15,000字长文：
鹰酱海军，沉没在码头.......
（上部）
2024年10月12日Military WatchMagazine报道：鹰酱造船厂新型核攻击潜艇（的产量），远远落后于海军对需求。
U.S. Shipbuilders Falling Far Behind Navy’s Demand For New Nuclear Attack Submarines
在地缘政治紧张局势迅速加剧和某大国海军力量不断扩张的时代，随着鹰酱海军数量和质量优势被某大国和其他潜在对手削弱，其蓝水优势面临着越来越大的挑战。
In an era of fast rising geopolitical tensions and expanding Chinese naval power, the United States Navy has faced growing challenges to its blue water primacy as its quantitative and qualitative advantages are eroded by China and other potential adversaries.
虽然鹰兔水面舰艇生产能力的巨大差异，早已引起西方世界的警惕——某大国造船厂水面舰艇的产能是鹰酱的232 倍，而鹰酱造船厂在为鹰酱海军生产潜艇的能力方面，居然也越来越落后。While the vast discrepancy in production capacity for surface ships between China and the United States has long been reported on with alarm in the Western world, with Chinese shipyards having a capacity 232 as large as that of the United States, American shipbuilders have also fallen increasingly behind in their ability to produce submarines for the U.S. Navy.
鹰酱海军俄亥俄级潜艇
U.S. Navy Ohio Class Submarine
众议员肯·卡尔弗特Ken Calvert在2024年 9 月份总结道：“总之，这些计划处于危机之中”，潜艇计划超出预算 170 亿美元，而建设面临长达三年的延误。无一例外，他们都延期了。“他强调”预算越来越超额。如果没有今天的干预，我对海军造船业重回正轨的信心——为零。”
Representative Ken Calvert having summarised September: “In a word, these programs are in crisis,” with submarine programs reaching a staggering $17 billion over budget while construction faced delays of up to three years. “Without exception they are falling behind,” he stated, stressing that “increasingly they are over budget. Absent today's intervention I have zero confidence that Navy shipbuilding will get back on track.”
立法者抨击海军领导层“隐瞒了有关成本和延误的信息”，声称该军种“解决”危机的“计划”主要是好高骛远的”——这与立法者、官员和分析人士广泛提出的担忧相呼应。
The lawmaker at the time slammed the Navy leadership for having “withheld information on costs and delays,” claiming that the service’s “plans to address” the crisis “are primarily aspirational.” This echoed concerns widely raised by lawmakers, officials and analysts.
某大国和大毛都通过引入新一代高度复杂的战舰的大规模造船计划，彻底改变了他们的核战略和攻击潜艇舰队，这仍然是自苏联解体以来大毛在数量和技术上保持世界领先地位的少数几个领域之一，因为人们认为此类潜艇是发动大国战争的能力核心。
Both China and Russia have revolutionised their nuclear strategic and attack submarine fleets with large scale shipbuilding programs introducing new generations of highly sophisticated warships, with this remaining one of the few areas where Russia has quantitatively and technologically remained a world leader since the USSR’s disintegration due to the perceived central importance of such submarines to the ability to wage a great power war.
其实，比起国会老爷对海军潜艇的牢骚，更难听的话也早有人说过了——鹰酱海军退役上尉，杰里·亨德里克斯博士Jerry Hendrix最近强调了这个问题。The issue was recently highlighted by retired U.S. Navy Captain Jerry Hendrix, who in a recent assessment observed
兵器迷注：杰瑞.亨德里克斯Jerry Hendrix 博士，是鹰酱国家安全咨询和服务提供商 Telemus Group 的副总裁。在 2018 年加入 Telemus 之前，他是 501（c）3 非营利智库——新鹰酱安全中心的高级研究员和国防战略和评估项目主任。亨德里克斯博士曾在鹰酱海军服役了 26 年。
2024年5月，americanaffairsjournal报道了发表了杰瑞.亨德里克斯Jerry Hendrix 博士对鹰酱海军潜艇部队建设非常苛刻的批评文章：鹰酱潜艇工业基地的危机————沉没在码头。对鹰酱本国海军，特别是鹰酱潜艇部队的发展脉络和问题分析，仍然有一定的参考价值。
Sunk at the Pier: Crisis in the American Submarine Industrial Base
兵器迷将这篇分析文章做了翻译、整理和调整（有节略），请大家一阅。全文15000字，35张图，分上、下两部分先后发出。
一、前言
随着与某大国爆发热战的可能性笼罩着鹰酱的战略未来，某大国的作战系统，诸如远程弹道导弹和巡航导弹，以及有人驾驶轰炸机和战斗机，都是精心设计的用来抵消鹰酱的投射力量——海军航母和空军攻击机——使它们在未来太平洋岛省战争的最初几周都变得无足轻重。为了使某大国这种对所谓反介入/区域拒止的武器投资付诸东流，鹰酱国防规划者越来越冷静地自信地将目光投向了海军的潜艇部队。潜艇——安静、隐蔽，并装载了致命的导弹、鱼雷和水雷组合——可以深入太平洋的第一和第二岛链。要击败某大国的部队，大多数西方战略家和力量规划者都认为——重担将落在鹰酱潜艇艇员的肩上。
With the potential for a hot war with China looming over America’s strategic future, the minds of U.S. defense planners increasingly turn with calm confidence to the Navy’s submarine force. Submarines—quiet, stealthy, and loaded with lethal combinations of missiles, torpedoes, and mines—can penetrate deep into the Pacific’s first and second island chains, negating Chinese investments in so-called anti-access/area denial weapons. These Chinese systems, long-range ballistic and cruise missiles as well as manned bombers and fighters, were purposely designed to negate America’s power projection forces—its Navy carriers and Air Force attack aircraft—rendering them irrelevant in the opening weeks of any future Pacific war over Taiwan. If a Chinese invasion force is to be defeated, then, most Western strategists and force planners believe that the burden will fall upon the shoulders of submariners
不幸的是——鹰酱潜艇部队在应对这一挑战方面——表现不佳。在我（即杰瑞.亨德里克斯Jerry Hendrix 博士，下同）作为海军军官的职业生涯中，从 1988 年进入少尉军衔，到 2014 年以上尉身份退休，然后从那以后担任政府和行业的顾问。我目睹了鹰酱潜艇舰队从冷战时期的 140 艘核动力艇急剧下降到不到一半的 67 艘船。今天。此外，在目前的 67 艘核潜艇中，只有 49 艘属于“快速攻击”猎手级别（即高速攻击核潜艇）。
Unfortunately, the U.S. submarine force is poorly postured to meet this challenge. Across my career as a naval officer, entering as an ensign in 1988 and retiring as a captain in 2014, and then as a consultant to both government and industry since, I have watched the American submarine fleet fall precipitously from its Cold War high of 140 nuclear-powered “boats” to less than half that number, sixty-seven boats, today. Moreover, of the current sixty-seven nuclear submarines, only forty-nine fall into the hunter-killer “fast attack” classification.
2018年初时的鹰酱潜艇
国防部最近宣布，在2025 财年预算中将只采购一艘新的快速攻击潜艇。此外，在已经服役的潜艇部队中，这 49 艘攻击核潜艇中，有 16 艘位于干船坞或被系在码头上，缺乏所需的潜水证书。由于鹰酱海军已经积压了三年的维护工作，这些潜艇无法启航。
The Defense Department announced recently that it would procure only one new fast-attack submarine in the fiscal year 2025 budget. Additionally, of the submarine force already in commission, sixteen of those forty-nine boats—or nearly a third of the Navy’s premier offensive force—are in drydocks or tied to piers, lacking required dive certifications. These submarines cannot get underway due to a three-year maintenance backlog in the U.S. Navy.
归根结底，鹰酱潜艇部队是鹰酱实力的“矛尖”，许多军事计划都依赖于此。但鹰酱潜艇部队却没有准备好应对当前的威胁环境的快速解决方案，花了几十年的时间——以及一系列错误的假设和错误的决策——陷入了目前的无法就绪的状态。而且至少需要数年时间，以及对新船建造和潜艇维修能力的大量投资，才能恢复过来。
The bottom line is that the American submarine force, the “point of the spear” of American power, upon which so many military plans depend, is unprepared to meet the current threat environment, and there are no quick fixes. It has taken decades—and a sequence of bad assumptions and poor decisions—to fall into the current state of unpreparedness, and it will take years, as well as significant investments in both new ship construction and submarine repair capacity, to recover.
二、昔日荣光An Early Lead
1954 年，鹰酱人开发了世界上第一艘核动力潜艇鹦鹉螺号SSN-571，在海底竞争中率先一步。大毛人很快紧随其后，但他们早期的核动力潜艇不仅噪音更大，因此更容易被发现和跟踪，而且他们危险的核推进系统对船员也更加危险。此外，每次苏联改进他们的设计时，鹰酱人在自己的潜艇上都会取得更重大的进步。
Americans took an early lead in the undersea competition with the development of the USS Nautilus, the world’s first nuclear-powered submarine, launched in 1954. The Russians quickly followed, but their early nuclear‑powered boats were not only noisier, and hence easier to detect and track, but their nuclear propulsion systems were also more dangerous to their crews.
在整个冷战时期，鹰酱潜艇部队在能力和容量方面都超过了苏联。无论他们航行到哪里，苏联人都发现自己受到鹰酱潜艇的监视和跟踪，鹰酱对他们的对手保持着恒定的“攻击标准”。回顾苏联档案，历史学家引用了大毛潜艇舰长近乎绝望的情绪，他们无法躲避鹰酱同行，以及苏联高级政治领导人对他们无法跟上鹰酱海底领域技术进步的担忧。
Furthermore, every time the Soviets improved their designs, the Americans made more significant advances in their own submarines. The U.S. submarine force exceeded the Soviet Union in terms of both capabilities and capacity throughout the Cold War period. Everywhere they turned, the Soviets found themselves being monitored and tracked by American submarines who maintained constant “attack criteria” on their counterparts. Historians who reviewed the Soviet archives have cited the near despair of Russian submarine captains, who were unable to elude their American peers, as well as the concerns of the USSR’s senior political leaders regarding their inability to keep up with American technical advances, including in the undersea realm.
鹰酱潜艇部队曾经从冷战胜利中脱颖而出——技术优势允许其在大西洋、太平洋和北冰洋对苏联船只和潜艇进行持续的操作骚扰——战略家们认为这加速了苏联的解体。
The American submarine force emerged from the Cold War triumphant, with strategists giving it considerable credit for accelerating the collapse of the Soviet Union. Its technological superiority allowed for constant operational harassment of Soviet ships and submarines in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Arctic oceans.
到冷战结束时，最新的鹰酱快速攻击型潜艇洛杉矶（改进型），是自鹦鹉螺号以来的第5种主要新型潜艇设计。
By the end of the Cold War, the latest American fast-attack submarine, the Los Angeles (Improved) class, the fifth major new submarine class design since the Nautilus
即使在本子东芝公司非法泄露敏感静音技术，大毛潜艇取得巨大进步之后，技术水平最高的苏联竞争对手阿库拉级，也要落后鹰酱整整一代。
... was at least a generation ahead of its closest Soviet competitor, the Akula, even after the advances made in the newest Russian design following the illegal leaking of sensitive quieting technologies by the Japanese Toshiba Corporation.
1991 年圣诞节，当苏联国旗在克里姆林宫上空降下时，鹰酱海军已经为更新一代快速攻击潜艇——SSN-21 海狼级的设计奠定了基础。
And as the Soviet flag was lowered over the Kremlin on Christmas in 1991, the American Navy had already laid the keel for a new fast-attack submarine design, the SSN-21 Seawolf class boat.
由于鹰酱海军在潜艇设计和工业基础投资，和不断的技术创新文化，使其成为冷战后的几代潜艇装备都占据世界主导地位——从 1958 年到 1989 年，鹰酱潜艇工业基地每年生产 3 -5 艘核动力潜艇，到苏联解体时产生了一支由 90 艘核潜艇组成的快速攻击队伍。整个工业基地包括大量技术工人——在康涅狄格州格罗顿的电动船造船厂（兵器迷注：即通用电力电船公司）和弗吉尼亚州东南部的纽波特纽斯造船厂——有超过5万名工人。
Because of the American Navy’s culture of constant technological innovation in both submarine design and investments in its industrial base, it was positioned to dominate the post–Cold War world for generations. The submarine industrial base, producing between three to five nuclear-powered submarines per year from 1958 to 1989, had generated a fast-attack force of ninety boats by the time the Soviet Union dissolved. This industrial base included a large population of skilled workers, just over fifty thousand laborers between the Electric Boat shipyard in Groton, Connecticut, and the Newport News Shipyard in southeastern Virginia.
Electric Boat shipyard in Groton, Connecticut
Newport News Shipyard in southeastern Virginia
三、“和平红利”时代“Peace Dividends”
随后出现的“和平红利”的时代，改变了一切。
But then came the era of the “peace dividend,” and everything changed
海狼级比其前辈更大、更快、更安静、潜深更深，装备更好，在每一个重要指标上都领先于世界。然而——以 1990 年美元计算成本为35亿美元，大约是鲟鱼级潜艇成本的3倍，是将取代的洛杉矶级潜艇成本的3倍。1991 年，乔治 HW 布什政府决定——停止生产海狼级——原本计划生产29 艘潜艇
The Seawolf class was larger, faster, quieter, deeper diving, and better armed than its predecessors; it led the world in every significant metric. It cost $3.5 billion per hull in 1990 dollars, however, roughly four times the cost of the Sturgeon class submarines and three times the cost of the Los Angeles class boats it was intended to replace. In 1991, the George H. W. Bush administration made the decision to end production of the Seawolf class, planned for twenty-nine boats, just as it was beginning.
中断海狼级生产的决定的原因是多方面的：
The decision to truncate Seawolf class production was made for several reasons.
首先，这些潜艇成本高昂的理由是需要比苏联潜艇领先一代——随着苏联的解体和与大毛建立更友好的关系——这不再是优先事项。
First, the justification for the high cost of these boats had been the need to stay a generation ahead of the Soviet Union’s submarines. With the demise of the USSR and the establishment of friendlier relations with Russia, this was no longer a priority.
其次，布什政府感到有必要解决不断上升的国债和赤字问题，其中包括大幅削减国防预算和随之而来的军事力量结构。其中，政府将海军规模从里根时代的 594 艘减少到大约 440 艘，潜艇部分从之前的 100 艘快速攻击潜艇缩减到大约 50 艘。考虑到当时部队中相对较新的洛杉矶级潜艇的数量——1972 年至1996 年间已签订了 62 艘合同——似乎不需要 30 艘海狼级潜艇来替代旧的快速攻击艇。海军可以简单地按计划甚至加速退役其较旧的快速攻击艇，并随着潜艇的数量的下降，达到新的战斗力量目标。
Second, the Bush administration felt compelled to address the rising national debt and deficits, which included significant cuts in the Defense budget and the accompanying military force structure. As part of this process, the administration chose to draw down the size of the Navy from the Reagan-era high of 594 ships to approximately 440 ships, with the submarine component contracting to around fifty from the previous force of one hundred fast-attack subs. Given the number of relatively new Los Angeles class boats in the force at that time—sixty-two had been contracted to enter the fleet between 1972 and 1996—there seemed to be little need for thirty Seawolf class submarines as replacements for older fast-attack boats. The Navy could afford to simply decommission its older fast-attack boats on schedule, or even at an accelerated pace, and ride the population curve of submarines down until it met its new battle force goal.
到 1990 年代中期，潜艇部队的未来已经岌岌可危（in jeopardy）。在克林顿政府期间，第二艘和第三艘海狼级舰艇，即康涅狄格号和吉米卡特号完成了建造，以勉强维持潜艇工业基地。但2个主要建造厂的工人数量已减少到约 12,000——为1980 年代（顶峰）水平的四分之一。
Nevertheless, by the mid-1990s, it dawned upon policymakers that the future of the submarine force was in jeopardy. During the Clinton administration, the decision was made to complete a second, and then a third, Seawolf class boat, the USS Connecticut and USS Jimmy Carter, to maintain the submarine industrial base, whose workforce had dwindled to around twelve thousand workers, a quarter of its 1980s level, in the two major new submarine construction yards.
2021年康涅狄格号潜艇SSN-22在南海撞上了一座未知的海山
在这个时期，大量冷战时期的潜艇开始达到其使用寿命，潜艇部队的规模从 1994 年的 88 艘下降到 2002 年的 54 艘。但因为缺乏实质性的海底威胁和巨大的建造运营费用，政治领导人仍然没有兴趣继续生产海狼级快速攻击潜艇。
By this time, large numbers of Cold War–era boats were beginning to reach the end of their service lives and the size of the submarine force declined from eighty-eight in 1994 to fifty-four in 2002. Political leaders still had no appetite to continue production of the Seawolf class fast-attack submarine due to the lack of a significant undersea threat and the great expense associated with it.
相反，海军与工业界合作，在潜艇设计中寻找“金发女孩”式的解决方案
兵器迷注：金发女孩效应 Goldilocks Effect，意思是在面对三个选择时，人们一般的选择会不偏向某个极端，而是选择中庸的那一个方案。
就是说——这种船比洛杉矶级更大、更安静，虽然不如洛杉矶级快，但比海狼更小、更便宜、更现代。
Instead, the Navy worked with industry to find a “Goldilocks” solution in submarine design, a boat that was larger and quieter than, though not as fast as, the Los Angeles class, but smaller, cheaper, and more modern than the Seawolfs.
由此产生的弗吉尼亚级潜艇出现在1990 年代后期，并针对被认为是冷战后的任务集进行了优化。为了防止海军的快速攻击潜艇数量低于 40 艘，1998 年订购了一艘弗吉尼亚潜艇，在接下来的十年中，每增加一年再签约一艘——这终于使潜艇工业基础从 90 年代的缓慢步伐中缓缓地回归，但整个十年中也只建造了三艘潜艇。
The resultant Virginia class submarine emerged in the late 1990s and was optimized for what were perceived as the post–Cold War mission sets. To keep the Navy from falling below forty fast-attack submarines, one Virginia was ordered in 1998, with one additional boat contracted for each subsequent year, save one, over the next decade to allow the submarine industrial base to gently shift back from the slow pace of the ’90s, when only three boats were built across the entire decade.
然而，新的潜艇建造只是1990 年代潜艇工业基地面临的挑战之一。即使引入了弗吉尼亚级，另一个问题仍在继续恶化：干船坞和维护能力。drydock and maintenance capacity.
从铺设龙骨到服役平均需要4年时间建造一艘潜艇，但在随后的 30 年使用寿命中，20% 或 6 年的时间，都花在鹰酱海军造船厂进行定期的全面维护。与海军常规水面战斗舰（巡洋舰、驱逐舰和护卫舰）不同，国会已颁布法令，海军的核动力舰艇、航母和潜艇，必须在海军造船厂或建造新潜艇的两个商业造船厂进行维修。海军的航母和潜艇必须维护在安全的围栏后面，并受到政府的密切监督，并由训练有素、合格和经过认证的工人提供服务。
While it takes an average of four years to assemble a submarine from her keel-laying to her commissioning, over the boat’s thirty years of service life that follow, 20 percent, or six years, is spent undergoing scheduled, comprehensive maintenance in a U.S. Navy shipyard. Unlike the Navy’s conventional surface combatants—cruisers, destroyers, and frigates—Congress has decreed that the Navy’s nuclear-powered ships, its carriers and submarines, must be repaired in Navy shipyards or in the two commercial shipyards that build new submarines. The Navy’s carriers and submarines must be maintained behind secure fences and under close government supervision, serviced by highly trained, qualified, and certified workers.
问题在于：没有足够的造船厂来处理海军潜艇部队的定期维护。于是进入海军干船坞的队伍——每年都在变长。目前，海军在4个造船厂——弗吉尼亚州的诺福克;华盛顿州布雷默顿;和夏威夷珍珠港内——有10 个干船坞可用。此外，纽波特纽斯造船厂有2个干船坞，电力电船厂还有1个用于潜艇维护（也就是一共13个干船坞）。
At present, there are ten drydocks available within the Navy’s four shipyards at Kittery, Maine; Norfolk, Virginia; Bremerton, Washington; and Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Additionally, there are two drydocks at the Newport News Shipyard and one at Electric Boat’s shipyard being used for submarine maintenance.
这些干船坞都已经满额，但还有另外5艘核动力潜艇正在等待定期维护。潜艇维修已经延误了1,100 天，或大约三年。换句话说，海军目前缺少3个干船坞和相关劳动力，随着海军计划在未来 15 年内，将其快速攻击潜艇部队从目前的 50 艘增加到 60 多艘，这个问题只会加剧。
These are full, but there are an additional five nuclear-powered submarines awaiting induction for their scheduled maintenance and cannot get underway or submerge again until they complete this process. According to Navy submarine admirals, the community is experiencing delays of 1,100 days, or about three years, in its submarine repairs. Put another way, the Navy is currently short three drydocks and the workforce that goes with them, a problem that will only increase as the Navy plans to grow its fast-attack submarine force from its present fifty boats to over sixty during the next fifteen years.
与海军面临的其他问题一样，这个问题可以追溯到 1990 年代冷战后的十年以及当时做出的一系列错误决定。a series of poor decisions made at that time.
鹰酱海军进入冷战时有11家造船厂：
The U.S. Navy had entered the Cold War with eleven shipyards.
冷战期间关闭了3个造船厂——1964 年的纽约造船厂、1973 年的波士顿造船厂和 1988 年旧金山北部的猎人角造船厂——留下海军有八个公共造船厂进行维护。
Three were closed during the Cold War—the New York yard in 1964, the Boston yard in 1973, and the Hunters Point yard north of San Francisco in 1988—leaving the Navy with eight public shipyards to perform maintenance.
冷战后，1991 年和 1993 年授权成立的两个基地调整和关闭委员会 （BRAC），以考虑现有基础设施是否过多。
After the Cold War, two Base Realignment and Closure Commissions (BRACs) were authorized in 1991 and 1993 to consider whether there was excess infrastructure within the existing military footprint.
1991年，BRAC决定关闭费城船厂
In 1991, the decision was made to close the Philadelphia yard,
1993 年,BRAC关闭南卡罗来纳州查尔斯顿和加利福尼亚州马雷岛船厂。
in 1993 both the Charleston, South Carolina, and the Mare Island, California, yards were shuttered.
其时，有潜艇专家因为担心未来的干船坞容量——特别是查尔斯顿的3个大型和2个中型干船坞的重要性——建议保留查尔斯顿或马雷岛船厂。
In the last two cases, submarine experts recommended that either the Charleston or Mare Island yard be kept due to concerns with drydock capacity going forward. The importance of the three large and two medium-sized drydocks at Charleston, in particular, was noted by commentators at the time.
遗憾的是:这些担忧被忽视了，因为调整和关闭委员会BRAC 的委员们做出了一个（错误的）战略假设——在没有外部威胁的情况下——潜艇战斗力量应该下降到 40 多艘，就够了。
These concerns were ignored due to a strategic assumption made by the BRAC commissioners that the submarine battle force should fall to the low forties in the absence of an external threat
而这一(假设不存在的威胁），在短短10年后就已经显而易见了，那就是——某大国。
a threat that became readily apparent just one decade later—China.
欲知后事如何，且听下回分解
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