报告人
占杨 助理教授
主持人
王志 副教授
时间
12月26日（周四）14:00-16:00
地点
协鑫楼516
Pairwise stability in network formation games: Computation and applications
报告摘要
Networks are at the forefront of research in economics and operations research as powerful tools to model social and economic interactions. We develop an effective algorithm to compute equilibria in network formation games, where agents have concave utility functions. To do so, we reformulate the concept of pairwise stability as a Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative game played by the nodes and links in the network and adapt the tracing procedures for non-cooperative games to the network formation problem. Finally, we apply the algorithm to several examples in the literature and obtain a number of novel insights.
报告人简介
占杨现为南京大学工程管理学院助理教授(特聘研究员)，2015年于中国科学技术大学获学士学位，2019年于香港城市大学获博士学位。研究兴趣包括运筹优化，博弈论，供应链管理等。科研成果发表在Mathematical Programming, INFORMS Journal on Computing等运筹学和管理科学学领域期刊上。主持国家和江苏省自然科学基金青年项目，入选第九届中国科协青年人才托举工程，获江苏省运筹学会青年科技奖。
报告人
崔竞时 副研究员
主持人
王志 副教授
时间
12月26日（周四）14:00-16:00
地点
协鑫楼516
Operation Framework for Electricity Balancing Market Based on Market Entity’s Participating Modes
报告摘要
The increasing penetration of renewable energy poses operational challenges for power systems due to the uncertainty of renewable generation. This has driven the development of electricity balancing markets to help integrate renewable generation while maintaining reliability. We investigate how a power system can reliably and cost-effectively meet end user demand by implementing a real-time balancing market. We consider a market operated by a system operator and multiple market participants. To satisfy demand requirements, market participants submit day-ahead bids, and the system operator decides the imbalance penalty based on the total imbalance of all market participants. We examine the existence, uniqueness, effectiveness, and robustness of the equilibrium that arises from the strategic interactions between participants in this market. We extend the framework to accommodate varying risk preferences by categorizing market participants as either risk-neutral or risk-averse. We also evaluate the concept of a decentralized market that seeks to trade off between participant autonomy and overall efficiency.
报告人简介
崔竞时，毕业于清华大学交叉信息研究院，获计算机科学与技术工学博士学位，博士期间曾在ETH Zurich访问半年。于2023年7月加入南京大学工程管理学院。研究方向为综合运用机器学习、优化模型等解决电力系统与电力市场中的相关问题。主持国家自然科学基金青年项目、江苏省自然科学基金青年项目等。研究成果发表在IEEE Transactions on Power Systems、IEEE Transactions on Sustainable Energy、Applied Energy等期刊，以及ACM UbiComp-ISWC、IEEE PESGM、IEEE ISGT等会议。担任IEEE SmartGridComm 2022、2023的TPC member。
美编 | 童金
责编 | 李梦爽、唐迪明
