（文章转自中美聚焦）
It is imperative for China and the United States to reach a common understanding on strategic stability to avoid misunderstandings, misperceptions and miscalculations that could escalate into conflict, especially amid souring China-U.S. relations and heightened regional tensions.
Strategic stability dialogues could play a pivotal role in maintaining communication between the two nuclear powers on critical security issues, enabling both sides to better understand each other’s perspectives, positions and constraints, to address potential misunderstandings and to foster consensus. Through such discussions, China and the United States would have an opportunity to clarify their respective views with respect to the security environment, identify threats and outline their policy priorities. Additionally, they could explore the possibility of joint assessments on strategic and security issues of common concern. Such collaboration could contribute to the maintenance and stability of China-U.S. relations and gradually build mutual trust over time.
However, the Chinese government has thus far determined that the current circumstances are not conducive to initiating an official dialogue on strategic stability with the United States, primarily for three reasons.
A consensus on the definition of strategic stability, including its connotations and scope, has yet to be reached by Chinese and American scholars, let alone by Chinese and U.S. government officials.
One of the most widely cited definitions of the term was summarized by Edward Warner, a representative of the U.S. defense secretary at the U.S.-Russia New START talks in 2011, when he spoke of three distinct levels. In the narrowest sense, strategic stability describes the absence of incentive to use nuclear weapons first (crisis stability) and the absence of incentive to build up nuclear forces (arms race stability). But in a broader sense, it describes the absence of armed conflict between nuclear-armed states. In its broadest sense, strategic stability describes a regional or global security environment in which states enjoy peaceful and harmonious relations.
In various contexts, nuclear powers use the concept of strategic stability at different levels in their official documents, tailored to their specific needs. Thus, before any strategic stability dialogue can happen, it is essential that China and the United States establish a shared understanding of the concept and its scope. This, in turn, will determine what topics should be included in the discussion.
Previously, Washington proposed that Beijing conform to a narrower definition of strategic stability for purposes of dialogue — which the Chinese side did not agree to do. During military-to-military talks in 2017, officials of the People’s Liberation Army proposed a dialogue on strategic stability in a broader sense, to include areas such as politics, economy, science and technology, but the U.S. rejected the idea, favoring its own narrower focus. Today, Chinese and American scholars, along with retired government officials and military officers, continue to hold differing views on the concept of strategic stability.
Some argue that dialogue should encompass a broad range of issues, including nuclear safety and security, nonproliferation cooperation, emerging technologies and domains such as AI, cyber and outer space — together with regional hot spot concerns. Others, however, contend that the talks should focus more narrowly, addressing only crisis and arms-race stability.
Given such significant differences in the understanding of strategic stability, it is difficult to envision the two governments engaging in a Track I dialogue about it. Moreover, it is unlikely that Chinese and American officials could engage in any in-depth discussion on issues that turn on such basic definitions. Therefore, it falls to Track II discussions to develop a mutually acceptable concept of strategic stability and to define the scope of the dialogue. This is the groundwork for future Track I engagement.
Beijing and Washington hold differing views on some of the principles governing potential strategic stability dialogues. The United States emphasizes the need for mutual transparency regarding nuclear forces, while China argues that such an approach is inequitable given the vast disparity in nuclear arsenals between the two countries. According to the SIPRI Yearbook 2024, the United States is estimated to possess 5,044 nuclear warheads — more than 10 times China’s estimated inventory of 500 (a figure that Beijing disputes). China argues that it is unreasonable to expect it to maintain the same level of transparency as the United States under these circumstances. Instead, it advocates the principle of gradual, fair, acceptable and nonreciprocal transparency — a position the United States has been unwilling to endorse
At the Track II level, however, Chinese and American scholars have engaged in discussions and reached consensus on several principles to guide strategic stability dialogues. Both sides recognize the critical importance of maintaining strategic stability, particularly at a time when international arms control mechanisms are eroding, the risks of nuclear proliferation are escalating, major regional conflicts are drawing indirect involvement from both China and the United States and emerging technologies and new domains of warfare are introducing heightened uncertainties.
To address these challenges, the two countries should move beyond a security dilemma mindset and work to narrow their perception gaps. Some American experts believe that if the United States would address China’s concerns about U.S. missile defense systems and provide assurances regarding the effectiveness of China’s existing nuclear deterrent, Beijing may feel less urgency to expand its arsenal, thereby reducing the risk of a nuclear arms race. Scholars on both sides also emphasize the importance of continuity in strategic stability dialogues.
Lessons from the experience of the United States and the Soviet Union (later Russia) highlight the fact that the dialogue process fosters mutual understanding and increases transparency. In fact, the process itself can often be more significant than the outcome. Therefore, once strategic stability dialogues are initiated, it becomes essential to commit to maintaining them on a regular basis. Interruptions due to external factors, particularly unforeseen “black swan” events, not only undermine the effectiveness of the dialogues but can also harm overall strategic stability. To strengthen strategic stability, both sides should actively contribute to the success of the dialogues, adhering to principles of mutual respect, candor, openness, equality and mutual benefit.
Scholars are concerned about the potential negative impact of broader China-U.S. relations and domestic politics on strategic stability dialogues. It would be unimaginable for Beijing and Washington to initiate such a dialogue during periods of significant bilateral tensions. A meaningful process for such dialogues is achievable only when relations are on a relatively stable footing.
Donald Trump’s return to the White House has introduced renewed uncertainties and challenges to the hard-earned progress in China-U.S. relations that has been achieved since the Woodside summit between President Xi Jinping and President Joe Biden in late 2023. Unlike China, whose foreign policy is relatively insulated from domestic political pressure, U.S. foreign policy — and especially its approach to China — is highly sensitive to domestic political dynamics. Still, discussions on strategic stability in the United States tend to be professional and technical, generally avoiding overt politicization.
It is suggested that future China-U.S. strategic stability dialogues should remain cognizant of such political dynamics, ensuring that domestic considerations do not derail efforts to maintain and enhance the bigger picture. Such discussions at the Track II and 1.5 levels should continue to pave the way for Track I dialogues.
Beijing has limited experience in dialogues about strategic stability, and so it will take time to build proficiency. There is a clear experience gap between China and the United States in this area. The U.S. has more than 60 years of experience in arms control talks and strategic stability dialogues with the Soviet Union (now Russia), resulting in a series of treaties and agreements and the establishment of the U.S.-Russia National and Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NNRRCs) as a key — and ongoing — communication channel for crisis prevention and management. In contrast, China has yet to participate in any intergovernmental strategic stability dialogues and has only been involved in a few China-U.S. Track II discussions.
Moreover, recent military reforms and significant personnel changes within the PLA have produced newly appointed officials who are responsible for strategic stability issues but lack a deep understanding of traditional strategic concepts. Being unfamiliar with the evolving dynamics in this field, they need time to learn. These Chinese military officers and diplomats should draw lessons from historical experiences, particularly the dialogues between the U.S.and Moscow, while also developing a fresh perspective on strategic stability in light of the changing global landscape.
They must also recognize the key differences between past dialogues and future China-U.S. strategic stability discussions (including disparities on the size of nuclear arsenals), nuclear policies and strategic cultures.
Compared with formal government-level dialogues, Track II or 1.5 dialogues offer greater openness, candor and flexibility, which allow experts from China and the United States to explore potential areas of agreement on strategic stability. For China, these informal dialogues offer a valuable opportunity to learn and master the technical knowledge and skills necessary before any future Track I engagements. Such Track II or 1.5 discussions can play a crucial role in reducing misunderstandings, preventing miscalculations, managing differences and fostering cooperation.
But while the current dialogues have been helpful, they are not sufficient to address the complexities of China-U.S. relations on strategic stability. Both sides need more extensive and frequent Track II engagement to help chart a path forward, gain crucial insights and lay a solid foundation for more formal, high-level discussions in the future.
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