据CAR官网显示，来自都柏林大学的Yong Kyu Gam、上海外国语大学的刘春波，合作的论文“Bank relationship and contractual flexibility: Evidence from covenant enforcement”在国际会计学顶刊《Contemporary Accounting Research》线上正式发表。
Title: Bank relationship and contractual flexibility: Evidence from covenant enforcement
银行关系与合同灵活性：来自契约执行的证据
Yong Kyu Gam
都柏林大学
刘春波
上海外国语大学
This paper investigates how banks utilize soft information to provide contractual flexibility in loan covenant enforcement. We find that relationship lenders are significantly less likely than non-relationship lenders to enforce covenants for material violations when borrowers are potentially in breach of financial covenants. The mitigation of information asymmetry by relationship lending, as opposed to alternative explanations, serves as the underlying mechanism. Furthermore, relationship borrowers with potential covenant breaches are less likely to experience increases in loan interest rates after renegotiation, to adopt conservative financial or investment policies, or to file for bankruptcy. Following potential covenant breaches of borrowers, relationship banks are better able to preserve regulatory capital and secure future lending business. Our findings suggest that soft information accumulated during lending relationships is vital for banks to provide contractual flexibility.
本文研究了银行如何利用软信息在贷款契约执行中提供合同灵活性。我们发现，与非关系贷款人相比，关系贷款人在借款人可能违反财务契约时，显著不太可能执行契约条款。关系贷款通过减少信息不对称，而不是其他替代解释，作为潜在的机制。此外，对于可能违反契约的关系借款人，在重新谈判后不太可能经历贷款利率的增加，不太可能采取保守的财务或投资政策，或者申请破产。在借款人可能违反契约之后，关系银行更能够保留监管资本并确保未来的贷款业务。我们的发现表明，在贷款关系中积累的软信息对于银行提供合同灵活性至关重要。
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