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Akbarpour, M., et al. (2023). "Redistributive Allocation Mechanisms." Journal of Political Economy 132(6): 1831-1875.

Many scarce public resources are allocated at below-market-clearing prices and sometimes for free. Such ?nonmarket? mechanisms sacrifice some surplus, yet they can potentially improve equity. We develop a model of mechanism design with redistributive concerns. Agents are characterized by a privately observed willingness to pay for quality, a publicly observed label, and a social welfare weight. A market designer controls allocation and pricing of a set of objects of heterogeneous quality and maximizes the expectation of a welfare function. The designer does not directly observe individuals? social welfare weights. We derive structural insights about the form of the optimal mechanism, leading to a framework for determining how and when to use nonmarket mechanisms.

Alfaro, I., et al. (2023). "The Finance Uncertainty Multiplier." Journal of Political Economy 132(2): 577-615.

We show how real and financial frictions amplify, prolong, and propagate the negative impact of uncertainty shocks. We use a novel instrumentation strategy to address endogeneity in estimating the impact of uncertainty by exploiting differential firm exposure to exchange rate, policy, and energy price volatility. We show that financially constrained firms cut investment more than unconstrained firms following an uncertainty shock. We then build a general equilibrium heterogeneous firms model with real and financial frictions, finding that financial frictions (i) amplify uncertainty shocks by doubling their impact on output; (ii) increase persistence by doubling the duration of the drop; and (iii) propagate uncertainty shocks by spreading their impact onto financial variables.

Andrew, A., et al. (2023). "Preschool Quality and Child Development." Journal of Political Economy 132(7): 2304-2345.

Globally, preschool enrollment has surged, but its quality is often poor. We evaluate strategies to improve quality of public preschools in Colombia. The first, designed by the government and rolled out nationwide, provided extra funding, mainly earmarked for hiring teaching assistants. The second also offered low-cost training for existing teachers. The first intervention had no effect on child development, while the second improved children?s cognitive development, especially for more disadvantaged children. This pattern can be explained by the interventions affecting teachers' behavior differently. The first led teachers to reduce their classroom time, including learning activities, while additional training offset the adverse effect on learning activities and improved teaching quality.

Anstreicher, G. (2023). "Spatial Influences in Upward Mobility." Journal of Political Economy 132(1): 149-199.

This paper extends a canonical model of intergenerational human capital investment to a geographic context to study the role of migration in influencing income mobility in the United States. The main result is that migration is considerably influential in shaping the high rates of economic mobility observed among children from low-wage areas, with human capital investment behavioral responses being important to consider. Equalizing school quality across locations does more to reduce interstate inequality in income mobility than equalizing skill prices, and policies that attempt to decrease human capital flight from low-wage areas via cash transfers are unlikely to be cost-effective.

Argente, D., et al. (2023). "The Life Cycle of Products: Evidence and Implications." Journal of Political Economy 132(2): 337-390.

We document that sales of individual products decline steadily throughout most of the product life cycle. Products quickly become obsolete as they face competition from newer products sold by competing firms and the same firm. We build a dynamic model that highlights an innovation-obsolescence cycle, where firms need to introduce new products to grow; otherwise, their portfolios become obsolete as rivals introduce their own new products. By introducing new products, however, firms accelerate the decline of their own existing products, further depressing their sales. This mechanism has sizable implications for quantifying economic growth and the impact of innovation policies.

Assad, S., et al. (2023). "Algorithmic Pricing and Competition: Empirical Evidence from the German Retail Gasoline Market." Journal of Political Economy 132(3): 723-771.

We provide the first empirical analysis of the relationship between algorithmic pricing (AP) and competition by studying the impact of adoption in Germany?s retail gasoline market, where software became widely available in 2017. Because adoption dates are unknown, we identify adopting stations by testing for structural breaks in AP markers, finding most breaks to be around the time of widespread AP introduction. Because station adoption is endogenous, we instrument using headquarter adoption. Adoption increases margins but only for nonmonopoly stations. In duopoly and triopoly markets, margins increase only if all stations adopt, suggesting that AP has a significant effect on competition.

Auten, G. and D. Splinter (2023). "Income Inequality in the United States: Using Tax Data to Measure Long-Term Trends." Journal of Political Economy 132(7): 2179-2227.

Concerns about income inequality emphasize the importance of accurate income measures. Estimates of top income shares based only on individual tax returns are biased by tax-base changes, social changes, and missing income sources. This paper addresses these shortcomings and presents new estimates of the distribution of national income since 1960. Our analysis of pretax income shows that top income shares are lower and have increased less since 1980 than other studies using tax data. In addition, increasing government transfers and tax progressivity have resulted in rising real incomes for all income groups and little change in aftertax top income shares.

Baldauf, M. and J. Mollner (2023). "Competition and Information Leakage." Journal of Political Economy 132(5): 1603-1641.

When seeking to trade in over-the-counter markets, institutional investors typically restrict both the number of potential counterparties they contact and the information they disclose (e.g., by requesting two-sided rather than one-sided quotes). We rationalize these important facts in a model featuring endogenous front-running. Although an additional contact intensifies competition and aids in finding a natural counterparty, it also intensifies information leakage?which can be costly if it helps a losing dealer to front-run. We also address information design: the client optimally provides no information about her trading direction when requesting quotes. We conclude with implications for market design and regulation.

Banerjee, A. and O. Compte (2024). "Consensus and Disagreement: Information Aggregation under (Not So) Naive Learning." Journal of Political Economy 132(8): 2790-2829.

We explore a model of non-Bayesian information aggregation in networks. Agents noncooperatively choose among Friedkin-Johnsen-type aggregation rules to maximize payoffs. The DeGroot rule is chosen in equilibrium if and only if there is noiseless information transmission, leading to consensus. With noisy transmission, while some disagreement is inevitable, the optimal choice of rule amplifies the disagreement: even with little noise, individuals place substantial weight on their own initial opinion in every period, exacerbating the disagreement. We use this framework to think about equilibrium versus socially efficient choice of rules and its connection to polarization of opinions across groups.

Baqaee, D. R., et al. (2023). "The Supply-Side Effects of Monetary Policy." Journal of Political Economy 132(4): 1065-1112.

We propose a supply-side channel for the transmission of monetary policy. We show that when high-markup firms have lower pass-throughs than low-markup firms, then positive demand shocks, such as monetary expansions, alleviate cross-sectional misallocation by reallocating resources to high-markup firms. Consequently, positive ?demand shocks? are accompanied by endogenous positive ?supply shocks? that raise productivity and lower inflation. We derive a tractable, four-equation model where monetary shocks generate hump-shaped productivity responses. In our calibration, the supply-side effect amplifies the total impact of monetary shocks on output by about 70%. We provide empirical evidence validating our model?s predictions using identified monetary shocks.

Bassetto, M. and W. Cui (2024). "A Ramsey Theory of Financial Distortions." Journal of Political Economy 132(8): 2612-2654.

The return on government debt is lower than that of assets with similar payoffs. We study optimal debt management and taxation when the government cannot directly redistribute toward the agents in need of liquidity but otherwise has access to a complete set of linear tax instruments. Optimal government debt provision calls for gradually closing the wedge between the returns as much as possible, but tax policy may work as a countervailing force: as long as financial frictions bind, it can be optimal to tax capital even if this magnifies the discrepancy in returns.

Baum-Snow, N. and L. Han (2023). "The Microgeography of Housing Supply." Journal of Political Economy 132(6): 1897-1946.

We perform a comprehensive neighborhood-level analysis of housing supply. Predictions of floor space and housing unit supply elasticities using our estimates average 0.5 and 0.3 across all urban neighborhoods in the United States, exhibiting greater variation within than between metro regions. New construction accounts for about 50% of unit supply responses, with important additional roles for teardowns and renovations. Supply responses grow with central business district distance mostly from the increasing availability of undeveloped land, flatter land, and less regulation. Identification comes from variation in labor demand shocks to commuting destinations, as aggregated using insights from a quantitative spatial equilibrium model.

Berger, A. N., et al. (2023). "Piercing through Opacity: Relationships and Credit Card Lending to Consumers and Small Businesses during Normal Times and the COVID-19 Crisis." Journal of Political Economy 132(2): 484-551.

We build a bridge between relationship lending and transactions lending?investigating relationship effects on contract terms for credit cards, a relatively pure transactions-lending technology. Using more than 1 million accounts, we find that during normal times, consumers with relationships obtain better terms but small businesses with relationships do not. Both groups obtain improved terms during COVID-19, consistent with intertemporal smoothing?relationship borrowers obtain more favorable terms during crises, paid for by worse terms in normal times. Among other findings, CARES Act impediments to reporting consumer delinquencies to credit bureaus, designed to protect customers, reduced informational value of credit scores, penalizing safer consumers.

Berlinski, S., et al. (2023). "Childcare Markets, Parental Labor Supply, and Child Development." Journal of Political Economy 132(6): 2113-2177.

We develop and estimate a model of supply and demand for childcare. On the demand side, households make consumption, labor supply, and childcare decisions. On the supply side, centers make entry, price, and quality decisions. In addition, both paid and informal caregivers are available. Child development is a function of the time spent with parents and nonparental care providers. We estimate the model using data from the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study, Birth Cohort, and perform policy experiments. Vouchers that can be used only in high-quality centers or by working mothers are particularly effective, since they deliver child development gains while increasing mothers? labor supply.

Best, J. and D. Quigley (2023). "Persuasion for the Long Run." Journal of Political Economy 132(5): 1740-1791.

We examine persuasion when the sole source of credibility today is a desire to maintain a public record for accuracy. A long-run sender plays a cheap talk game with a sequence of short-run receivers, who observe some record of feedback about past accuracy. When all feedback is public (as is standard in repeated games), persuasion frequently requires inefficient on-path punishment?even if accuracy is monitored perfectly. If instead the record publishes coarse summary statistics (as is common online), any communication equilibrium the sender prefers to one-shot cheap talk?including Bayesian persuasion?can be supported without cost.

Bisin, A. and T. Verdier (2023). "On the Joint Evolution of Culture and Political Institutions: Elites and Civil Society." Journal of Political Economy 132(5): 1485-1564.

We provide an abstract model of the interaction between culture and political institutions. The model is designed to study the political economy of elites and civil society on the determination of long-run socioeconomic activity. We characterize conditions such that the cultural traits of elites and civil society and the institutions determining their relative political power complement (substitute) each other, giving rise to a multiplier effect that amplifies (dampens) their combined ability to spur socioeconomic activity. We show how the joint dynamics may display hysteresis and oscillations, depending on the form of the interaction between elites and civil society.

Blum, B. S., et al. (2023). "The ABCs of Firm Heterogeneity When Firms Sort into Markets: The Case of Exporters." Journal of Political Economy 132(4): 1162-1208.

We develop a novel methodology for disentangling the demand and cost drivers of firm heterogeneity when firms sort themselves into different markets, and we apply it to export status differences. Our methodology results in joint estimates of firm-level productivity and of markups in every market, without imposing functional form restrictions on demand. We find that exporters, relative to nonexporters, (i) have flatter domestic demand curves?thicker domestic markets?and (ii) have higher demand conditional on productivity. Finally, (iii) these demand advantages translate to foreign markets, thereby leading to export status differences.

Bordalo, P., et al. (2023). "Belief Overreaction and Stock Market Puzzles." Journal of Political Economy 132(5): 1450-1484.

We construct an index of long-term expected earnings growth for S&P 500 firms and show that it has remarkable power to jointly predict future errors in expectations and stock returns, in both the aggregate market and the cross section. The evidence supports a mechanism whereby good news causes investors to become too optimistic about long-term earnings growth. This leads to inflated stock prices and, as beliefs are systematically disappointed, subsequent low returns in the aggregate market. Overreaction of long-term expectations helps resolve major asset-pricing puzzles without time-series or cross-sectional variation in required returns.

Born, B., et al. (2023). "Mr. Keynes Meets the Classics: Government Spending and the Real Exchange Rate." Journal of Political Economy 132(5): 1642-1683.

In economies with fixed exchange rates, the adjustment to government-spending shocks is asymmetric. Expansionary shocks are absorbed by the real exchange rate, contractionary shocks by output. This result emerges in a small open-economy model with downward nominal wage rigidity and is supported by new empirical evidence based on panel data from different exchange-rate regimes. The exchange-rate regime, economic slack, inflation, and how spending is financed all matter for the fiscal transmission mechanism in the way predicted by the model. Estimates that fail to distinguish between the effects of positive and negative shocks are subject to a ?depreciation bias.?

Bruhn, J., et al. (2024). "The Effects of Combat Deployments on Veterans’ Outcomes." Journal of Political Economy 132(8): 2830-2879.

As millions of soldiers deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan between 2001 and 2021, Veteran Affairs Disability Compensation payments quadrupled and the veteran suicide rate rose rapidly. We estimate the causal contribution of combat deployments to declining veteran well-being. Deployments increase injuries, combat deaths, and disability compensation, but we find limited effects on suicide, deaths of despair, financial health, incarceration, or education. Our estimates suggest that deployment cannot explain either the recent rise in disability payments, which is more likely driven by policy changes, or the surge in noncombat deaths, which is better explained by shifts in observable characteristics of soldiers.

Buchak, G., et al. (2023). "Beyond the Balance Sheet Model of Banking: Implications for Bank Regulation and Monetary Policy." Journal of Political Economy 132(2): 616-693.

We empirically document two adjustment margins that are usually absent from the predominant ?bank balance sheet lending? view of financial intermediation. For the shadow bank substitution margin, shadow banks substitute for traditional banks among loans that are easily sold. For the balance sheet retention margin, banks switch between balance sheet lending and selling loans based on their balance sheet strength. Estimates from a structural model show that these margins significantly shape policy responses, dampening the effect of capital requirements on lending whose costs are borne by wealthier borrowers. Secondary-market disruptions such as quantitative easing have significantly larger impacts on lending than capital requirements.

Budish, E., et al. (2023). "A Theory of Stock Exchange Competition and Innovation: Will the Market Fix the Market?" Journal of Political Economy 132(4): 1209-1246.

Will stock exchanges innovate to address latency arbitrage and the arms race for speed? This paper models how exchanges compete in the modern electronic era and how this shapes incentives for market-design innovation. In the status quo, exchange trading fees are competitive, but exchanges earn economic rents from selling speed. These rents create a wedge between private and social incentives to innovate and support the persistence of an inefficient market design in equilibrium of a market-design adoption game. We discuss implications for policy and insights for the literatures on market design, innovation, and platforms.

Burkhauser, R. V., et al. (2023). "Evaluating the Success of the War on Poverty since 1963 Using an Absolute Full-Income Poverty Measure." Journal of Political Economy 132(1): 1-47.

We evaluate progress in the War on Poverty as President Lyndon B. Johnson defined it, which established a 20% baseline poverty rate and adopted an absolute standard. While the official poverty rate fell from 19.5% in 1963 to 10.5% in 2019, our absolute full-income poverty measure?which uses a fuller income measure and updates thresholds only for inflation?fell from 19.5% to 1.6%. However, we also show that relative poverty reductions have been modest. Additionally, government dependence increased over this time, with the share of working-age adults receiving under half their income from market sources more than doubling.

Carmona, G. and K. Laohakunakorn (2023). "Improving the Organization of Knowledge in Production by Screening Problems." Journal of Political Economy 132(4): 1290-1326.

We extend Garicano?s model of optimal organizations by allowing problems to be screened. We show that when screening is as costly as solving problems, optimal organizations are hierarchies as in Garicano?s model, but when the cost of screening is small, workers screen all problems that they and the top managers cannot solve, those problems that they screen are sent directly to those who can solve them, and those problems that they neither solve nor screen are passed to the top managers. For intermediate values of the screening cost, the optimal organization is a hybrid of the above forms.

Carneiro, P., et al. (2023). "Impacts of a Large-Scale Parenting Program: Experimental Evidence from Chile." Journal of Political Economy 132(4): 1113-1161.

We present results from a large-scale experimental evaluation of a national parenting program in Chile. The program is low cost: it lasts only 6?8 weeks, and it is administered to groups of eight to 12 parents. It is implemented by the national health system, taking advantage of its existing physical infrastructure and human resources. We find that 3 years after the interventions ends, children whose parents are offered the opportunity to participate in this program increase their vocabulary and socioemotional development scores by 0.1 standard deviations, mirrored by similar improvements in caregiver?s parenting behaviors and beliefs.

Colonnelli, E., et al. (2023). "Investing with the Government: A Field Experiment in China." Journal of Political Economy 132(1): 248-294.

We conduct a large-scale, nondeceptive field experiment to elicit preferences for government participation in China's venture capital and private equity market. Our main result is that the average firm dislikes investors with government ties. We show that such dislike is not present with government-owned firms and that this dislike is highest with best-performing firms. Additional results and surveys suggest that political interference in decision-making is the leading reason why government investors are unattractive to private firms. Overall, our findings point to the limits of a model of ?state capitalism? that strongly relies on the complementarity between private firms and government capital to drive high-growth entrepreneurship and innovation.

Conley, T. G., et al. (2023). "Social Interactions, Mechanisms, and Equilibrium: Evidence from a Model of Study Time and Academic Achievement." Journal of Political Economy 132(3): 824-866.

We develop and estimate a model of student study time choices on a social network. The model is designed to exploit unique data in the Berea Panel Study. Study time data allow us to quantify an intuitive mechanism for academic social interactions: own study time may depend on friend study time in a heterogeneous manner. Social network data allow us to embed study time and resulting academic achievement in an estimable equilibrium framework. We develop a specification test that exploits the equilibrium nature of social interactions and use it to show that novel study propensity measures mitigate econometric endogeneity concerns.

Dávila, E., et al. (2023). "The Value of Arbitrage." Journal of Political Economy 132(6): 1947-1993.

This paper studies the social value of closing price differentials in financial markets. We show that arbitrage gaps exactly correspond to the marginal social value of executing an arbitrage trade. Moreover, arbitrage gaps and price impact measures are sufficient to compute the total social value from closing an arbitrage gap, which may emerge for different reasons, including nonpecuniary benefits of holding particular assets. Theoretically, we show that, for a given arbitrage gap, the total social value of arbitrage is higher in more liquid markets. We compute the welfare gains from closing arbitrage gaps for covered interest parity violations.

DellaVigna, S., et al. (2024). "Bottlenecks for Evidence Adoption." Journal of Political Economy 132(8): 2748-2789.

Governments increasingly use randomized controlled trials (RCTs) to test innovations, yet we know little about how they incorporate results into policymaking. We study 30 US cities that ran 73 RCTs with a national nudge unit. Cities adopt a nudge treatment into their communications in 27% of the cases. We find that the strength of the evidence and key city features do not strongly predict adoption; instead, the largest predictor is whether the RCT was implemented using preexisting communication, as opposed to new communication. We identify organizational inertia as a leading explanation: changes to preexisting infrastructure are more naturally folded into subsequent processes.

Demir, B., et al. (2023). "O-Ring Production Networks." Journal of Political Economy 132(1): 200-247.

We document strong skill matching in Turkish firms? production networks. Additionally, in the data, export demand shocks from rich countries increase firms? skill intensity and their trade with skill-intensive domestic partners. We explain these patterns using a quantitative model with heterogeneous firms, quality choices, and endogenous networks. A counterfactual economy-wide export demand shock of 5% leads both exporters and nonexporters to upgrade quality, raising the average wage by 1.2%. This effect is nine times the effect in a scenario without interconnected quality choices. We use the model to study the conditions for the success of export promotion policies.

Dewatripont, M. and J. Tirole (2024). "The Morality of Markets." Journal of Political Economy 132(8): 2655-2694.

Scholars and civil society have argued that competition erodes supplier morality. This paper establishes a robust irrelevance result, whereby intense market competition does not crowd out consequentialist ethics; it thereby issues a strong warning against the wholesale moral condemnation of markets and procompetitive institutions. Intense competition, while not altering the behavior of profitable suppliers, may, however, reduce the standards of highly ethical suppliers or not-for-profits, raising the potential need to protect the latter in the marketplace.

di Giovanni, J., et al. (2023). "Foreign Shocks as Granular Fluctuations." Journal of Political Economy 132(2): 391-433.

This paper uses a dataset covering the universe of French firm-level value-added, imports, and exports and a quantitative multicountry heterogeneous firm model to study the propagation of foreign shocks to the domestic economy. Foreign shocks are transmitted primarily through large firms as they are the most likely to trade internationally. At the micro level, the majority of the GDP impact of foreign shocks is accounted for by the ?foreign granular residual,? a statistic capturing larger firms? greater responsiveness to foreign shocks. At the macro level, firm heterogeneity attenuates the GDP impact of foreign shocks relative to a homogeneous firm counterfactual.

Dickstein, M. J., et al. (2023). "Market Segmentation and Competition in Health Insurance." Journal of Political Economy 132(1): 96-148.

In the United States, households obtain health insurance through distinct market segments. To explore the economics of this segmentation, we consider the effects of pooling coverage provided through small employers and through individual marketplaces. We model households? demand for insurance and health care along with insurers? price setting to predict equilibrium choices and premiums. Applying our model to data from Oregon, we find that pooling can mitigate adverse selection in the individual market and benefit small group households without raising taxpayer costs. Our estimates provide insight into the effects of new regulations that allow employers to shift coverage to individual marketplaces.

Diercks, A. M., et al. (2023). "When It Rains It Pours: Cascading Uncertainty Shocks." Journal of Political Economy 132(2): 694-720.

The effects of uncertainty shocks are superadditive. On the basis of local projections, we find that the combination of nearby positive shocks can be multiple times more powerful than the sum of their stand-alone effects. In a standard New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, uncertainty shocks are proven to be superadditive only when the model is solved under fourth- (or higher-)order perturbation. The fourth-order solution unlocks the fourth derivative of marginal utility, ?edginess,? which is key to generating stronger reactions to multiple risks and superadditivity. Intuitively, an agent already bearing one risk is less willing to bear another in the presence of edginess.

Doval, L. and A. Smolin (2024). "Persuasion and Welfare." Journal of Political Economy 132(7): 2451-2487.

Information policies such as scores, ratings, and recommendations are increasingly shaping society?s choices in high-stakes domains. We provide a framework to study the welfare implications of information policies on a population of heterogeneous individuals. We define and characterize the Bayes welfare set, consisting of the population?s utility profiles that are feasible under some information policy. The Pareto frontier of this set can be recovered by a series of standard Bayesian persuasion problems. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions under which an information policy exists that Pareto dominates the no-information policy. We illustrate our results with applications to data leakage, price discrimination, and credit ratings.

Eichenbaum, M., et al. (2024). "Expectations, Infections, and Economic Activity." Journal of Political Economy 132(8): 2571-2611.

This paper develops a quantitative theory of how people weigh the risks of infections against the benefits of engaging in social interactions that contribute to the spread of infectious diseases. Our framework takes into account the effects of public policies and private behavior on the spread of the disease. We evaluate the model using a novel micro panel dataset on consumption expenditures of young and older people across the first three waves of COVID-19 in Portugal. Our model highlights the critical role of expectations in shaping how human behavior influences the dynamics of epidemics.

Ek, A. (2023). "Cultural Values and Productivity." Journal of Political Economy 132(1): 295-335.

This paper estimates differences in human capital as country-of-origin-specific labor productivity terms in firm production functions, making it immune to wage discrimination concerns. After accounting for education and experience, estimated human capital varies by a factor of around three between the 90th and the 10th percentile. When I investigate which country-of-origin characteristics most closely correlate with human capital, cultural values are the only robust predictor. This relationship persists among children of migrants. Consistent with a plausible cultural mechanism, individuals whose origin places a high value on autonomy hold a comparative advantage in positions characterized by a low degree of routinization.

Englmaier, F., et al. (2024). "The Effect of Incentives in Nonroutine Analytical Team Tasks." Journal of Political Economy 132(8): 2695-2747.

Despite the prevalence of nonroutine analytical team tasks in modern economies, little is understood regarding how incentives influence performance in these tasks. In a series of field experiments involving more than 5,000 participants, we investigate how incentives alter behavior in teams working on such a task. We document a positive effect of bonus incentives on performance, even among teams with strong intrinsic motivation. Bonuses also transform team organization by enhancing the demand for leadership. Exogenously increasing teams? demand for leadership results in performance improvements comparable to those seen with bonus incentives, rendering it as a likely mediator of incentive effects.

Fan, X., et al. (2023). "Estimation of a Life-Cycle Model with Human Capital, Labor Supply, and Retirement." Journal of Political Economy 132(1): 48-95.

We estimate a life-cycle model of consumption, human capital investment, and labor supply. The interaction between human capital and labor supply toward the end of the life cycle is most novel. The estimates replicate the main features of the data, in particular the large increase in wages and small increase in labor supply at the beginning of the life cycle and the small decrease in wages but large decrease in labor supply toward the end. We show that incorporating human capital is critical when analyzing changes to Social Security.

Gabaix, X. and R. S. J. Koijen (2023). "Granular Instrumental Variables." Journal of Political Economy 132(7): 2274-2303.

We develop a new method to construct instruments in a broad class of economic environments. In the economies we study, a few large firms, industries, or countries account for an important share of economic activity. Idiosyncratic shocks to these large players significantly affect aggregate outcomes and are valid instruments. We provide a methodology to extract these idiosyncratic shocks to create granular instrumental variables (GIVs), which are size-weighted sums of idiosyncratic shocks. We show how GIVs enable us to estimate causal parameters, such as elasticities and multipliers, and are applicable in a broad range of empirically relevant settings.

Ganimian, A. J., et al. (2023). "Augmenting State Capacity for Child Development: Experimental Evidence from India." Journal of Political Economy 132(5): 1565-1602.

We use a large-scale randomized experiment to study the impact of augmenting staffing in the world?s largest public early-childhood program: India?s Integrated Child Development Services. Adding a worker doubled net preschool instructional time and led to increases of 0.28σ and 0.46σ in math and language test scores after 18 months for children who remained enrolled in the program and 0.13σ and 0.10σ for all children enrolled at baseline. Rates of stunting and severe malnutrition were also lower in the treatment group for children who remained enrolled. A cost-benefit analysis suggests that the benefits of augmenting staffing significantly exceed its costs. These effects are likely to replicate even at larger scales of program implementation.

Jagelka, T. (2023). "Are Economists’ Preferences Psychologists’ Personality Traits? A Structural Approach." Journal of Political Economy 132(3): 910-970.

I propose a method for mapping psychological personality traits to economic preferences. I use factor analysis to extract information on individuals? cognitive ability and personality and embed it within a random preference model to estimate distributions of risk and time preferences and parameters related to choice inconsistency. I explain up to 60% of variation in average risk and time preferences and individuals? capacity to make consistent choices using factors related to cognitive ability and three of the Big Five personality traits. Differences in preferred outcomes are related to personality, whereas mistakes in decisions are related to cognitive skill.

Jeenas, P. and R. Lagos (2023). "Q-Monetary Transmission." Journal of Political Economy 132(3): 971-1012.

We study the effects of monetary policy?induced changes in Tobin?s q on corporate investment and capital structure. We develop a theory of the mechanism, provide empirical evidence, evaluate the ability of the quantitative theory to match the evidence, and quantify the relevance for monetary transmission to aggregate investment.

Kapor, A., et al. (2024). "Aftermarket Frictions and the Cost of Off-Platform Options in Centralized Assignment Mechanisms." Journal of Political Economy 132(7): 2346-2395.

We study the welfare and human capital impacts of colleges? (non)participation in Chile?s centralized higher-education platform, leveraging administrative data and two policy changes: the introduction of a large scholarship program and the inclusion of additional institutions, which raised the number of on-platform slots by approximately 40%. We first show that the expansion of the platform raised on-time graduation rates. We then develop and estimate a model of college applications, offers, wait lists, matriculation, and graduation. When the platform expands, welfare increases, and welfare, enrollment, and graduation rates are less sensitive to off-platform frictions. Gains are larger for students from lower-socioeconomic-status backgrounds.

Kashyap, A. K., et al. (2023). "Optimal Bank Regulation in the Presence of Credit and Run Risk." Journal of Political Economy 132(3): 772-823.

We modify the 1983 Diamond and Dybvig model so that banks offer liquidity services to depositors, raise equity funding, make risky loans, and invest in safe, liquid assets. Banks monitor borrowers to ensure that they repay loans and they are susceptible to depositor runs. We model the run decision by solving a novel global game. Relative to a social planner, banks opt for a more deposit-intensive capital structure, their assets may be more or less lending intensive, and the level of lending may be higher or lower. Correcting these three distortions requires a package of three regulations.

Lerner, J., et al. (2023). "Financial Innovation in the Twenty-First Century: Evidence from US Patents." Journal of Political Economy 132(5): 1391-1449.

We explore the evolution of financial innovation using US finance patents. Patented financial innovations are substantial and increasingly economically important. Their subject matter has changed, consistent with the industry?s shift toward household investors and borrowers. Information technology (IT) and other nonfinancial firms drove the surge in financial patenting. The location of innovation shifted, with banks moving activity away from states with tight financial regulation and high-tech regions attracting innovation by payments, IT, and nonfinancial firms. Analyses of returns suggest that the social value of these innovations is higher than their private value. We present a simple model to explain these trends.

Lin, X. and C. Liu (2023). "Credible Persuasion." Journal of Political Economy 132(7): 2228-2273.

We propose a new notion of credibility for Bayesian persuasion problems. A disclosure policy is credible if the sender cannot profit from tampering with her messages while keeping the message distribution unchanged. We show that the credibility of a disclosure policy is equivalent to a cyclical monotonicity condition on the policy?s induced distribution over states and actions. We also characterize how credibility restricts the sender?s ability to persuade under different payoff structures. In particular, when the sender?s payoff is state independent, all disclosure policies are credible. We apply our results to the market for lemons and show that no useful information can be credibly disclosed by the seller.

Low, C. (2023). "The Human Capital–Reproductive Capital Trade-Off in Marriage Market Matching." Journal of Political Economy 132(2): 552-576.

Throughout the twentieth century, the relationship between women?s human capital and men?s income was nonmonotonic: while college-educated women married richer spouses than high school?educated women, graduate-educated women married poorer spouses than college-educated women. This can be rationalized by a bidimensional matching framework where women?s human capital is negatively correlated with another valuable trait: fertility, or reproductive capital. Such a model predicts nonmonotonicity in income matching with a sufficiently high income distribution of men. A simulation of the model using US Census fertility and income data shows that it can also predict the recent transition to more assortative matching as desired family sizes have fallen.

Martellini, P., et al. (2023). "The Global Distribution of College Graduate Quality." Journal of Political Economy 132(2): 434-483.

We measure college graduate quality?the average human capital of a college?s graduates?for graduates from 2,800 colleges in 48 countries. Graduates of colleges in the richest countries have 50% more human capital than graduates of colleges in the poorest countries. Migration reinforces these differences: emigrants from poorer countries are highly positively selected on human capital. Finally, we show that these stocks and flows matter for growth and development by showing that college graduate quality predicts the share of a college?s students who become inventors, engage in entrepreneurship, and become top executives both within and across countries.

Mazzonna, F. and F. Peracchi (2023). "Are Older People Aware of Their Cognitive Decline? Misperception and Financial Decision-Making." Journal of Political Economy 132(6): 1793-1830.

We investigate whether older people correctly perceive their cognitive decline and the potential financial consequences of misperception. First, we show that older people tend to underestimate their cognitive decline. We then show that those experiencing a severe decline but unaware of it are more likely to suffer wealth losses. These losses largely reflect decreases in financial wealth and are mainly experienced by wealthier people who were previously active on the stock market. Our findings support the view that financial losses among older people unaware of their cognitive decline are the result of bad financial decisions, not of rational disinvestment strategies.

Mityakov, S. and T. A. Mroz (2023). "Unobserved Inputs in Household Production." Journal of Political Economy 132(6): 1876-1896.

Most household production studies ignore unobserved inputs. Without additional assumptions, however, estimated impacts of the observed inputs cannot provide informative estimates of marginal products because of contaminating variations in unobserved inputs. Not even the signs of marginal impacts can be ascertained. One can establish the direction of these biases and significantly reduce them by including detailed information about nonproductive (pure consumption) goods in the analysis. Estimates from prior demand studies can also help determine the direction of the bias. We describe the stringent assumptions one must invoke in the absence of such additional information to be able to relate estimated effects to the true marginal products.

Nirei, M. and J. A. Scheinkman (2023). "Repricing Avalanches." Journal of Political Economy 132(4): 1327-1388.

We present a menu-cost pricing model with a large but finite number n of firms. A firm?s nominal price increase lowers other firms? relative prices, thereby inducing further nominal price increases. The distribution of these ?repricing avalanches? converges as n?∞ to a mixture of generalized Poisson distributions with an indexofdispersion=1/(1??)2, where ? is determined by the equilibrium of the continuous limit. We calibrate the model to the US experience during 1988?2005 and obtain a ? surprisingly close to unity. Our model accounts for the positive relationship between inflation level and volatility observed in the data.

Noack, F. and C. Costello (2024). "Credit Markets, Property Rights, and the Commons." Journal of Political Economy 132(7): 2396-2450.

Credit markets and property rights are fundamental for modern economies, but their implications for the commons are unknown. Using a dynamic model of competitive resource extraction, we show that improving property right security unambiguously increases conservation incentives, but the effect of credit markets on resource extraction effort hinges on the security of property rights. We test these predictions using data on global fisheries, credit markets, and the largest ever marine property rights assignment. We find that property right security reduces resource extraction and that credit market development increases resource extraction under insecure property rights but reduces resource extraction under secure property rights.

Nocke, V. and P. Rey (2023). "Consumer Search, Steering, and Choice Overload." Journal of Political Economy 132(5): 1684-1739.

We develop a model of within-firm sequential, directed search and study a firm?s ability and incentive to steer consumers. We find that the firm often benefits from adopting a noisy positioning strategy, which limits the information available to consumers. This induces consumers to keep searching but discourages some of them from visiting the firm. This occurs even though the firm and the consumers have in common an interest in maximizing the probability of trade. Because of such noisy positioning, an increase in the size of the product line further discourages consumers from visiting the firm?consistent with choice overload.

Nybom, M. and J. Stuhler (2024). "Interpreting Trends in Intergenerational Mobility." Journal of Political Economy 132(8): 2531-2570.

Studying a dynamic model of intergenerational transmission, we show that past events affect contemporaneous trends in intergenerational mobility. Structural changes may generate long-lasting mobility trends that can be nonmonotonic, and declining mobility may reflect past gains rather than a recent deterioration of equality of opportunity. We provide two applications. We first show that changes in the parent generation have partially offset the effect of rising skill premia on income mobility in the United States. We then show that a Swedish school reform reduced the transmission of inequalities in the directly affected generation but increased their persistence in the next.

Oberfield, E., et al. (2023). "Plants in Space." Journal of Political Economy 132(3): 867-909.

To decide the number, size, and location of its plants, a firm balances the benefit of delivering goods from multiple plants with the cost of setting up and managing these plants and the potential for cannibalization among them. Modeling the decisions of heterogeneous firms in an economy with a vast number of distinct locations involves a large combinatorial problem. Using insights from discrete geometry, we study a tractable limit case of this problem in which these forces operate at a local level. Our analysis delivers predictions on sorting across space. Compared with less productive firms, productive firms place more plants in dense, high-rent locations and fewer plants in markets with low density and low rents. We present evidence consistent with these and several other predictions, using US establishment-level data.

Ortner, J., et al. (2023). "Mediated Collusion." Journal of Political Economy 132(4): 1247-1289.

Cartels and bidding rings are often facilitated by intermediaries, who recommend prices/bids to firms and can impose penalties (such as reverting to competitive behavior in future interactions) if these recommendations are not followed. Motivated by such cases, we study correlated equilibria in first-price procurement auctions with complete information, where bidders who disobey their recommendations are penalized. Cartel-optimal profit is greater when more information about submitted bids is disclosed at auction and when the maximum penalty is larger. When only the winner?s identity is disclosed (or the winner?s identity and bid), cartels do not benefit from mediation. Our main result characterizes the cartel-optimal equilibrium with two symmetric bidders when both bids are disclosed. The optimal equilibrium involves extensive randomization and displays tied bids and high winning bids with positive probability, even when the maximum penalty is very small. The stationary mediation schemes we consider are always more profitable for the cartel than bid rotation.

Papadia, A. and C. A. Schioppa (2023). "Foreign Debt, Capital Controls, and Secondary Markets: Theory and Evidence from Nazi Germany." Journal of Political Economy 132(6): 2074-2112.

We investigate how internal distribution motives can affect the implementation of an important macroeconomic policy: capital controls. To do this, we study one of history?s largest debt repatriations, which took place under strict capital controls in 1930s Germany, providing a wealth of quantitative and historical evidence. We show that the authorities kept private repatriations under strict control, thus avoiding detrimental macroeconomic effects, while allowing discretionary repatriations in order to reap internal political benefits. We formalize this mechanism in a model in which elite capture can affect optimal debt repatriations and the management of official reserves under capital controls.

Pastorino, E. (2023). "Careers in Firms: The Role of Learning about Ability and Human Capital Acquisition." Journal of Political Economy 132(6): 1994-2073.

Job and wage mobility can arise from firms and workers learning about workers? ability and from workers acquiring human capital with experience. To date, the relative importance of these two mechanisms is debated. Using administrative data from one firm, I estimate a structural model that integrates them. I find the direct effect of beliefs about ability on wages, which existing work has focused on, to be small. However, by improving the sorting of workers to the firm?s jobs, learning about ability is indirectly a crucial determinant of wage growth and dispersion.

Resnjanskij, S., et al. (2023). "Can Mentoring Alleviate Family Disadvantage in Adolescence? A Field Experiment to Improve Labor Market Prospects." Journal of Political Economy 132(3): 1013-1062.

We study a mentoring program that aims to improve the labor market prospects of disadvantaged adolescents. Our randomized controlled trial investigates its effectiveness on three outcomes highly predictive of later labor market success: math grades, patience/social skills, and labor market orientation. For low-SES (socioeconomic status) adolescents, the mentoring increases a combined index of the outcomes by over half a standard deviation after 1 year, with significant increases in each outcome. Effects on grades and labor market orientation, but not on patience/social skills, persist 3 years after program start. By that time, the mentoring also improves early realizations of school-to-work transitions for low-SES adolescents. The mentoring is not effective for higher-SES adolescents.

Rotberg, S. and J. B. Steinberg (2024). "Tax Evasion and Capital Taxation." Journal of Political Economy 132(7): 2488-2529.

Wealth inequality has prompted calls for higher taxes on capital income and wealth but also concerns that rich households would respond by concealing their assets offshore. We use a general equilibrium model to study how taxing capital more heavily would affect offshore tax evasion and how this would affect the broader economy. Without evasion, tax revenue could be increased dramatically, inequality could be reduced, and widespread welfare gains could be achieved. After accounting for evasion, however, tax revenue would rise marginally or even fall, inequality would increase, and widespread welfare losses would result.

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