How to deal with the hard-right threat in Germany ？
As extremists win more votes across Europe, forming moderate and effective governments is getting harder
随着极端分子在欧洲赢得更多选票，要组建温和而有效的政府变得越来越困难。
2024年9月05日 09:06 上午
IT WOULD BE comforting to play down the significance of the votes in two German states on September 1st, when the hard-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party lost in Saxony by a whisker and scored a nine-point lead over its nearest rival in Thuringia. Yes, this victory is the first the hard right has won in a state election in Germany since the second world war. And yes, its leader in Thuringia is a nasty piece of work with two criminal convictions for using a slogan popularised by the Nazi brownshirts and banned under German law. But Thuringia is home to less than 3% of Germans. It is about as representative as Wyoming in America, where Donald Trump took 68% of the votes in 2016, or Clacton in Britain, which elected Reform UK’s leader, Nigel Farage, in July.
9月1日在德国两个州的选举中，极右翼的德国选择党（AfD）在萨克森州以微弱劣势落败，在图林根则领先其最接近的竞争对手9个百分点。是的，这是自二战以来极右翼首次在德国州级选举中获胜。而且，该党在图林根的领导人有两项因使用纳粹冲锋队口号而被定罪的犯罪记录，该口号在德国法律中被禁止使用。但图林根只居住着不到3%的德国人。它就像美国怀俄明州或英国克莱顿一样代表性不高，在2016年特朗普赢得了怀俄明州68% 的选票，并于7月份改革英国党领导人奈杰尔·法拉奇（Nigel Farage）当选为议员。
Yet what happens in Thuringia does not stay there. Polls show support for the AfDis running at 16-17% nationally, with the anti-migrant Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) at 8%, and another radical anti-capitalist party on 3%. Almost a third of Germans favour extreme parties.
然而，图林根发生的事情并不会只影响那里。民调显示，全国范围内，阿迪福斯的支持率为16%至17%，反移民的萨哈拉·瓦根克内希特联盟（BSW）的支持率为8%，另一激进反资本主义政党的支持率为3%。几乎三分之一的德国人都倾向于极端政党。
Germany is hardly alone. In France Marine Le Pen’s hard-right National Rally and its allies hold 25% of parliamentary seats, with another 13% for the radical-left Unsubmissive France party of Jean-Luc Mélenchon. Or look at Italy, where the hard-right parties the Brothers of Italy, led by Giorgia Meloni, and the League, led by Matteo Salvini, together took 35% of the vote in the election in 2022. Austria heads to the polls this month with the hard-right Freedom Party in the lead, on about 27%. Hungary is ruled by an ultra-nationalist who believes in antisemitic and homophobic conspiracy theories.
德国并不是唯一一个出现这种情况的国家。在法国，极右翼政党“国民联盟”（National Rally）及其盟友占据了议会席位的25%，让-吕克·梅朗雄（Jean-Luc Melenchon）领导的极左翼“不屈法国”（Unsubmissive France）党占据了另外13%的席位。再看意大利，由乔治娅·梅洛尼（Giorgia Meloni）领导的极右翼政党“意大利兄弟党”和由马泰奥·萨尔维尼（Matteo Salvini）领导的“联盟党”，两者在2022年选举中共获得35% 的选票。本月，奥地利将举行大选，“自由党”（Freedom Party）预计将以约27% 的支持率领先。匈牙利则被一个相信反犹太主义和反同性恋阴谋论的极端民族主义者所统治。
Rising support for extremists is concerning in its own right. But it has a pernicious knock-on effect. In order to form moderate governments that exclude extremists, the diminished mainstream parties are being forced to construct ever more unwieldy coalitions that often prove bad at governing. In a vicious cycle, disappointment further fuels support for the anti- establishment parties. Germany’s national government, a hapless three- party coalition, is a case in point and next year’s federal elections may be followed by more tortuous coalition negotiations. It may take months to form state governments in Thuringia and Saxony. The same dynamic explains why it took two months after France’s president, Emmanuel Macron, held a snap parliamentary election, for him to name a prime minister, and it is doubtful that his new government will survive for long.
越来越多人支持极端分子确实令人担忧。而且这种情况还会带来一系列不良影响。为了组建排除极端分子的温和政府，主流政党的实力被削弱，他们不得不组建越来越复杂的联盟，结果往往是执政效果欠佳。这就形成了一个恶性循环，失望进一步助长了反体制政党的支持。以德国为例，目前的三方联合政府就显得有些无能，在明年的联邦选举后可能会出现更加曲折复杂的联合谈判过程。在图林根州和萨克森州，也许需要数月时间才能组建起州级政府。同样道理也解释了为什么法国总统埃马纽尔·马克龙（Emmanuel Macron）进行突然议会选举两个月后才任命首相，并且他新组建的政府是否能够长期掌权还存在疑问。
How, then, to handle the extremes? The answer depends on just how nasty they are. In some cases the problem is surmountable. Take Italy. Ms Meloni’s party has its roots in neo-fascism, but she has been intelligent enough to moderate its policies to the extent that few could plausibly claim that her government is unacceptable in a liberal state. The lure of power is a strong incentive to evolve. In France Ms Le Pen is trying to tack towards the responsible centre. So far, no other party will formally deal with the National Rally, but in the future, perhaps under another leader, that may change. Even now, business folk in France are more worried by Mr Mélenchon’s ruinous policies than by Ms Le Pen.
那么，该如何应对极端主义呢？答案取决于极端主义的恶劣程度。在某些情况下，问题可以得到解决。以意大利为例。权力的诱惑是一个强大的激励因素，促使人们不断进步。在法国，勒庞女士正试图向负责任的中间派靠拢。目前，其他政党不会正式与“国民联盟”打交道，但在未来，也许在另一位领导人的领导下，情况可能会改变。即使现在，法国商人也更担心梅朗雄的毁灭性政策，而不是勒庞。
Another model is Sweden, where the anti-immigrant Sweden Democrats support a minority centre-right government, and have moderated their conduct in return for influence. In the Netherlands the right-wing firebrand, Geert Wilders, has been tied down inside a four-party coalition led by a technocrat; he had to drop his most incendiary proposals, such as banning the Koran. Bringing extremists in from the cold is no guarantee that they will be tamed, however. It did not work with Austria’s Freedom Party, despite two spells in office.
另一个例子是瑞典，那里的反移民瑞典民主党支持少数中右政府，并以此换取了影响力。在荷兰，右翼激进分子、基尔特·威尔德斯（Geert Wilders）被束缚在由技术官僚领导的四党联合政府中；他不得不放弃了一些最极端的提议，比如禁止《古兰经》。然而，将极端分子从边缘地带拉入主流政治并不能保证他们会变得温和。尽管奥地利自由党（Austria's Freedom Party）曾两度执政，但这种做法并未奏效。
Germany is the toughest nut to crack. Deals with the leftist BSW may be deemed necessary, though risky. But the AfD has a long way to go before the cordon sanitaire that keeps it out of office should be breached. It is not just individuals like the Thuringian leader who are the problem; there and in Saxony, the state-level AfD outfits are designated by Germany’s intelligence service as “proven” extremists, as is the party’s national youth arm. Treating the AfD like pariahs reinforces its appeal among the discontented; but the alternative is worse.
德国是最难对付的。可能需要与左翼基民盟（BSW）达成交易，尽管有风险。但要让联盟党（AfD）进入执政阵营还有很长的路要走。问题不仅在于像图林根州领导人这样的个人；在那里和萨克森州，德国情报部门已经确认了该地区级别的AfD组织以及该党全国青年团体为“已证实”的极端分子。把AfD当作社会贱民只会增强它在不满者中的吸引力；但另一种选择更糟糕。
The best way to grapple with the extremists is to deal with the grievances that boost their popularity. Dismissing the concerns of a third or more of the electorate is not just anti-democratic, it is anti-pragmatic. Loading the costs of the energy transition onto consumers evokes fury: central governments need to pick up more of the tab. Solving local irritants, such as a lack of teachers, can soothe voters’ general discontent. The most intractable problem, however, is immigration. Liberals shy away from getting tough. Yet the perception that migration is out of control fuels the hard right more than anything else. Reinforcing Europe’s external borders, deporting failed asylum-seekers and integrating those who stay are all difficult. But until governments look as though they are trying harder, the rise of the right will continue, and the centre will go on evaporating.
要对付极端分子，最好的办法就是解决导致他们受欢迎的不满情绪。忽视三分之一以上选民的关切不仅是反民主，也是没头脑。把能源转型成本全都推给消费者会引起愤怒：中央政府需要承担更多责任。解决当地问题，比如教师短缺，可以缓和选民普遍的不满情绪。然而，最难搞定的问题还是移民。自由派回避采取强硬立场。但事实上，移民失控观念比其他任何事情都更助长了极右翼势力发展。加强欧洲外部边境管控、遣返被拒收避难者并接纳留下来移民都很困难。但除非政府看起来更加卖力地解决问题，否则极右翼势力将持续崛起，并且中间派将消失得无影无踪。
