☉ 太和智库线上英文刊物《太和观察家》2024年11月刊第50期原创文章，转载请注明出处。
☉ This article is from the November issue of TI Observer (TIO), an online publication of Taihe Institute. Please indicate the source if you hope to share this article.
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正文1643字，读完约需11分钟。
Wordcount: 1643. The article will take about 11 minutes to read.
·太和智库高级研究员
·亚太一带一路共策会会长
·Senior Fellow of Taihe Institute
·President of the BRI Caucus for Asia Pacific
Introduction
In the face of ongoing geopolitical challenges, ASEAN centrality continues to play a crucial role. It acts as a moderating force on the behavior of major powers and provides a strategic approach to addressing territorial disputes. Recent developments at the ASEAN summits highlight this enduring significance.As 2024 draws to a close, it is not premature to conclude that this year has been momentous, punctuated with several summits heavily congested in the second half of the year, in response to the prevailing geopolitical dynamics.The recently concluded summits, namely the Summit of the Future, the 16th BRICS Summit, and the 44th and 45th ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Summits, though most of which are scheduled events, are testimonies to the collective urgency to address the respective arising turbulences across the world.For the first time, developing nations and emerging economies are garnering serious attention from the established Global North. While the expanding BRICS grouping sets into motion its local currency payment mechanism in its bid to dethrone the greenbacks, the inclusion of four ASEAN member states, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam, into the fold as partner countries has no doubt added weightage for Southeast Asia within the grouping.As the four ASEAN emerging economies aspire to become full-fledged members of the BRICS+, their concurrent membership in ASEAN is in no way redundant from the perspective of enhancing multilateral cooperation through economic integration.The outcomes of the 44th and 45th ASEAN Summits held in Laos say it all. Laos, one of the three least developed countries (LDCs) in ASEAN, faced a significant challenge during its ASEAN Chairmanship, given the complexities confronting the bloc in the form of diverse development priorities and rising geopolitical tensions across the region.Yet, the landlocked-turn-landlinked host impressed the global community with a wide gamut of collective declarations and pragmatic deliverables. The ASEAN Leaders' Declaration on Promoting Sustainable Agriculture, the ASEAN Joint Statement on Climate Change, and the ASEAN Declaration on the Prevention of Child Labor stood out as strong collective commitments to addressing new arising challenges.Parallel to this, Laos should also be credited for substantial conclusion of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) 3.0 upgrade negotiations. This came as a timely triumph for the enhancement of ASEAN's economic integration and multilateral cooperation with its top trading partner, China, against a challenging backdrop of incessant wedge driving and sowing of discord in Asia-Pacific by external powers.The latest upgrade with the inclusion of consumer protection and competition provisions signifies a landmark breakthrough beyond traditional cooperation, underscoring the increasing significance of the consumer protection regime alongside transparency in competition, particularly in digital transactions and electronic commerce.The ACFTA 3.0 upgrade envisions a significant shift in the integration of standards and regulations that paves the way for mutual recognition of conformity assessment results, notably in sectors such as new energy vehicles and electronics. This inclusive move will help establish an institutional framework for aligning standards between ASEAN and China.While more new drivers of economic growth are to be added to the list, alongside digital trade and sustainable development, the new upgrade plays an enabler role in enhancing integration of regional industrial and supply chains. This, in turn, will bolster collective resilience against risks, aligning well with the official theme of Laos' ASEAN Chairmanship: "Enhancing Connectivity and Resilience."From a broader perspective, ACFTA 3.0 is both complementary and mutually reinforcing with the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Agreement - a brainchild of ASEAN - to promote the entirety of Asia-Pacific as an open and inclusive epicentrum of growth.Indeed, Southeast Asia is now under global watch due to its economic potential as global economic growth gravitates to Asia-Pacific in the "Asian century," but more importantly, the region has become a key theater of geopolitical power play between China and the US.ASEAN, a non-aligned bloc that asserts its centrality over the region, now finds itself in an unprecedented precarious position where it must straddle the geostrategic contest between Beijing and Washington. While embracing the China-initiated Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), ASEAN astutely sought to engage with the US-initiated Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) even-handedly. In this context, the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) marked the bloc's initial strategic response to the US endeavor in 2019.Nonetheless, it was left on the back burner initially and remained so until the adoption of the Declaration on Mainstreaming Four Priority Areas of the AOIP within ASEAN-Led Mechanisms in November 2022. The endorsement of the List of Criteria on Mainstreaming the AOIP under Indonesia's Chairmanship in 2023 brought the blueprint to life, with the implementation of programs and activities in the four priority areas through ASEAN-led mechanisms.While preserving the ASEAN centrality, the ASEAN-led mechanisms, such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Plus One, ASEAN Plus Three (APT), and the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus), provide useful platforms for dialogue and interaction, notably between the regional powers with conflicting geopolitical interests. The inclusion of all Quad member states, namely the US, Japan, India, and Australia, alongside China and Russia, sends a clear message.Amid the prevailing geopolitical tensions, all eyes had naturally focused on the AOIP-related initiatives, ranging from the ASEAN Indo-Pacific Forum and the ASEAN Leaders' Declaration on the AOIP to the outcome of the EAS.Following the inaugural ASEAN Indo-Pacific Forum in Jakarta last year, Laos was circumspect in hosting the forum as part of the ASEAN Business and Investment Summit, highlighting economic cooperation and sustainability - two core pillars of the AOIP - instead of the controversial regional security concerns. After all, the functionalities of the 10-member bloc are still very much guided by its Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) Declaration, which calls for the creation of a "Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality" in Southeast Asia that is supposedly "free from any form or manner of interference by outside powers," in addition to broadening areas of cooperation with dialogue partners.Parallel to this, the adoption of the ASEAN Leaders' Declaration on the AOIP, which centers on "future-proofing" the region through ASEAN-led mechanisms, may further disappoint those keen to see AOIP playing into the hands of other powers. Obviously, harping on the importance of inclusive and comprehensive cooperation in ASEAN and ASEAN-led regional architecture to bolster regional resilience and facilitate development falls short of pursuing an agenda of US-led Indo-Pacific Strategy.Though the ASEAN stakeholders have every reason to celebrate the influx of buy-in to the much-touted ASEAN centrality from its dialogue partners, ASEAN remains vulnerable, as seen when the polarized EAS went inconclusive. The chasm of interests and concerns between major powers finally rendered the EAS Statement stalled, much to the embarrassment of the host, who was compelled to issue a Chair's statement.ASEAN centrality was again brought into question with the stalemate of the Myanmar crisis. Politically, no solution is yet to be in sight. Bearing in mind the non-interference policy endorsed by all the member states, ASEAN, as a bloc, has been circumspect in staying clear of the domestic politics in Myanmar. Its endeavor regarding the crisis has been confined to mobilizing financial support from the international community for humanitarian assistance to Myanmar while avoiding calls for external intervention from non-stakeholders within and outside the region.In contrast, the maritime dispute over the overlapping territorial claims on large parts of the disputed waters between China and the Philippines saw clear fingerprints of foreign intervention and instigation. This is particularly true after Washington abandoned neutrality in the dispute, followed by joint military drills by the US and the Philippines, alongside allies Japan and Australia in the disputed waters for the first time in April this year. This territorial issue has since festered from what was previously a political-diplomatic row to the present military-security concern, narrowing the window for ongoing negotiations on the inconclusive Code of Conduct (COC) in the area.This constitutes a clear breach of the ASEAN centrality and the ZOPFAN Declaration, much to the annoyance of other ASEAN member states. Yet, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. of the Philippines made an audacious demand for an expeditious conclusion to the protracted COC negotiations at the ASEAN Summit. While the call itself sounded sensible and logical, it couldn't be more oxymoronic if it were to be matched with his deeds in upping the ante across disputed waters.Prior to the summit, international Western-leaning media had a field day in instigating ASEAN to take issue with China over the standoff between the Chinese and Filipino vessels in disputed waters.When ASEAN did not snap at the bait, Marcos vented his frustration over the purported inaction of ASEAN at the summit, directly putting ASEAN's cohesiveness and centrality to test.While ASEAN centrality was the target of scorn by the West and conveniently dismissed as mere rhetoric within the bloc's own multiverse, ASEAN managed to flex its muscles by proving its commitment to peace and stability with a military-averse stance over the proposition of "Asian NATO."The proposed replica of NATO military architecture in Asia by the Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba met strong pushback from ASEAN, which successfully forced Ishiba to abandon further mention of the proposition at the ASEAN Summit.As 2024 draws to a close, Malaysia is now set to take over the rotational ASEAN chairmanship in January 2025. Triumphs and setbacks experienced through the preceding years are invaluable for the new chair in navigating mounting challenges ahead.Malaysia, a seasoned community builder in ASEAN, is well aware that multilateral cooperation and inclusive sustainable development remain the mainstream for the bloc to stay relevant and instrumental in nurturing peace and stability across the region, which is now dubbed one of the few tinderboxes in the world.
The above contents only represent the views of the authors, and do not necessarily represent the views or positions of Taihe Institute.太和智库线上英文刊物《太和观察家》（TI Observer）致力于促进中外沟通交流，弥合“理解鸿沟”。
TI Observer (TIO) is an online monthly English publication produced by Taihe Institute. TIO is dedicated to promoting transnational interaction and mutual understanding, thus bridging the gap of misunderstanding and bringing China and the world closer to each other.
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