学术活动 | 北大哲学系一周学术活动一览(11.11—11.17)

文摘   2024-11-10 21:52   北京  

2024.11.11—11.17

学术活动

一览


1

2024.11.12


A Sound and Complete Axiomatization
for Intuitionistic Linear Temporal Logic

系列     逻辑前沿报告


——主讲人    Lukas Zenger(伯尔尼大学)


——时间        2024.11.12   15:10—18:00


——方式        线下


地点        地学楼206


简介        

Intuitionistic linear temporal logic iLTL extends intuitionistic propositional logic with the temporal modalities 'next', 'eventually' and 'henceforth'. Formulas are evaluated over expanding models, i.e. intuitionistic Kripke models equipped with an order-preserving function representing the temporal dynamics. The mathematical theory of iLTL has been studied extensively in recent years, resulting, amongst others, in a decidability proof for iLTL over expanding models. However, providing a sound and complete axiomatization has remained an open problem.In this talk I will first summarize the state of the field, including some of the main results about the proof theory and model theory of (fragments of) iLTL. I will then propose an extension of iLTL with the co-implication connective of Heyting-Brouwer logic called bi-intuitionistic linear temporal logic biLTL. By using the technical notion of a quasimodel, I will show that this extension is still decidable for the class of expanding models. Moreover, I present a sound and complete Hilbert-style calculus for biLTL, the first for any logic extending iLTL. As an unexpected corollary, I will show that no notion of co-implication is definable in a topological setting validating bi-intuitionistic logic.This is joint work with David Fernández-Duque (University of Barcelona) and Brett McLean (Ghent University).


2

2024.11.13


Against Meta-Internalism

系列         哲学会饮系列讲座

            

主讲人     Anton Alexandrov (北京大学哲学系)

            

时间         2024.11.13   12:10


方式        线下


地点        李兆基人文学苑2号楼B112


简介        


Internalism and externalism in the philosophy of mind and language are well known positions. In the paper Cohnitz & Haukioja 2012 the question is raised in virtue of what these positions might hold. They argue for meta-internalism, i.e. the view that psychological states of a speaker determine whether the one or the other position holds regarding the reference and meaning of a particular term the speaker uses. In this talk I explore the prospects of meta-internalism. I point out that the view reflects misunderstandings of the first order positions and a misconception about how thought experiments work.



供稿 | 各教研室

排版 | 刘枫林

审核 | 王彦晶

发布 | 刘枫林

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