversation with you to try to get in sync about what’s true and what to do about it, I am working on a few new technologies for doing that, which I will tell you about later.

因为我认识到，不同的读者有不同的专业水平，他们想花在这上面的时间也不尽相同，而且我也想帮助你从这上面得到你想要的东西，所以我把最重要的内容用粗体字标出，这样你就可以只读最基本的内容，也可以选择深入阅读你感兴趣的细节。

我把我认为是永恒和普遍的原则用斜体标出。如果你是一位真正热爱经济和市场的专业人士或有抱负的专业人士，我建议你读完这本书，因为我相信它会给你带来独特的视角，让你乐在其中，并帮助你在工作中取得成功。如果你不是，我建议你只阅读粗体字部分。

另外，因为我很愿意与你进行双向交流，尝试就什么是真相以及如何应对达成共识，所以我正在开发一些新技术来做到这一点，稍后我会告诉你。

In the next chapter, I will describe the Big Debt Cycle in just seven pages. If you want to stop there, that’s perfectly fine.

在下一章中，我将用短短七页纸描述大债务循环。如果你想就此打住，也完全没问题。

I hope that you will find the study’s analysis helpful.

希望研究分析对您有所帮助。

Part 1: Overview of the Big Debt Cycle

第 1 部分：大债务周期概述

Chapter 1: The Big Debt Cycle in a Tiny Nutshell

第 1 章：小结大债务周期

My goal for this chapter is to convey in seven pages a very brief but complete description of the mechanics of a typical Big Debt Cycle.

本章的目标是用七页纸简短而完整地描述一个典型的大债务周期的机制。

How the Machine Works

机器如何工作

Credit is the primary vehicle for funding spending and it can easily be created.[2] Because one person’s spending is another’s earnings, when there is a lot of credit creation, people spend and earn more, most asset prices go up, and most everyone loves it. Paying back debt is much less enjoyable. As a result, central governments and central banks have a bias toward creating a lot of credit. Credit also creates debt that has to be paid back, which has the opposite effect—i.e., when debts have to be paid back, it creates less spending, lower incomes, and lower asset prices, which people don’t like. In other words, when someone (a borrower-debtor) borrows money (called principal) at a cost (an interest rate), the borrower-debtor can spend more money than they have in earnings and savings over the near term. But over the long term, this requires them to pay back (the principal + interest) and when they have to pay it back, it requires them to spend less money than they have. This dynamic is why the credit/spending/debt-paying-back dynamic is inherently cyclical.

因为一个人的支出就是另一个人的收入，所以当信贷大量产生时，人们的支出和收入都会增加，大多数资产价格都会上涨，大多数人都喜欢这样。还债就没那么令人愉快了。

因此，中央政府和中央银行倾向于创造大量信贷。信贷也会产生必须偿还的债务，这就产生了相反的效果--也就是说，当必须偿还债务时，就会减少支出、降低收入、降低资产价格，而这些都是人们不喜欢的。

换句话说，当某人（借款人-债务人）以一定的成本（利率）借入资金（称为本金）时，借款人-债务人在短期内可以花费比他们的收入和储蓄更多的钱。

但从长远来看，这需要他们偿还（本金+利息），而当他们必须偿还时，这就要求他们花的钱少于他们所拥有的钱。这种动态就是信贷/消费/还债动态具有内在周期性的原因。

The Short-Term Debt Cycle

短期债务周期

Everyone who has been around long enough to be affected by it several times should be well-acquainted with the short-term debt cycle. It starts with money and credit being provided readily when economic activity and inflation are lower than desired, and when interest rates are low relative to inflation rates and low in relation to the rates of return on other investments. Those conditions encourage borrowing to spend and invest, which causes asset prices, economic activity, and inflation to pick up until they are higher than desired, at which time money and credit are restrained, and interest rates become relatively high in relation to inflation rates and rates of return on other investments. This leads to less borrowing to spend and invest, which leads to lower asset prices, a slowing of economic activity, and lower inflation, which leads interest rates to come down, money and credit to become easier, and the cycle to begin again. These cycles have typically lasted about six years, give or take three years.

每一个经历过多次短期债务周期的人都应该对这种周期非常熟悉。首先，当经济活动和通胀率低于预期，利率相对于通胀率较低，相对于其他投资的回报率也较低时，货币和信贷就会被轻易提供。

这些条件鼓励借贷消费和投资，从而导致资产价格、经济活动和通胀率上升，直至高于预期水平，此时货币和信贷受到限制，利率相对于通胀率和其他投资回报率变得相对较高。

这导致用于消费和投资的借贷减少，从而导致资产价格下降、经济活动放缓和通货膨胀率降低，进而导致利率下降、货币和信贷更加宽松，循环再次开始。这些周期通常持续六年左右，或多或少三年。

Short-Term Debt Cycles Add up to Big, Long-Term Debt Cycles

短期债务周期累积成长期大债务周期

What isn’t paid enough attention is the way in which these short-term debt cycles add up to big, long-term debt cycles. Because credit is a stimulant that creates a high, people want more of it, so there is a bias toward creating it. This leads debt to rise over time, which typically leads to most of the short-term cyclical highs and lows in debt to be higher than the ones before. These add up to create the long-term debt cycle, which ends when it becomes unsustainable. The capacity to take on more debt is different early in the Big Debt Cycle when debt burdens are lower and there is more potential for credit/debt to be able to fund highly profitable endeavors than it is later in the cycle when debt burdens are higher, and lenders have fewer productive options.

没有引起足够重视的是，这些短期债务周期是如何累积成巨大的长期债务周期的。因为信贷是一种兴奋剂，能让人产生兴奋感，人们想要更多的信贷，所以就会偏向于创造信贷。这导致债务随着时间的推移而增加，通常会导致大部分短期周期性债务高点和低点都高于之前的高点和低点。

这些因素叠加在一起就形成了长期债务周期，当它变得不可持续时就会结束。在大债务周期的早期，债务负担较轻，信贷/债务有更大的潜力为高利润的事业提供资金，而在大债务周期的后期，债务负担较重，贷款人的生产性选择较少，这时，承担更多债务的能力就不同了。

In that early part, it is easy to borrow—even to borrow a lot—and pay it back. These early short-term cycles are primarily driven by the previously described availability and economics of borrowing and spending, and also a lingering cautiousness brought about by memories of the pain of the most recent time when money was tight.[3] Early in the Big Debt Cycle, when debts and total debt service are relatively low in relation to incomes and other assets, increases and decreases in credit, spending, debt, and debt service are primarily determined by the previously described incentives with less risk. But late in the Big Debt Cycle, when debts and debt service costs get high relative to income and the value of other assets that can be used to meet one’s debt service obligations, the risks of default are higher. Also, late in the Big Debt Cycle, when there are a lot of debt assets and liabilities relative to income, the balancing act of trying to keep interest rates high enough to satisfy lender-creditors without having them too high for borrower-debtors becomes more challenging. That’s because one person’s debts are another’s assets and both must be satisfied. So, while short-term debt cycles end because of the previously described economic considerations, long-term debt cycles end because the debt burdens are too great to be sustained. Said differently, because it is more enjoyable to borrow and spend, if one isn’t careful, debt and debt service can grow like a cancer, eating up one’s buying power and squeezing out other consumption. This is what makes the long-term Big Debt Cycle.

在早期，借钱--甚至借很多钱--还钱都很容易。在大债务周期的早期，当债务和还本付息总额相对于收入和其他资产而言较低时，信贷、支出、债务和还本付息的增加和减少主要由前面所述的风险较小的激励因素决定。但在大债务周期的后期，当债务和还本付息成本相对于收入和其他可用于履行还本付息义务的资产价值较高时，违约风险就会较高。

此外，在大债务周期的后期，当债务资产和负债相对于收入而言较多时，既要努力保持足够高的利率以满足贷款人-债权人的要求，又要让利率对借款人-债务人来说过高，这种平衡行为变得更具挑战性。这是因为一个人的债务就是另一个人的资产，两者都必须得到满足。因此，虽然短期债务周期的结束是出于前面所述的经济考虑，但长期债务周期的结束则是因为债务负担过重，难以为继。

换句话说，由于借贷和消费更令人愉快，如果不小心，债务和还本付息就会像癌症一样发展，吞噬人们的购买力，挤压其他消费。这就是长期的大债务循环。

Throughout the millennia and across countries, what has driven the Big Debt Cycle and has created the big market and economic problems that go along with it is the creation of unsustainably large amounts of debt assets and debt liabilities relative to the amounts of money, goods, services, and investment assets in existence.

千百年来，在各个国家，推动大债务周期并造成与之相伴的巨大市场和经济问题的原因是，相对于现有的货币、商品、服务和投资资产的数量，创造了不可持续的巨额债务资产和债务负债。

Said more simply, a debt is a promise to deliver money. A debt crisis occurs when there have been more promises made than there is money to deliver on them. When that happens, the central bank is forced to choose between a) printing a lot of money and devaluing it or b) not printing a lot of money and having a big debt default crisis. In the end, they always print and devalue. Either way—via default or devaluation—the creation of too much debt eventually causes debt assets (e.g., bonds) to be worth less.

更简单地说，债务就是兑现金钱的承诺。当承诺多于兑现承诺的资金时，就会发生债务危机。当这种情况发生时，央行被迫在以下两种情况中做出选择：a) 大量印钞并使钞票贬值；b) 不大量印钞并引发严重的债务违约危机。最终，他们总是印钞和贬值。无论哪种方式--通过违约或贬值--过多的债务最终都会导致债务资产（如债券）价值降低。

While there are variations in how each of these cases plays out, the most important factor is whether the debt is denominated in a currency that the central bank can “print”. But no matter the variation we almost always see that it becomes relatively undesirable to hold the debt assets (i.e., bonds) relative to holding the productive capacity of the economy (i.e., equities) and/or owning other, more stable forms of money (e.g., gold).

虽然每种情况都有不同的表现形式，但最重要的因素是债务是否以中央银行可以 "印制 "的货币计价。但无论如何变化，我们几乎总能看到，相对于持有经济的生产能力（即股票）和/或持有其他更稳定的货币形式（如黄金），持有债务资产（即债券）变得相对不可取。

To me it is interesting and inappropriate that, when credit rating agencies rate the credit of a central government, they don’t rate the riskiness of its debt losing value. They only rate the risk of default on the debt, which gives the misimpression that all higher-rated debt is a safe storehold of value. Said differently, because central banks can bail out central governments, the riskiness of central governments’ debts are hidden. Creditors would be better served if the rating agencies rated the riskiness of the debt losing value through both default and devaluation. After all, these bonds are supposed to be storeholds of wealth and should be rated as such. As you will see in this study, that is how I look at bonds. For countries with debts denominated in their own currencies (i.e., in a currency they can print), I rate central governments’ debts separately from their central banks to show how risky they are, and I rate the risks of central banks’ debts by considering the risk of the devaluation of money to be as, if not more, probable than a default on government debt.

在我看来，有趣且不恰当的是，当信用评级机构对中央政府的信用进行评级时，它们并不对其债务贬值的风险进行评级。他们只对债务违约的风险进行评级，这给人一种错误印象，认为所有评级较高的债务都是安全的保值品。

换句话说，由于中央银行可以救助中央政府，中央政府债务的风险性就被隐藏起来了。如果评级机构对债务因违约和贬值而贬值的风险进行评级，债权人会得到更好的服务。

毕竟，这些债券本应是财富的储藏室，因此也应如此评级。正如您在本研究中所看到的，我就是这样看待债券的。对于债务以本国货币计价的国家（即以本国可以印制的货币计价），我将中央政府的债务与中央银行的债务分开评级，以显示它们的风险有多大，我对中央银行债务风险的评级是考虑到货币贬值的风险与政府债务违约的可能性相当，甚至更大。

Default or devaluation, I don’t care. What I care about is losing my storehold of wealth, which inevitably will happen one way or another.

违约还是贬值，我不在乎。我在乎的是失去我所拥有的财富，这不可避免地会以某种方式发生。

Following the Debt Cycle’s Progression

跟踪债务周期的进展情况

The main difference between a short-term debt cycle and a long-term (big) debt cycle has to do with the central bank’s ability to turn them around. For the short-term debt cycle, its contraction phase can be reversed with a heavy dose of money and credit that brings the economy up from a depressed disinflationary state because the economy has the capacity to produce another phase of noninflationary growth. But the long-term debt cycle’s contraction phase cannot be reversed by producing more money and credit because existing levels of debt growth and debt assets are unsustainable and holders of debt assets want to get out of them because they believe that, one way or another, they will be poor storeholds of wealth.

短期债务周期与长期（巨额）债务周期的主要区别在于中央银行扭转它们的能力。对于短期债务周期，其收缩阶段可以通过大量的货币和信贷来扭转，使经济从低迷的通货紧缩状态中恢复过来，因为经济有能力创造另一个非通货紧缩的增长阶段。

但是，长期债务周期的收缩阶段无法通过增加货币和信贷来扭转，因为现有的债务增长水平和债务资产是不可持续的，债务资产的持有者希望摆脱债务资产，因为他们相信，无论如何，他们都将是财富的可怜持有者。

Think of the Big Debt Cycle’s progression like the progression of a disease or a life cycle through stages that exhibit different symptoms. By identifying these symptoms one can identify approximately where the cycle is in its progression with some expectations of how it is likely to progress from there. Described most simply, the Big Debt Cycle moves from sound/hard money and credit to increasingly loose money and credit to a debt bust that leads to a return to sound/hard money and credit brought about by necessity. More specifically, at first there is heathy borrowing by the private sector that can be paid back; then the private sector overborrows, has losses, and has problems paying it back; then the government sector tries to help, overborrows, has losses, and has problems paying it back; then the central bank tries to help by “printing money” and buying the government debt, and has problems paying it back, which leads it to monetize a lot more debt if it can (i.e., if the debt is denominated in the currency that it can print). Though not all cases progress in exactly the same way, most cases progress through the following five stages:

大债务周期的发展过程就像疾病或生命周期的发展过程，会经历不同的阶段，表现出不同的症状。通过识别这些症状，我们可以确定循环的大致发展阶段，并对其可能的发展方向有所预期。

最简单的描述是，大债务周期从稳健/坚挺的货币和信贷到日益宽松的货币和信贷，再到债务萧条，最后回归到必要的稳健/坚挺的货币和信贷。更具体地说，起初是私人部门借贷，但可以偿还；然后是私人部门过度借贷，出现亏损，偿还出现问题；然后是政府部门试图提供帮助，过度借贷，出现亏损，偿还出现问题；

然后是中央银行试图通过 "印钞 "和购买政府债务来提供帮助，偿还出现问题，这导致中央银行在可能的情况下将更多债务货币化（即如果债务是以中央银行可以印制的货币计价）。尽管并非所有情况都以完全相同的方式发展，但大多数情况都会经历以下五个阶段：

1)  The Sound Money Stage: When net debt levels are low, money is sound, the country is competitive, and debt growth fuels productivity growth, which creates incomes that are more than enough to pay back the debts. This leads to increases in financial wealth and confidence.

1) 货币稳健阶段：当净债务水平较低时，货币是稳健的，国家具有竞争力，债务增长会促进生产力增长，从而创造出足以偿还债务的收入。这将增加金融财富和信心。

Credit is the promise to deliver money. Unlike credit which requires a payment of money at a later date, money settles transactions—i.e., if money is given the transaction is complete, whereas if credit is given money is owed. It’s easy to create credit. Anyone can create credit but not anyone can create money. For example, I can create credit by accepting your promise to pay me money even if you don’t have the money. As a result, credit easily grows so there is much more credit than there is money. The most effective money is both a medium of exchange and a storehold of wealth that is widely accepted around the world. At the early stage of the Big Debt Cycle money is “hard,” which means that it is a medium of exchange that is also a storehold of wealth that can’t easily be increased in supply, such as gold, sterling silver, and Bitcoin. Cryptocurrency like Bitcoin is now emerging as an accepted hard currency because it is a currency that is widely accepted around the world and is limited in supply. The biggest, most common risk to money becoming an ineffective storehold of wealth is the risk that a lot of it will be created. Imagine having the ability to create money; who wouldn’t be tempted to do a lot of that? Those who can always are. That creates the Big Debt Cycle. In the early part of the Big Debt Cycle, a) money is typically hard—e.g., gold—and the paper money that circulates like money is convertible into the “hard money” at a fixed price and b) there isn’t a lot of paper money and debt (which is the promise to pay money) outstanding. The Big Debt Cycle consists of the building up of a) “paper money” and debt assets/liabilities relative to b) “hard money” and real assets (e.g., goods and services) and relative to the income that is required to service the debt. Basically, the Big Debt Cycle works like a Ponzi scheme or musical chairs with investors holding an increasing amount of debt assets in the belief that they can convert them into money that will have buying power to get real things, yet as the amount of the debt assets that are held up by that faith increases relative to the real things, that conversion becomes more obviously impossible until that is realized and the process of selling the debt to get the hard money and real assets begins.

信贷是交付货币的承诺。与赊账不同的是，赊账需要在日后支付资金，而资金则是交易的结算方式--也就是说，如果给了钱，交易就完成了，而如果给了赊账，就欠了钱。创造信用很容易。任何人都可以创造信用，但不是任何人都可以创造金钱。例如，我可以通过接受你给我钱的承诺来创造信用，即使你没有钱。因此，信用很容易增长，所以信用比货币多得多。

最有效的货币既是交换媒介，也是全世界广泛接受的财富储备。在大债务周期的早期阶段，货币是 "硬 "的，这意味着它是一种交换媒介，同时也是一种不容易增加供应的财富储备，如黄金、纯银和比特币。像比特币这样的加密货币现在正在成为一种被接受的硬通货，因为它是一种在全世界被广泛接受的货币，而且供应量有限。货币成为无效财富储备的最大、最常见的风险是大量创造货币的风险。

试想一下，如果有能力创造货币，谁会不去大量创造呢？有能力的人总是这样。这就形成了大债务循环。在大债务周期的早期，a）货币通常是硬通货--如黄金--而像货币一样流通的纸币可以按固定价格兑换成 "硬通货"；b）未偿还的纸币和债务（即支付货币的承诺）并不多。大债务周期包括 a) 相对于 b) "硬通货 "和实物资产（如商品和服务）以及相对于偿还债务所需的收入，"纸币 "和债务资产/负债的积累。 

基本上，"大债务循环 "就像庞氏骗局或音乐椅一样，投资者持有越来越多的债务资产，相信他们可以将这些资产转换成具有购买力的货币，以获得实物，然而，随着这种信念所支撑的债务资产相对于实物的数量增加，这种转换显然变得越来越不可能，直到意识到这一点，并开始出售债务以获得硬通货和实物资产的过程。

At the early stage of the debt cycle, private and government debt and debt service ratios are 1) low relative to incomes and/or 2) low relative to liquid assets. For example, government debt and debt service are low relative to government tax revenue and/or low relative to government liquid assets (e.g., reserves and other savings such as sovereign wealth assets) that can easily be converted into money. For example, when the Big Debt Cycle that we are in began in 1944, the ratios of a) US government debt and b) US money supply divided by the amount of gold the US government had were equal to a) 7x and b) 1.3x respectively, whereas now these ratios are a) 37x and b) 6x respectively.

在债务周期的早期阶段，私人和政府债务及偿债率 1) 相对于收入较低，和/或 2) 相对于流动资产较低。

例如，政府债务和偿债率相对于政府税收收入较低，和/或相对于政府流动资产（如储备金和其他储蓄，如主权财富资产）较低，而这些资产很容易转化为货币。

例如，当我们所处的大债务周期开始于 1944 年时，a) 美国政府债务和 b) 美国货币供应除以美国政府拥有的黄金数量的比率分别为 a) 7 倍和 b) 1.3 倍，而现在这两个比率分别为 a) 37 倍和 b) 6 倍。

During this early stage in the cycle, debt levels, debt growth, economic growth, and inflation are neither too hot nor too cold and finances are both sound.

在这一周期的早期阶段，债务水平、债务增长、经济增长和通货膨胀既不会太热也不会太冷，财政状况都很稳健。

At this stage in the cycle, “risky assets” are relatively inexpensive relative to “safe” assets. That is because the memories of the prior period in which there was great damage done affects psychology and pricing. For example, in the late 1940s and early 1950s stock earning’s yields were roughly 4x that of bond yields.

在周期的这一阶段，"风险资产 "相对于 "安全 "资产要便宜得多。这是因为人们对上一时期造成巨大损失的记忆影响了心理和定价。例如，在 20 世纪 40 年代末和 50 年代初，股票收益率大约是债券收益率的 4 倍。

During this stage, there is a healthy economy and good investment returns that lead to the next stage.

在这一阶段，经济健康发展，投资回报良好，从而进入下一阶段。

2)  The Debt Bubble Stage: When debt and investment growth are greater than can be serviced from the incomes being produced.

2) 债务泡沫阶段：当债务和投资增长超过所产生收入的偿还能力时。

In this stage, money is readily available and cheap, there is a debt-financed economic expansion and an economic boom. Demands for and prices of goods, services, and investment assets are driven up by a lot of debt-financed buying, sentiment is very bullish, and, by most conventional measures, the market is overpriced.

在这一阶段，资金容易获得且价格便宜，出现了债务融资的经济扩张和经济繁荣。对商品、服务和投资资产的需求和价格因大量举债购买而上升，市场情绪非常看涨，而且从大多数传统的衡量标准来看，市场定价过高。

In this stage, there are typically amazing new inventions that are truly transformative that investors invest in without an ability or care to assess whether the present value of their future cash flows will be greater or less than their costs.

在这一阶段，通常会出现一些真正具有变革意义的惊人新发明，投资者在对其进行投资时，没有能力也不关心评估其未来现金流的现值是否会大于或小于其成本。

This dynamic eventually produces a bubble that is reflected in the rates of debt and debt service growth to finance speculation being greater than the income growth rates that are needed to service the debts. In this stage, markets and economies seem great, most everyone believes that they will get better, they are financed by a lot of borrowing, and “wealth” is created out of nothing. By wealth being created out of nothing, I mean that there is greater imagined wealth rather than actual existing wealth. For example, bubble periods are identifiable by extensive periods (e.g., three years) of debt growth that is significantly faster than income growth, high asset prices relative to traditional measures of the present values of likely future cash flows, and many other factors that I measure in my bubble indicator. A contemporary example is the unicorn that is valued at over $1 billion that has made the owner a “billionaire” on paper but has only raised $50 million in capital because speculative venture capitalists put in the money to get option-like chips in case it does well. Bubbles can go on a while before the top is made. However, they inevitably lead to the next stage.

这种态势最终会产生泡沫，表现为为投机提供资金的债务和还本付息的增长率高于偿还债务所需的收入增长率。

在这一阶段，市场和经济似乎很好，大多数人都相信它们会变得更好，它们通过大量借贷获得资金，"财富 "被无中生有地创造出来。我所说的 "无中生有 "是指想象中的财富比实际存在的财富更多。

举例来说，泡沫时期的特征包括债务增长速度明显快于收入增长速度，资产价格相对于未来现金流现值的传统衡量标准偏高，以及我在泡沫指标中衡量的许多其他因素。(当代的一个例子是估值超过 10 亿美元的独角兽企业，其所有者在纸面上已成为 "亿万富翁"，但只筹集到 5000 万美元的资金，因为投机性风险资本家投入资金是为了获得类似期权的筹码，以防企业发展良好。泡沫可以持续一段时间后才见顶。然而，它们不可避免地会进入下一阶段。

3) The Top Stage: When the bubble pops and there is a credit/debt/market/economic contraction.

3) 最高阶段：泡沫破灭，信贷/债务/市场/经济收缩。

The popping of the bubble occurs due to a combination of a tightening of money and the prior rate of debt growth being unsustainable. It is just that simple.

泡沫破灭的原因是货币紧缩和之前的债务增长速度难以为继。就是这么简单。

When the bubble is popped, a self-reinforcing contraction begins so the debt problems spread very quickly, like an aggressive cancer, so it is very important for policy makers to deal with it quickly, either to reverse it or to guide the deleveraging to its conclusion. In most cases, the debt contraction can be temporarily reversed by giving the system a heavy dose of what caused the debt problem—i.e., by creating more credit and debt. That continues until it can’t continue anymore, at which time a big deleveraging occurs.

当泡沫破灭时，自我强化的收缩就会开始，因此债务问题会像侵袭性癌症一样迅速扩散，所以决策者必须迅速处理，要么扭转局面，要么引导去杠杆化完成。在大多数情况下，债务收缩可以暂时逆转，方法是向整个系统大量投放造成债务问题的物质，即创造更多的信贷和债务。这种情况会一直持续到无法再继续为止，届时就会出现大规模的去杠杆化。

4) The Deleveraging Stage: When there is a painful bringing down of debt and debt service levels to be in line with income levels so that the debt levels are sustainable.

4) 去杠杆化阶段：在这一阶段，债务和还本付息水平都会出现痛苦的下降，与收入水平保持一致，从而使债务水平具有可持续性。

At the beginning of this stage in the Big Debt Cycle, the first cracks typically spread from the private sector to the central government and then to the central bank. Net selling of debt assets, especially net selling of government debt assets, is a big red flag. When that happens conditions will deteriorate quickly unless managed very well and very quickly by central governments and central banks. That selling takes the form of runs on banks. By “runs on banks” I mean the turning in of debt assets to get real money, which lenders like banks don’t have enough of. When debt problems become apparent, the holders of the debt assets sell their debt assets, which drives interest rates on the debt up. This makes the debt more difficult to service, hence more risky, which drives interest rates higher.

在大债务周期的这一阶段开始时，第一道裂痕通常会从私营部门蔓延到中央政府，然后再蔓延到中央银行。债务资产的净抛售，尤其是政府债务资产的净抛售，是一个大红旗。一旦出现这种情况，除非中央政府和中央银行迅速采取有效措施，否则情况将迅速恶化。

这种抛售的形式是银行挤兑。我所说的 "银行挤兑 "是指将债务资产上交以获得真金白银，而银行等贷款机构并没有足够的真金白银。当债务问题变得明显时，债务资产的持有者会出售他们的债务资产，这就促使债务利率上升。这使得债务更难偿还，因此风险更大，从而推高利率。

The selling of the government’s debt leads to a) a free-market-driven tightening of money and credit, which leads to b) a weakening of the economy, c) downward pressure on the currency, and d) declining reserves as the central bank attempts to defend the currency. Classically, these runs accelerate and feed on themselves as holders of debt assets see that, one way or another (through default or through the devaluation of their money), they will lose the buying power that they had believed was stored in these debt assets, causing great shifts in market values and wealth until debts are defaulted on, restructured, and/or monetized. Because this tightening proves too harmful for the economy, the central bank eventually simultaneously eases credit and allows a devaluation of the currency. The devaluation of money can itself be the reason to sell the debt asset because it becomes a poor storehold of wealth. So, whether there is a tightening of money that leads to debt defaults and a bad economy or an easing of money that produces a devaluation of money and debt assets, it is not good for the debt asset. This dynamic creates what is called a death spiral because it is a self-reinforcing, debt-contraction dynamic in which the rising interest rates cause problems that creditors see, leading them to sell the debt assets, which leads to even higher interest rates or the need to print more money, which devalues the money and leads to even more selling of the debt assets and the currency and so on until the spiral runs its course. When this happens to government debt, the realization that too much debt is the problem naturally leads to the inclination to cut spending and borrowing. However, because one person’s spending is another’s income, cutting spending at such times typically only contributes to increases in debt-to-income ratios. That is typically when policies are shifted to a mix of debt restructurings and debt monetizations with the mix chosen primarily dependent on how much of the debt is denominated in the country’s currency. This defaulting on, restructuring of, and/or monetizing debt reduces the debt burdens relative to incomes until a new equilibrium is reached. The movement to a stable equilibrium typically takes place via a few painful adjustment spasms because borderline financial soundness is achieved before secure financial soundness.

抛售政府债务导致 a) 自由市场驱动的货币和信贷紧缩，从而导致 b) 经济疲软，c) 货币面临下行压力，d) 中央银行试图捍卫货币而导致储备下降。经典的情况是，当债务资产的持有者发现，通过某种方式（通过违约或通过货币贬值），他们将失去他们认为存储在这些债务资产中的购买力，从而导致市场价值和财富的巨大变化，直到债务被违约、重组和/或货币化。

由于这种紧缩政策对经济的危害太大，中央银行最终会同时放松信贷并允许货币贬值。货币贬值本身就可以成为出售债务资产的理由，因为它变成了一种不良的财富储备。

因此，无论是紧缩货币导致债务违约和经济不景气，还是放松货币导致货币和债务资产贬值，对债务资产来说都不是好事。这种动态会造成所谓的死亡螺旋，因为它是一种自我强化、债务收缩的动态，在这种动态中，利率上升会导致债权人看到问题，从而导致他们出售债务资产，这又会导致更高的利率，或者需要印制更多的钞票，这又会使货币贬值，导致更多的债务资产和货币被出售，如此循环，直至螺旋式上升。当政府债务出现这种情况时，意识到债务过多是问题所在，自然会倾向于削减支出和借贷。 

然而，由于一个人的支出就是另一个人的收入，在这种时候削减支出通常只会导致债务收入比上升。这时，政策通常会转向债务重组和债务货币化的组合，而组合的选择主要取决于有多少债务是以本国货币计价的。

债务违约、债务重组和/或债务货币化降低了债务负担相对于收入的比例，直至达到新的平衡。向稳定平衡的转变通常需要经过几次痛苦的调整，因为在实现安全的金融健全之前，先要实现边缘金融健全。

Classically, the deleveraging process progresses as follows. Early in this recession/depression phase, central banks bring interest rates down and make credit more available. However, when a) debts are large and a debt contraction is underway, b) interest rates can’t be lowered any more (i.e., when they fall around 0%), c) there is not enough demand for government debt, and d) the monetary easing is not enough to offset the self-reinforcing depressionary pressures, the central bank is forced to switch to new “tools” to stimulate the economy. Classically, to stimulate the economy the central bank must lower interest rates to below nominal economic growth rates, inflation rates, and bond rates, but that is difficult to do when they approach 0%. At the same time, the central government is typically getting itself into a lot more debt because tax revenues are down and spending is up to support the private sector, yet there is not enough private sector demand to buy that debt. The central government experiences a debt squeeze in which the free-market demand for its debt falls short of the supply of it. If there is net selling of the debt, that creates a much worse problem.

经典的去杠杆化过程如下。在衰退/萧条初期，央行会降低利率，增加信贷供应。然而，当出现以下情况时：

a) 债务规模庞大，债务收缩正在进行；b) 利率无法再降低（即当利率降至 0% 左右时）；c) 对政府债务的需求不足；d) 货币宽松政策不足以抵消自我强化的萧条压力，央行被迫转而使用新的 "工具 "来刺激经济。

通常，为了刺激经济，中央银行必须降低利率，使其低于名义经济增长率、通货膨胀率和债券利率，但当利率接近 0% 时，就很难做到这一点了。

与此同时，中央政府通常会陷入更多债务，因为税收收入减少，支持私营部门的支出增加，但私营部门却没有足够的需求来购买这些债务。在这种情况下，中央政府会出现债务紧缩，即自由市场对其债务的需求少于供给。如果出现债务净抛售，则会造成更严重的问题。

Often in this deleveraging stage of the cycle there is a “pushing on a string,” a phrase coined by policy makers in the 1930s. It occurs late in the long-term debt cycle when central bankers struggle to convert their stimulative policies into increased spending because savers, investors, and businesses fear borrowing and spending and/or there is deflation, so the risk-free interest that they are getting is relatively attractive to them. At such times, it is difficult to get people to stop saving in “cash” even when interest rates go to 0% (or even below 0%). This phase is characterized by the economy entering a deflationary, weak, or negative growth period as people and investors hoard low-risk, typically government-guaranteed cash.

在这一周期的去杠杆化阶段，往往会出现 "按下葫芦浮起瓢 "的情况，这是政策制定者在 20 世纪 30 年代创造的一个短语。

它发生在长期债务周期的后期，此时央行行长们难以将其刺激性政策转化为支出的增加，因为储蓄者、投资者和企业害怕借贷和支出，以及/或存在通货紧缩，所以他们获得的无风险利息对他们来说相对具有吸引力。

在这种时候，即使利率降到 0%（甚至低于 0%），也很难让人们停止 "现金 "储蓄。这一阶段的特点是，由于人们和投资者囤积低风险、通常由政府担保的现金，经济进入通货紧缩、疲软或负增长时期。

At this stage, central banks must choose between keeping money “hard,” which will lead debtors to default on their debts, which will lead to deflationary depressions, or making money “soft” by printing a lot of it, which will devalue both it and the debt. Because paying off debt with hard money causes such severe market and economic downturns, when faced with this choice central banks always eventually choose to print and devalue money. Of course, each country’s central bank can only print that country’s money, which brings me to my next big point.

在这一阶段，中央银行必须做出选择：

是继续 "硬 "货币，这将导致债务人拖欠债务，从而导致通货紧缩；还是通过大量印钞使货币 "软 "起来，这将使货币和债务贬值。

由于用硬通货偿还债务会导致严重的市场和经济衰退，因此在面临这种选择时，中央银行最终总是会选择印钞和贬值。当然，每个国家的央行只能印该国的钞票，这就是我要说的下一个重点。

At this stage, if it has the ability to “print money,” the central bank creates a substantial amount of money and credit and throws it aggressively at the markets. It typically buys government debt and private sector debt of systemically important entities that are at risk of defaulting (in order to make up for the private sector’s inadequate demand for debt and to keep interest rates artificially low), and it sometimes buys equities and creates incentives for people to buy goods, services, and financial assets. At this stage, it is also typically desirable to devalue the currency because that is stimulative to the economy and raises inflation rates thus negating the deflationary pressures. If the currency is linked to gold, silver, or something else, that link is typically broken and there is a move to a fiat monetary system. If the currency isn’t linked—i.e., if the currency is already a fiat currency—devaluing it relative to other storeholds of wealth and other currencies is helpful. In some cases, the central bank’s moves can drive nominal interest rates higher, either because the central bank tightens monetary policy to fight inflation or because it doesn’t tighten money to fight inflation and holders of the debt don’t want to buy the newly issued government debt and/or they want to sell it because it doesn’t provide an adequate return. It is important to watch real and nominal interest rates and the supply and demand for debt to understand what is happening. At such times, extraordinary policies to get money like imposing extraordinary taxes and capital controls become common.

在这一阶段，如果中央银行有能力 "印钞"，它就会创造大量货币和信贷，并积极投向市场。央行通常会购买有违约风险的政府债务和具有系统重要性的实体的私营部门债务（以弥补私营部门对债务的需求不足，并人为地压低利率），有时还会购买股票，激励人们购买商品、服务和金融资产。

在这一阶段，货币贬值通常也是可取的，因为这会刺激经济，提高通货膨胀率，从而抵消通货紧缩的压力。如果货币与黄金、白银或其他东西挂钩，这种挂钩通常会被打破，从而转向法定货币体系。

如果货币没有挂钩，即货币已经是法定货币，那么相对于其他财富储备和其他货币而言，货币贬值是有帮助的。在某些情况下，央行的举动会推高名义利率，这可能是因为央行收紧货币政策以对抗通胀，也可能是因为央行没有收紧货币以对抗通胀，而债务持有者不想购买新发行的国债，和/或他们想出售国债，因为国债不能提供足够的回报。

观察实际利率和名义利率以及债务的供求关系对了解正在发生的事情非常重要。在这种时候，征收特别税和资本管制等获取资金的非常政策就变得很常见。

This deleveraging stage is typically a painful time when debt burdens are reduced by defaults, restructurings, and/or devaluations. This is when an aggressive mix of debt restructurings and debt monetizations inevitably takes place to reduce the debt and debt service burdens relative to incomes. In a typical deleveraging the debt-to-income ratio has the be lowered by roughly 50%, give or take about 20%. It can be done well or poorly. When it is done well, which I call a “beautiful deleveraging,” central governments and central banks simultaneously do both debt restructurings and monetary stimulations in a balanced way. The restructurings reduce debt burdens and are deflationary while the monetary stimulations also reduce debt burdens (by providing money and credit to make it easier to buy debt) but are inflationary and stimulative to the economy so, if they get the balance right, positive growth occurs with falling debt burdens and acceptable inflation. Whether done well or poorly, this is the stage of the Big Debt Cycle that reduces a lot of the debt burden and establishes the bottom that can be built on to begin the next Big Debt Cycle.

去杠杆化阶段通常是一个痛苦的时期，债务负担因违约、重组和/或贬值而减轻。在这个阶段，不可避免地要进行积极的债务重组和债务货币化，以减轻相对于收入的债务和偿债负担。

在典型的去杠杆化过程中，债务与收入的比率必须降低约 50%，或多或少约 20%。这种做法可好可坏。

如果做得好，我称之为 "漂亮的去杠杆化"，中央政府和中央银行会同时以平衡的方式进行债务重组和货币刺激。债务重组会减轻债务负担，造成通货紧缩，而货币刺激也会减轻债务负担（通过提供货币和信贷，使人们更容易购买债务），但会造成通货膨胀，刺激经济，因此，如果平衡得当，就会在债务负担下降和通货膨胀可接受的情况下实现正增长。

无论做得好与坏，这都是大债务周期的一个阶段，它可以减轻大量债务负担，并为下一个大债务周期的开始奠定基础。

5) The Big Debt Crisis Recedes: When a new equilibrium is reached, and a new cycle begins.

5) 大债务危机重现：当达到新的平衡时，新一轮周期开始。

In order to have a viable money/credit/debt system, it is imperative that a) money/debt is sound enough to be a viable storehold of wealth, b) debt and debt service burdens are in line with the incomes to service them so that debt growth is sustainable, c) creditors and debtors both believe that those things will exist, and d) the availability of money and credit and real interest rates begin to fall in line with that which is needed by both lender-creditors and borrower-debtors. This late phase of the Big Cycle is when there is a movement to those things happening. It requires both psychological and fundamental adjustments. After a big deleveraging, it is typically difficult to convince lender-creditors to lend because the devaluations/restructurings they experienced in the deleveraging make them risk-averse, so it is imperative that the central government and the central bank take credibility-restoring actions. These generally involve bringing their finances in order by a) the central government earning more money than it spends and/or b) the central bank making money hard again by offering high real yields, raising reserves, and/or linking the currency to something hard like gold or a strong currency. Typically, in this stage, interest rates need to be relatively high in relation to inflation rates and more than high enough to compensate for currency weakness, so it pays to be a lender and is costly to be a borrower. This stage of the cycle can be very attractive for lender-creditors.

为了建立一个可行的货币/信贷/债务体系，必须做到：a) 货币/债务足够稳健，能够成为可行的财富储备；b) 债务和偿债负担与偿还债务的收入相匹配，这样债务增长才具有可持续性；c) 债权人和债务人都相信这些事情会发生；d) 货币和信贷的可用性以及实际利率开始下降，以满足贷款人-债权人和借款人-债务人的需要。

在大周期的后期阶段，这些事情正在发生。这需要心理和基本面的调整。在大幅去杠杆化之后，通常很难说服贷款人-债权人贷款，因为他们在去杠杆化过程中经历的贬值/重组使他们规避风险，因此中央政府和中央银行必须采取恢复信誉的行动。

这些行动一般包括：a) 中央政府赚的钱比花的钱多，和/或 b) 中央银行通过提供高实际收益率、提高储备和/或将货币与黄金或强势货币等坚硬的东西挂钩，使货币重新变得坚硬，从而使其财政正常。

通常情况下，在这一阶段，利率需要相对于通胀率较高，而且要高得足以弥补货币的疲软，因此做贷款人要付出代价，而做借款人则要付出高昂的代价。周期的这一阶段对贷款人-信贷人来说非常有吸引力。

The stage that the Big Debt Cycle is in is also reflected in the types of monetary policies being used. As the Big Debt Cycle progresses, central banks have to change how they run monetary policy in order to keep the credit/debt/economic expansion going, so by observing what type of monetary policy they are using, one can surmise about what stage the Big Debt Cycle is in. The phases in monetary policy and the conditions that lead to them are as follows:

大债务周期所处的阶段也反映在所使用的货币政策类型上。随着大债务周期的发展，各国央行必须改变货币政策的运作方式，以保持信贷/债务/经济扩张的持续进行，因此，通过观察各国央行使用的货币政策类型，可以推测大债务周期所处的阶段。货币政策的阶段以及导致这些阶段的条件如下：

Phase 1: A Linked (i.e., Hard) Monetary System (MP1). This is the type of monetary policy that existed from 1944 until 1971. This type of monetary policy ends when the debt bubble bursts, and there is the previously described “run on the bank” dynamic, which is a run from credit assets to the hard money, and the limited amount of hard money causes massive defaults. This creates a compelling desire to print money rather than leave the supply of it limited by the supply of the gold or hard money that exists to be exchanged at the promised price.

第一阶段：挂钩（即硬通货）货币体系（MP1）。

这是从 1944 年到 1971 年的货币政策类型。这种类型的货币政策在债务泡沫破裂时结束，出现了之前描述的 "挤兑银行 "动态，即从信贷资产向硬通货挤兑，有限的硬通货导致大量违约。

这就产生了一种强烈的印钞欲望，而不是让钞票的供应量受黄金或硬通货供应量的限制，因为黄金或硬通货是可以按承诺的价格进行交换的。

Phase 2: A Fiat Money, Interest-Rate-Driven Monetary Policy (MP2). During this phase, interest rates, bank reserves, and capital requirements are also controllers of the amounts of credit/debt growth. This fiat monetary policy phase both allows more flexibility and provides less assurance that money printing won’t be so large that it will devalue money and debt assets. The US was in this phase from 1971 until 2008. It ends when interest rate changes no longer work (e.g., interest rates hit 0% and there is a need to ease monetary policy) and/or the private market demand for the debt being created falls short of the supply being sold so that, if the central bank did not print the money and buy the debt, money and credit would be tighter and interest rates would be higher than desired.

第二阶段：法币、利率驱动的货币政策（MP2）。

在这一阶段，利率、银行准备金和资本要求也是信贷/债务增长的控制因素。这一阶段的法定货币政策既有更大的灵活性，又不能保证印钞量不会大到导致货币和债务资产贬值。

美国从 1971 年到 2008 年一直处于这一阶段。当利率变化不再起作用时（例如，利率达到 0%，需要放松货币政策）和/或私人市场对正在创造的债务的需求低于正在出售的供应时，这一阶段就结束了，因为如果中央银行不印钞和购买债务，货币和信贷就会收紧，利率就会高于预期。

Phase 3: A Fiat Monetary System with Debt Monetization (MP3). This type of monetary policy is implemented by the central bank using its ability to create money and credit to buy investment assets. It is the go-to alternative when interest rates can no longer be lowered and when private market demand for debt assets (mostly bonds and mortgages though it can also include other financial assets like equities) is not large enough to buy the supply at an acceptable interest rate. It is good for financial asset prices, so it tends to benefit disproportionally those who have financial assets. It won’t effectively deliver money into the hands of those who are financially most stressed, and it won’t be very targeted. The US was in this phase from 2008 until 2020.

第三阶段：债务货币化的法定货币体系（MP3）。

这种货币政策由中央银行利用其创造货币和信贷的能力来购买投资资产。当利率无法再降低，且私人市场对债务资产（主要是债券和抵押贷款，但也可能包括股票等其他金融资产）的需求不足以以可接受的利率购买供应时，就会选择这种货币政策。

它有利于金融资产价格，因此往往会使拥有金融资产的人受益过多。它不会有效地将资金送到那些金融压力最大的人手中，而且针对性不强。美国从 2008 年到 2020 年一直处于这一阶段。

Phase 4: A Fiat Money System with Coordinated Big Fiscal Deficit and Big Debt Monetization Policy (MP4). This type of monetary policy is used when, in order to make the system work well, central government fiscal policy and central bank monetary policy have to be coordinated in order to get money and credit into the hands of people and entities that need it most. While creating money and credit typically temporarily alleviates the debt problem, it does not rectify the problem.

第四阶段：协调大财政赤字和大债务货币化政策的法币体系（MP4）。

这种货币政策适用于以下情况：为了使该体系运转良好，中央政府的财政政策和中央银行的货币政策必须相互协调，以便将货币和信贷发放到最需要的人和实体手中。虽然创造货币和信贷通常能暂时缓解债务问题，但并不能解决问题。

Phase 5: A Big Deleveraging (MP5). This is when there must be a big reduction in debt and debt service payments through a debt restructuring and/or a debt monetization. When managed in the best possible way—what I call a beautiful deleveraging—the deflationary ways of reducing debt burdens (e.g., through debt restructurings) are balanced with the inflationary ways of reducing debt burdens (e.g., by monetizing them), so that the deleveraging occurs without having unacceptable amounts of either deflation or inflation. The Big Debt Cycle sequence to keep in mind is: first the private sector overborrows, has losses, and has problems paying it back (i.e., a debt crisis); then, to help, the government overborrows, has losses, and has problems paying it back; then, to help out, the central bank buys the government debt and takes losses. To fund those purchases and to fund other debtors in trouble (because it is the “lender of last resort”), the central bank prints a lot of money and buys a lot of debt. Then, at its worst, the central bank loses a lot of money on the debt it bought.

第五阶段：大幅去杠杆化（MP5）。

这时必须通过债务重组和/或债务货币化，大幅减少债务和偿债支出。如果管理得当，我称之为 "漂亮的去杠杆化"，那么通货紧缩的债务负担减少方式（如通过债务重组）与通货膨胀的债务负担减少方式（如通过债务货币化）之间就会达到平衡，这样去杠杆化就不会出现不可接受的通货紧缩或通货膨胀。

需要牢记的 "大债务周期 "顺序是：

首先，私营部门过度举债，出现亏损，偿债出现问题（即债务危机）；然后，为了提供帮助，政府过度举债，出现亏损，偿债出现问题；然后，为了提供帮助，中央银行购买政府债务，并承担亏损。为了资助这些购买和资助其他陷入困境的债务人（因为央行是 "最后贷款人"），央行大量印钞，购买大量债务。然后，在最糟糕的情况下，中央银行会因购买债务而损失大量资金。

While it is said that modern central bank “prints” money to buy the debt, the central bank doesn’t literally “print money.” Instead, it borrows money (reserves) from commercial banks that it pays a very short-term interest rate on. At its most extreme, the central bank can lose money because the interest earnings it gets on the debt it bought are less than the interest that it has to pay out on the money it borrowed, so when these amounts become large it can find itself in a self-reinforcing spiral of having to buy debt, which leads it to have losses and negative cash flows which leads it to need to print more money to service its debt and to need to buy more debt which ends up having more losses which requires it to do more of the same. This is the “death spiral” I mentioned earlier. When done in large amounts, the “printing” devalues the money and creates inflationary recessions or depressions. If interest rates rise, the central bank loses money on its bond holdings because the interest rate that it has to pay on its liabilities is greater than the interest rate it receives on the debt assets it bought. This is notable but not a big red flag until the central bank has a very large negative net worth and is forced to “print” more money to cover the negative cash flow that it experiences due to less money coming in on its assets than has to go out to service its liabilities. That is what I mean when I say the central bank goes broke: while the central bank doesn’t default on its debts, it can’t make its debt service payments without printing money.

虽然有人说现代中央银行 "印 "钱来购买债务，但中央银行并不是真的 "印钞票"。相反，它从商业银行借钱（储备金），并支付非常短期的利息。

在最极端的情况下，中央银行可能会亏损，因为它从购买的债务中获得的利息收入少于它必须从借来的钱中支付的利息，所以当这些金额变得很大时，它就会发现自己陷入了一个不得不购买债务的自我强化的螺旋，这导致它出现亏损和负现金流，从而需要印制更多的钞票来偿还债务，并需要购买更多的债务，最终导致更多的亏损，这就要求它做更多的同样的事情。这就是我前面提到的 "死亡螺旋"。

大量 "印钞 "会使货币贬值，造成通胀性衰退或萧条。如果利率上升，央行持有的债券就会亏损，因为央行必须为其负债支付的利率高于它从购买的债务资产中获得的利率。

这一点值得注意，但在中央银行出现巨额负净值，被迫 "印 "出更多钞票来弥补因资产进账少于负债出账而出现的负现金流之前，这并不是什么大问题。这就是我所说的央行破产：虽然央行不会拖欠债务，但如果不印钞票，就无法偿还债务。

Eventually the debt restructurings and debt monetizations reduce the size of the debts relative to incomes and the debt cycle runs its course.

最终，债务重组和债务货币化降低了债务相对于收入的规模，债务周期也随之结束。

Phase 6: The Return to Hard Money (MP6). In this phase the central government takes actions to restore the soundness of its money and credit/debt. This type of monetary policy occurs after the debt has been written down through debt defaults/restructurings and debt monetizations so the debt levels relative to the incomes and amounts of money that are available to service the debts can be brought back into alignment. As previously described, it comes after those who held the debt assets were burned by the defaults and/or inflationary periods, so confidence in holding debt assets has to be rebuilt. At this stage, countries typically go back to MP1 (i.e., a hard-asset-backing monetary policy) or MP2 (an interest rate/money supply-targeted monetary policy) that is beneficial to lender-creditors via high real interest rates.

第 6 阶段：回归硬通货（MP6）。

在这一阶段，中央政府采取行动恢复其货币和信贷/债务的稳健性。这种类型的货币政策发生在通过债务违约/重组和债务货币化将债务减记之后，这样债务水平相对于可用于偿还债务的收入和货币量就能恢复一致。

如前所述，这是在持有债务资产的人被债务违约和/或通货膨胀时期烧伤之后发生的，因此必须重建对持有债务资产的信心。

在这一阶段，各国通常会回到 MP1（即硬资产支持货币政策）或 MP2（以利率/货币供应为目标的货币政策），通过高实际利率使贷款人-债权人受益。

For great countries with great empires, the end of the Big Debt Cycle has meant the end of their prominence.

对于拥有伟大帝国的大国来说，大债务周期的结束意味着其显赫地位的终结。

A Few Concluding Observations

几点结论性意见

It pays to build up savings in the good times so there are savings to draw on in the bad times. There are costs to having too much savings as well as too little savings, and no one gets the balance exactly right.

顺境时积累储蓄，逆境时就可以动用储蓄。储蓄过多和过少都要付出代价，没有人能够在两者之间取得完美的平衡。

Big debt crises are inevitable. Throughout history only a very few well-disciplined countries have avoided them. That is because lending is never done perfectly relative to the incomes that are needed to service it. And it is often done badly because people always want more credit and that turns into debt. Debt levels get beyond that which is sustainable which leads to the need to bring the debt burdens down which typically leads to a mixture of debt defaults/restructurings and the creating of money and credit, leading a debt crisis to occur. And people’s psychology reinforces the cycle: the bubble period makes people more optimistic causing them to borrow more, and the bust causes people to be more pessimistic causing them to cut spending. Even though this progression has happened many times in history, most policy makers and investors think their current circumstances and monetary system won’t change. The change is unthinkable—and then it happens suddenly.

大规模债务危机不可避免。纵观历史，只有极少数纪律严明的国家避免了债务危机。这是因为，相对于偿还债务所需的收入而言，借贷从未做到完美无缺。而且往往做得不好，因为人们总是想要更多的信贷，这就变成了债务。

债务水平超过了可持续的水平，就需要降低债务负担，这通常会导致债务违约/重组以及创造货币和信贷，从而引发债务危机。而人们的心理又强化了这种循环：泡沫时期使人们更加乐观，导致他们借贷更多，而萧条时期又使人们更加悲观，导致他们削减开支。

尽管这样的发展在历史上发生过很多次，但大多数政策制定者和投资者都认为当前的环境和货币体系不会改变。这种变化是不可想象的--然后它就突然发生了。

The best way to anticipate a debt crisis happening is not by focusing on a single influence or number like debt as a percent of GDP; it is by understanding and focusing on a number of interrelated dynamics that we will get into, especially in the next two chapters.

预测债务危机发生的最佳方法不是关注单一的影响因素或数字，如债务占 GDP 的百分比；而是了解并关注一系列相互关联的动态因素，特别是在接下来的两章中，我们将对这些动态因素进行深入探讨。

If debts are denominated in a country’s own currency, its central bank can and will “print” the money to alleviate the debt crisis. This allows them to manage it better than if they couldn’t print the money, but of course it also reduces the value of the money. If the debt is not denominated in currencies that their central banks can print, then they will have debt defaults and deflationary depressions measured in the currency that they owe and can’t print.

如果债务是以一国本国货币计价的，那么该国的中央银行就可以而且将会 "印 "钞来缓解债务危机。这使他们能够比不能印钞时更好地管理债务，但当然也会降低货币的价值。

如果债务不是以其中央银行可以印制的货币计价，那么他们就会出现债务违约和通货紧缩，而这些债务是以他们所欠但无法印制的货币来衡量的。

All debt crises, even big ones, can be managed well by economic policy makers restructuring and monetizing them so that the deflationary ways of reducing the debt burdens (i.e., writing off and restructuring debt) and the inflationary ways of reducing debt burdens (creating money and credit and giving it to the debtors to make it easier for them to service their debts) balance each other. The key is to spread the paying back over time. For example, if the debt-to-income ratio needs to fall by about 50% to make it sustainable, a debt restructuring that spreads it out to be at a rate of 3% or 4% per year would be much less traumatic than one that is about 50% in one year.

所有债务危机，即使是大的债务危机，都可以通过经济政策制定者对其进行重组和货币化来很好地控制，从而使减轻债务负担的通货紧缩方式（即注销和重组债务）和减轻债务负担的通货膨胀方式（创造货币和信贷并将其提供给债务人，使其更容易偿还债务）相互平衡。

关键是将还债分摊到不同的时间段。举例来说，如果债务与收入的比率需要下降 50%左右才能维持下去，那么以每年 3%或 4%的速度分散偿还债务的债务重组，要比一年内偿还 50%左右的债务所造成的创伤小得多。

Debt crises provide great risks and opportunities that have been shown to both destroy empires and provide great investment opportunities for investors if they understand how they work and have good principles for navigating them well.

债务危机提供了巨大的风险和机遇，事实证明，如果投资者了解债务危机的运作方式，并掌握良好的应对原则，债务危机既能摧毁帝国，也能为投资者提供绝佳的投资机会。

If you try to focus on debt cycles precisely or focus your attention on the short term you won’t see them. It’s like comparing two snowflakes and missing that they are pretty much the same because they’re not exactly the same.

如果你试图精确地关注债务周期或将注意力集中在短期，你就不会看到它们。这就好比比较两片雪花，却忽略了它们其实是差不多的，因为它们并不完全一样。

That’s it in a nutshell.

一言以蔽之

In the rest of this study I will get into the mechanics in greater depth, show the actual archetypical sequences that have played out over 35 cases, look at how the Big Debt Cycle and Big Cycle that includes the other big cycles  (for instance, cycles of internal and external order) that started in 1944 and that we are currently in the late stages of have transpired relative to this template, and briefly look at the Chinese and Japanese Big Cycles and a number of other cases. The Japanese case is interesting because Japan is further along in its Big Debt Cycle. Notably its large debt and debt monetizations have led to the depreciation of its currency and debt, which led holders of its bonds to have losses of 45% relative to holding US dollar debt since 2013 and losses of 60% relative to holding gold since 2013. In the final chapters, I will share how I am processing the US today relative to this template, how the US could reduce the risk of an acute debt crisis, and how I read the Five Big Forces today.

在本研究的其余部分，我将更深入地探讨这一机制，展示在 35 个案例中出现的实际原型序列，研究始于 1944 年、目前正处于后期阶段的大债务周期和包括其他大周期（例如内部和外部秩序周期）在内的大周期是如何与这一模板相对应的，并简要研究中国和日本的大周期以及其他一些案例。

日本的案例很有意思，因为日本在大债务周期中走得更远。值得注意的是，日本的巨额债务和债务货币化导致其货币和债务贬值，这导致其债券持有人自2013年以来相对于持有美元债务的损失达45%，相对于持有黄金的损失达60%。

在最后几章中，我将分享我是如何根据这一模板来处理当今美国的问题的，美国可以如何降低严重债务危机的风险，以及我是如何解读当今的五大力量的。