War in Ukraine may only intensify under Trump, says Dmytro Kuleba

The country’s former foreign minister explains the powderkeg that is three leaders in a cannot-lose standoff

该国前外交部长解释了三名领导人在一场不能输的对峙中的火药桶

2024年11月14日 08:53 上午

BETWEEN 2016 AND 2022, Western diplomats and journalists frequently asked Ukrainian officials what Ukraine was prepared to concede to Russia for peace. This was more than mere curiosity. It was the tip of a policy iceberg submersed in the belief that peace could be achieved by sacrificing Ukrainian interests to Russia. Look at the headlines since February 2022 to see where this approach has led.

2016年至2022年间，西方外交官和记者经常询问乌克兰官员，为了和平，乌克兰准备向俄罗斯做出哪些让步。这不仅仅是出于好奇。这只是政策冰山的一角，人们相信，通过向俄罗斯牺牲乌克兰的利益，就能实现和平。但看看自2022年2月以来的头条新闻，就会知道这种做法导致了什么。

Since Donald Trump’s re-election, I’ve spoken to European and American media outlets only to learn that, nearly three years into Russia’s full-scale invasion, we are back to these same questions. It is painful to realise that Ukrainians may again pay the price imposed by those who misunderstand the situation. Whatever ideas Mr Trump and his entourage may entertain with regard to ending the war, they will be checked by reality.

自从唐纳德·特朗普连任以来，我与欧洲和美国媒体进行了交谈，结果却得知，在战争全面爆发三年后，我们又回到了同样的问题。令人痛苦的是，乌克兰人可能会再次为那些误解局势的人付出代价。无论特朗普及其随行人员对结束战争抱有何种想法，他们都将受到现实的检验。

The first question to pose instead has nothing to do with the Ukrainian position: how to pique Vladimir Putin’s interest in stopping the war? It is undeniable that Russia’s army is making progress in the creeping occupation of Ukraine. Mr Putin reads that as hard evidence that the current strategy of Ukraine and its partners does not work. He disdains the West for its weakness and indecisiveness, and believes that he will eventually prevail because those partners will be incapable of providing Ukraine with sufficient support to match Russia’s impressive war effort. Yet, if Mr Putin were as strong as he wants us to believe, why would he import thousands of North Korean troops and rely on North Korean ammunition?

相反，要提出的第一个问题与乌克兰的立场无关：如何激起弗拉基米尔·普京停止战争的兴趣？不可否认，俄罗斯军队在悄然占领乌克兰方面正在取得进展。普京认为，这是乌克兰及其合作伙伴当前战略行不通的确凿证据。他鄙视西方的软弱和优柔寡断，并相信他最终会获胜，因为这些合作伙伴将无法为乌克兰提供足够的支持，以匹配俄罗斯令人印象深刻的战争努力。然而，如果普京真如他希望我们相信的那样强大，他为什么要进口数千名朝鲜军队并依赖朝鲜的弹药呢？

Analysts seem to build their peace models on the assumption that Mr Putin is a rational decisionmaker. They miss the point that he is fighting the war of his life, and that his ambitions extend beyond mere territory. On the timeline of Russian history, he places himself as Vladimir III, following Peter I, who drowned Ukraine’s struggle for independence in blood following the victory at Poltava in 1709, and Catherine II, who dismantled Ukraine’s autonomy within the empire and destroyed its last Cossack stronghold in 1795. Mr Putin views subjugating Ukraine as a core part of his legacy; any failure to do so would mark him as the first Russian tsar who fell short. That is to say, a loser.

分析人士似乎建立和平模型的假设是普京是一位理性的决策者。他们忽略了一点：他正在打一场一生的战争，而他的野心超越了单纯的领土。在俄罗斯历史的时间轴上，他将自己定位为弗拉基米尔三世，继彼得一世之后，彼得一世在1709年波尔塔瓦的胜利后，用血淹没了乌克兰的独立斗争，而叶卡捷琳娜二世则在1795 年瓦解了乌克兰在帝国内部的自治权，消灭了最后的哥萨克人。 普京将征服乌克兰视为其政治遗产的核心部分。如果未能做到这一点，他将成为第一位未达预期的俄罗斯沙皇。也就是说——一个失败者。

Across the Atlantic, Mr Trump cannot afford to appear weak either. He must demonstrate to the entire world that his plan—whatever it is—is far better than Joe Biden’s. He may believe that the current strategy will not stop Russia’s advances and therefore must change.Fair enough. But he should realise that the strategy is failing not because it is fundamentally flawed, but rather because it was never fully implemented. Half-measures and half-resolve have led to half-results.

在大西洋彼岸，特朗普也不能表现得软弱。他必须向全世界证明，他的计划——无论是什么——都比乔·拜登的计划好得多。他可能认为当前的战略不会阻止俄罗斯的前进，因此必须改变。这很公平。但他应该认识到，该战略失败并不是因为它存在根本缺陷，而是因为它从未得到充分实施。马马虎虎的措施与决心导致了马马虎虎的结果。

Many believe Mr Trump will strip Ukraine of financial assistance to force it into a more accommodating mood. Yet President Volodymyr Zelensky would not immediately bend; he would still have some support from America, dispatched in the final days of Mr Biden’s administration, plus more from Europe.

许多人认为，特朗普将剥夺乌克兰的财政援助，以迫使其采取更加宽松的态度。然而，弗拉基米尔·泽伦斯基总统并没有立即屈服。他仍将获得美国在拜登执政最后几天提供的一些支持，以及来自欧洲的更多支持。

If the money were to dry up, a new dynamic would come into play, and not all of it on the battlefield. True, bereft of funding, Ukraine could lose ground completely. If the Trump administration then imposed unpalatable peace terms on Ukraine, and if Mr Zelensky agreed (an unlikely scenario), part of Ukrainian society would resist. Domestic unrest would risk the country’s internal collapse. That would give Mr Putin the victory he has long desired, painting Ukraine as a failed state—but responsibility for it would fall squarely on Mr Trump. He cannot afford for Ukraine to become his Afghanistan.

如果资金枯竭，新的动力将会发挥作用，但并非全部都在战场上。诚然，如果失去资金，乌克兰可能会彻底失利。如果特朗普政府随后对乌克兰强加令人难以接受的和平条款，并且泽连斯基先生同意（这种情况不太可能发生），那么部分乌克兰社会就会抵制。国内动乱可能导致国家内部崩溃。这将使普京获得他长期以来渴望的胜利，将乌克兰描绘成一个失败的国家——但其责任将完全落在特朗普身上。他不能让乌克兰成为他的阿富汗。

Neither Mr Zelensky nor Mr Putin will agree to anything like the Minsk agreements that reduced but did not end hostilities after Russia’s annexation in 2014 of Crimea. Both leaders have invested too heavily to accept such half-measures now. And the idea that territory-for-security could work is misguided. The war would not end if Ukraine were to reclaim its 1991 borders, nor if both sides were to agree on a new dividing line. The war will end only when Mr Putin accepts Ukraine’s right to exist as an independent and democratic Western power. Mr Putin will not accept legal losses of his territorial gains, and Ukraine cannot accept otherwise.

泽连斯基和普京都不会同意明斯克协议之类的协议，该协议减少了但并未结束俄罗斯 2014年克里米亚事件后的行动。两位领导人都投入了太多资金，现在无法接受这种半途而废的措施。以领土换安全的想法是错误的。即使乌克兰收回 1991 年的边界，或者双方就新的分界线达成一致，战争也不会结束。只有当普京接受乌克兰作为独立、民主的西方国家存在的权利时，战争才会结束。普京不会接受其领土收益遭受法律损失，乌克兰也不能接受其他情况。

Hence, even if any temporary solution is reached it will simply be a pause before the next conflict. It may sound counterintuitive, but under these circumstancesNATOmembership would be the only way to prevent Ukraine from reclaiming its lands in the future. But Mr Putin would not accept Ukrainian membership of NATO.

因此，即使达成任何临时解决方案，也只是下一次冲突之前的暂停。这听起来可能有悖常理，但在这种情况下，加入北约将是阻止乌克兰未来收回领土的唯一途径。但普京不会接受乌克兰加入北约。

In sum, none of these three leaders—Trump, Putin or Zelensky—can afford to lose. Ukrainian and Russian leaders see this war as defining their lives. Mr Trump cannot simply throw Ukraine under the bus. That would make him look weak in the short term, and in the long one force him to restore assistance to a yet more weakened and bleeding Ukraine.

总而言之，特朗普、普京或泽连斯基这三位领导人都输不起。乌克兰和俄罗斯领导人认为这场战争决定了他们的生活。特朗普不能简单地将乌克兰抛在一边。这会让他在短期内显得软弱，而从长远来看，会迫使他恢复对更加虚弱和流血的乌克兰的援助。

Those who crave de-escalation led by the president-elect, then, may be stunned to see the complete opposite in the coming months. Right now both Mr Zelensky and Mr Putin view Mr Trump as their chance to tip the scales in their favour. Mr Trump, in turn, will be compelled to follow them in escalating his own line.

那么，那些渴望在候任总统领导下缓和紧张局势的人可能会惊讶地发现，在未来几个月里，情况会完全相反。目前，泽连斯基和普京都将特朗普视为他们扭转局面的机会。反过来，特朗普也将被迫追随他们，升级自己的路线。

It is of course too early to say how this new Ukraine conundrum will play out. But it is clear that instead of focusing on what Ukraine will accept, the only viable way forward should be forcing Russia to accept peace.■

当然，现在说这个新的乌克兰难题将如何解决还为时过早。但很明显，唯一可行的出路应该是迫使俄罗斯接受和平，而不是关注乌克兰会接受什么。

PS：德米特罗·库莱巴（Dmytro Kuleba）是乌克兰前外交部长兼副总理。