自：美国战争研究所（ISW）网站11月
本文在时间线上廓清了朝军入俄参战始末，提出了此事在军事层面的若干可能影响。
朝鲜向俄乌战场部署军队，凸显了俄罗斯将继续依赖寻求替代力量生成途径支持战争，而非致力于更广泛的社会动员。俄罗斯始终未完全转变为战时状态，而是选择依赖加密货币和影子动员。14但如是措施所产生的人力资源是有限的。在战场态势急转直下时，这一问题变得尤为突出和严重。2024年8月，乌军侵入俄罗斯库尔斯克州后，俄罗斯的对策是以应征入伍者和边境警卫部队生成新的领土防御部队，并将现役部队从乌克兰的非关键前线位置重新部署，这与俄此前处理兵力生成需求的方式是一致的。15因此，使用朝军应是俄罗斯兵力生成方法之延伸——它允许俄罗斯以多达12000人员组建作战部队，而无需进行社会成本高昂的国内动员并处理由此产生的后果。10月24日，乌克兰情报机构证实，俄方将首先向库尔斯克州派遣朝军人员。16未来，俄罗斯可以且可能会在乌克兰境内的行动中动用朝军。
【1】https://t.me/DIUkraine/4723
【2】https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/05/us/politics/russia-north-korea-artillery.html
【3】https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-europe-middle-east-north-korea-john-kirby-4f600014dcf9c9e88fef9910854772f8
【4】https://www.reuters.com/world/us-says-russias-wagner-group-bought-north-korean-weapons-ukraine-war-2022-12-22/
【5】https://t.me/mod_russia/28614; https://www.rbc.ru/politics/25/07/2023/64c0149b9a794768bfd7d220; https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/cw4gwdvld3yo
【6】http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/72265; https://tass.ru/politika/18740883
【7】https://www.interfax.ru/world/926600
【8】https://www.politico.com/news/2024/01/04/kirby-russia-used-north-korean-missiles-in-ukraine-00133879
【9】https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1925888/
【10】http://kremlin.ru/supplement/6154;https://t.me/MID_Russia/42180
【11】https://iz.ru/1714745/2024-06-19/dogovor-o-partnerstve-rf-i-kndr-predusmatrivaet-okazanie-pomoshchi-pri-agressii
【12】https://t.me/tass_agency/272432
【13】https://www.interfax.ru/russia/988359; https://www.rbc.ru/politics/24/10/2024/6719f6699a79473722bd2e67
【14】https://isw.pub/UkrWar082924; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2024-0; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-26-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-12-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-10-2024
【15】https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-29-2024
【16】https://t.me/DIUkraine/4723
【17】https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/23/world/asia/north-korea-troops-russia-ukraine.html;https://cyberllc.army.mil/documents/30983766/92030609/%28U%29+240429+NK+Koreans+People%27s+Army++-+Ground+Forces+v1.pdf/4568705b-6ee4-c598-9cc5-a6807e355ff7?t=1714397713914#:~:text=The%20KPA%20Ground%20Force%20%E2%80%94%20armor,soldiers%20and%20another%20150%2C000%20reservists。
【18】https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/24/world/asia/north-korea-military-capability.html#:~:text=They%20are%20assigned%20to%20units,and%20fed%20than%20their%20colleagues.
【19】https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Documents/News/North_Korea_Military_Power.pdf
【20】https://www.economist.com/europe/2024/10/22/north-korea-is-sending-thousands-of-soldiers-to-help-vladimir-putin
【21】https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-20-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Feb%2021%20Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%20PDF.pdf; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-3; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-16-2024
【22】https://isw.pub/UkrWar092424; https://isw.pub/UkrWar091424; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062024
