今年诺奖获得者Daron Acemoglu 的学术水平很有限，其论文类似西方大学排名。
Daron Acemoglu研究制度经济学。他的论文之一是，Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson。该论文给制度的特性打分，然后计算制度总分，最后得出结论: 民主就是好。
该教授的另一篇论文是，INSTITUTIONS AS THE FUNDAMENTAL CAUSE OF LONG-RUN GROWTH 制度对经济增长的长期影响。
下面是该论文的摘要。从摘要可以看出，他把南北朝鲜的个案差异上升到理论和规律的高度。这显然是没有逻辑基础的。该论文的其它部分也没有逻辑基础。
经济学诺奖果真有西方政治企图。
This paper develops the empirical and theoretical case that differences in economic institutions are the fundamental cause of differences in economic development. We first document the empirical importance of institutions by focusing on two "quasi-natural experiments" in history, the division of Korea into two parts with very different economic institutions and the colonization of much of the world by European powers starting in the fifteenth century. We then develop the basic outline of a framework for thinking about why economic institutions differ across countries. Economic institutions determine the incentives of and the constraints on economic actors, and shape economic outcomes. As such, they are social decisions, chosen for their consequences. Because different groups and individuals typically benefit from different economic institutions, there is generally a conflict over these social choices, ultimately resolved in favor of groups with greater political power.
The distribution of political power in society is in turn determined by political institutions and the distribution of resources. Political institutions allocate de jure political power, while groups with greater economic might typically possess greater de facto political power. We therefore view the appropriate theoretical framework as a dynamic one with political institutions and the distribution of resources as the state variables. These variables themselves change over time because prevailing economic institutions affect the distribution of resources, and because groups with de facto political
power today strive to change political institutions in order to increase their de jure political power in the future. Economic institutions encouraging economic growth emerge when political institutions allocate power to groups with interests in broad-based property rights enforcement, when they create effective constraints on power-holders, and when there are relatively few rents to be captured by power-holders. We illustrate the assumptions, the workings and the implications of this framework using a number of historical examples.
