主讲人
王长军 副研究员
主持人
占杨 助理教授
时间
12月27日（周五）14:00-15:30
地点
协鑫楼208
Duopoly Assortment Competition under the Multinomial Logit Model: Simultaneous vs. Sequential
报告摘要
In this study, we investigate two different types of duopolistic competitive assortment problems under the multinomial logit model. We first extend prior work by introducing a more general competitive model incorporating common products under the multinomial logit model. For simultaneous assortment competition, we study the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria and fully characterize the structures of equilibrium outcomes. Specifically, we demonstrate the existence of an equilibrium that always Pareto-dominates others in the settings with both common and exclusive products. This equilibrium is efficiently computed using a carefully crafted iterative best response process.
For sequential assortment competition, we find that the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium leads to higher profitability for both the leader and the follower compared to the Pareto-dominant equilibrium in simultaneous assortment competition. Despite its profitability advantages, computing the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for duopoly sequential assortment competition is NP-hard, even with only exclusive products. To address this hardness result, we propose a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme for problems involving both common and exclusive products. (Joint work with Kameng Nip)
报告人简介
王长军，现任中国科学院数学与系统科学研究院副研究员。主要从事算法博弈与机制设计、组合优化等方向的理论研究。目前已在包括OR、MOR、POM、EC、WINE等的相关领域重要国际期刊及会议发表多篇论文。曾主持国家自然科学基金项目、中国科协青年人才托举工程项目及获中国运筹学会青年科技奖等。
主讲人
宋昊天 助理教授
主持人
占杨 助理教授
时间
12月27日（周五）15:30-17:00
地点
协鑫楼208
Multi-Dimensional Signaling with Supplier Credit Guarantee
报告摘要
This paper investigates credit guarantees in a supply chain setting involving a supplier, a capital-constrained buyer, and a bank. We find that under complete information, credit guarantees increase order quantities but paradoxically raise wholesale prices, overall rendering the credit guarantee not useful for improving the operational efficiency. However, under information asymmetry, either a partial or full guarantee emerges in equilibrium, with the wholesale price maintained at its optimal full-information level. This underscores the pivotal role of credit guarantees in effective signaling and delineates the distinct functions of the wholesale price and the guarantee-the former on operational efficiency and the latter on signaling efficacy. Further comparative analysis of the supplier and buyer performances under the two contract types reveals that credit guarantees do not always benefit both parties.
报告人简介
宋昊天，本科毕业于上海大学，硕士毕业于卡尔加里大学，博士毕业于纽约大学，现为浙江大学管理学院助理教授。主要研究方向包括平台运营管理、供应链金融、契约理论及其应用。在《Management Science》、《Manufacturing & Service Operations Management》、《Optimization Letters》等期刊上发表过学术论文。
美编 | 马国萍
责编 | 李梦爽、唐迪明
