《经济学人》财经专栏|弗拉基米尔·普京陷入痛苦的经济困境

文摘   2024-11-25 13:02   韩国  

Vladimir Putin is in a painful economic bind


Russia’s reliance on China is becoming a problem

俄罗斯对中国的依赖正成为一个问题


2024年11月21日 05:52 上午

MOST CENTRAL BANKSare cutting interest rates. Not Russia’s. Last month policymakers raised rates to 21%, a two-decade high; markets expect them to reach 23% by the year’s end. The shift is all the more unusual as it is happening at a time of war, when central bankers are normally loth to suppress economic activity.

大多数中央银行都在降息。但俄罗斯并非如此。上个月政策制定者将利率提高至 21%,创二十年来新高;市场预计到年底这一比例将达到 23%。这种转变更加不寻常,因为它发生在战争时期,当时央行行长通常不愿意抑制经济活动。

Russia’s economy hasconfounded analystssince the country invaded Ukraine in February 2022. Despite facing one of the tightest sanction regimes in modern history, it has undergone itsfastest expansionin more than a decade. Russia enjoyed growth of 3.6% last year and is expected to maintain such a pace this year. Yet rather than being a demonstration of strength, the central bank’s decision to lift interest rates is a warning of trouble to come.

自 2022 年 2 月战争爆发以来,俄罗斯经济一直令分析师感到困惑。尽管面临现代历史上最严厉的制裁制度之一,但其经济却经历了十多年来最快的扩张。俄罗斯去年经济增长3.6%,预计今年将保持这一速度。然而,央行加息的决定并不是实力的展示,而是对即将到来的麻烦的警告。

Government outgoings are increasingly difficult to sustain. Russia’s budget, unveiled in September, included a plan to increase defence spending by a quarter next year. Taken together, annual expenditures on defence and security—a separate budget item that covers the intelligence services—are now expected to rise to 17trn roubles ($170bn), an amount representing more than 40% of all government spending or 8% of Russia’sGDP. Defence spending alone will be 6% of Russian national income, the most since the cold war.

政府支出越来越难以维持。俄罗斯九月份公布的预算包括明年将国防开支增加四分之一的计划。总体而言,国防和安全的年度支出(涵盖情报服务的单独预算项目)目前预计将升至 17 万亿卢布(1700 亿美元),占所有政府支出的 40% 以上或俄罗斯 GDP 的 8% 。仅国防开支就将占俄罗斯国民收入的6%,为冷战以来最高水平。

Although that is a lot, it is not unusual for a country at war. America’s defence spending, for example, was 8-10% ofGDPduring the Vietnam war. In the second world war the great powers devoted 40-60% of their economic output to military ends. The crucial difference is to be found in monetary policy. British policymakers in the early 1940s endeavoured, and mostly succeeded, in fighting what they termed “a 3% war”, keeping interest rates near that level. America’s Federal Reserve held rates at 2.5% during the same conflict. Lower borrowing costs helped keep the large deficits affordable. By contrast, in Russia, the yield on ten-year sovereign debt has risen from around 6% before the war to 16%.

虽然数量不少,但对于一个处于战争状态的国家来说,这并不罕见。例如,越南战争期间,美国的国防开支占GDP的8-10%。第二次世界大战期间,大国将40-60%的经济产出用于军事目的。关键的区别在于货币政策。 20 世纪 40 年代初,英国政策制定者努力打响所谓的“3% 战争”,并将利率维持在该水平附近,并且大部分取得了成功。在同一场冲突期间,美国联邦储备委员会 (Federal Reserve) 将利率维持在 2.5%。较低的借贷成本有助于维持巨额赤字的承受能力。相比之下,俄罗斯十年期主权债务收益率已从战前的 6% 左右上升至 16%。



Hard labour


苦役


Conscripting prisoners and hiring North Korean soldiers is an unconventional indicator of a hot jobs market, but it is one nonetheless. Russia’s unemployment rate sits at a mere 2.4%. Spare capacity has been used up and the economy is showing all the classic signs of overheating. Annual inflation is running at more than 8%. Although increasing interest rates is the textbook response to such a situation, it raises borrowing costs. In the 1940s America and Britain kept inflation in check through a combination of steep increases in personal taxation, designed more to hold back household spending than to raise revenues, and rationing. In today’s Russia such measures would be deeply unpopular, as well as difficult to square with Vladimir Putin’s propaganda.

征召囚犯和雇用朝鲜士兵是就业市场火爆的一个非常规指标,但它确实是一个。俄罗斯的失业率仅为2.4%。闲置产能已经耗尽,经济正在显现出所有典型的过热迹象。年通货膨胀率超过8%。尽管加息是应对这种情况的教科书式反应,但它却提高了借贷成本。 20 世纪 40 年代,美国和英国通过大幅增加个人税收(更多的是为了抑制家庭支出而不是增加收入)和配给来控制通货膨胀。在今天的俄罗斯,此类措施将非常不受欢迎,也很难与弗拉基米尔·普京的宣传相一致。

There is another reason why the country has been forced to tighten monetary policy. For most of the second world war neither Britain nor America had to be especially concerned about the external value of their currency. The dollar benefited from being seen as a haven, while America’s “Lend Lease” programme provided Britain with both military equipment and resources such as oil and food, doing so pretty much for nothing. Had Britain lacked an ally with the deep pockets and industrial capacity of America, willing and able to supply two-thirds of its imports, then the fall in the value of the pound would have become a military problem.

国家被迫收紧货币政策还有一个原因。在第二次世界大战的大部分时间里,英国和美国都不必特别担心本国货币的外部价值。美元因被视为避风港而受益,而美国的“租借”计划为英国提供了军事装备以及石油和食品等资源,而这样做几乎是免费的。如果英国缺乏一个拥有美国雄厚财力和工业能力的盟友,愿意并且能够供应其三分之二的进口产品,那么英镑贬值将成为一个军事问题。

Mr Putin’s difficulty is that he lacks such an ally. China has become Russia’s most important trading partner, providing a third of all imports and more than 90% of microelectronics, which are used in drones, missiles and tanks. Yet such support is not being offered free. Russian officials must therefore keep an eye on the value of their currency in terms of the yuan; this year it has fallen by 7%, to near its lowest since shortly after the war began. Russia, unlike the allies in the second world war, faces an external vulnerability. That, rather than inflation, is ultimately what has pushed interest rates to record highs.

普京的困难在于他缺乏这样的盟友。中国已成为俄罗斯最重要的贸易伙伴,提供了俄罗斯三分之一的进口产品和90%以上的微电子产品,这些产品用于无人机、导弹和坦克。然而,这种支持并不是免费提供的。因此,俄罗斯官员必须密切关注其货币以人民币计算的价值;今年下降了 7%,接近战后不久以来的最低水平。与第二次世界大战中的盟国不同,俄罗斯面临着外部脆弱性。最终推动利率创历史新高的是这一因素,而不是通货膨胀。

Until recently, the Russian government had cushioned the economy from higher borrowing costs. A variety of schemes made it easier for households to suspend debt payments and for firms to borrow at lower subsidised rates, with the government stepping in to compensate banks for lost income. There are signs, though, that such programmes are becoming unaffordable. Amortgage-subsidy scheme, which had allowed borrowing at a cost of just 8% when official rates were much higher, ended on July 1st. Mortgage volumes fell by half the next month. Corporate bankruptcies have risen by 20% this year. The Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, a trade body, reckons investment plans for next year are being put on hold because of heavy borrowing costs.

直到最近,俄罗斯政府一直在缓解经济因借贷成本上升而受到的影响。各种计划使家庭更容易暂停偿还债务,企业更容易以较低的补贴利率借款,而政府则介入补偿银行的收入损失。不过,有迹象表明此类项目正变得难以承受。一项抵押贷款补贴计划于 7 月 1 日结束,该计划在官方利率高得多的情况下只允许以 8% 的成本借款。下个月抵押贷款量下降了一半。今年企业破产数量增加了20%。贸易机构俄罗斯工业家和企业家联盟认为,由于借贷成本高昂,明年的投资计划将被搁置。

Higher interest rates will crimp spending by both companies and consumers. TheIMFexpects Russian economic growth to slow sharply to 1.3% next year. EvenVEB, the state-run development bank, has cut its growth estimate to 2%. A combination of lower investment and manpower lost to the front is taking a toll. The need to maintain the value of the rouble in order to pay for crucial imports is a vulnerability for Mr Putin, and one which could soon undermine his ability to fight. He may be hoping that Donald Trump keeps his promise to bring the conflict to an end. Waging a 3% war is one thing; a 21% war is quite another.

较高的利率将抑制公司和消费者的支出。国际货币基金组织预计俄罗斯明年经济增速将大幅放缓至1.3%。就连国有开发银行 VEB 也将增长预期下调至 2%。投资减少和前线人力流失造成了损失。需要维持卢布的价值以支付重要的进口商品,这对普京来说是一个弱点,而且很快就会削弱他的战斗能力。他可能希望唐纳德·特朗普信守承诺,结束冲突。发动3%的战争是一回事,但发动3%的战争是一回事。 21%的战争则完全是另一回事。 ■


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