Even though the severity of anthropogenic climate change is generally known, failure to respond is tied to various, complex reasons. And while many of said reasons can be defined as technical, such as the difficult transition from fossil-fuel to renewable technologies, the problem is far more rooted in politics for the US. Partisanship is arguably one of the greatest social barriers to climate change mitigation in the US, which has led to a primarily state-based and local-based patchwork of approaches to decarbonisation. From the 1980s/90s, a counter-movement against climate change mitigation has resulted in more uncertainty towards climate science, mainly from political conservatives. The polarity of standing on climate change can be linked to social identity and social affiliation, in which the concept of partisanship for individuals (especially from a young age), will shape views/opinions according to their “in-group views”; i.e. an individual with an in-group doubting the validity of climate science will adjust/change their views to match, so as not to be the odd one out.
Social identity theory itself is a complex topic, crafted by years and years of life experience, that largely dictates how we define ourselves and think (of others and ourselves). Individuals can have layers of social identity and be categorised via various means, e.g. salience of group affiliation, such as in the form of partisanship. Partisanship can be defined across two dimensions: positive (“expressive”) and negative. The former focuses on being/staying a part of the “in-group”, while the latter emphasises on opposing the “out-group(s)”. Particularly in the US, negative partisanship has seen a significant rise in the past decade, with a key example being the opposition to climate change policies. That being said, expressive partisanship is still more prevalent in the US. Additionally, when partisanship is low, there is far less polarity between democrats and republicans on climate change policy. Moreover, expressive partisanship does not appear to be barrier to engaging (or wanting to engage) in climate change mitigation for republications.
In fact, it can be quite the opposite in many cases with high expressive partisanship. Instead, concerns are more founded on other factors, such as costs and risks. So long as these are appropriately addressed, it can be argued that highly-expressive Republicans may be more willing than previously assumed to engage in climate change mitigation, albeit further research is required to be certain. This is not to say that negative partisanship is unnecessary/should be completely eradicated. Democrats who subscribe to a more negative partisanship are found to be much more supportive of climate change policies, compared to expressive democrats, for the betterment of the Earth and to “defeat” the opposition (i.e. republicans). Therefore, negative partisanship could be utilised among the US democratic party to encourage and support climate change policies. And depending on the extent, negative partisanship can (and has) result in significant paradigm shifts in either direction.
尽管人为气候变化的严重性众所周知，但未能做出反应与各种复杂的原因有关。 虽然上述许多原因都可以定义为技术性的，例如从化石燃料到可再生技术的艰难过渡，但这个问题更多地源于美国的政治。 党派之争可以说是美国减缓气候变化的最大社会障碍之一，这导致了主要基于州和地方的脱碳方法的拼凑。 从 1980 年代/90 年代开始，反对减缓气候变化的反运动导致气候科学的不确定性增加，主要来自政治保守派。 气候变化立场的两极可以与社会认同和社会归属联系起来，其中个人（尤其是年轻时）的党派观念将根据他们的“群体观点”塑造观点/意见； 也就是说，一个处在怀疑气候科学有效性的群体中的人会调整/改变他们的观点以免成为一个奇怪的不合群的人。
社会认同理论本身是一个复杂的话题，由多年的生活经验精心打造，在很大程度上决定了我们如何定义自己和思考（他人和我们自己）。 个人可以具有社会身份的层次，并可以通过各种方式进行分类，例如 团体从属关系的显着性，例如以党派偏见的形式。 党派关系可以从两个维度来定义：积极的（“表达性的”）和消极的。 前者侧重于成为/留在“群体内”的一部分，而后者则强调反对“群体外”。 特别是在美国，消极党派偏见在过去十年中显着上升，一个重要的例子就是反对气候变化政策。 话虽如此，表达性党派偏见在美国仍然更为普遍。 此外，当党派倾向较低时，民主党和共和党在气候变化政策上的对立就会少得多。 此外，共和党中的表达性党派偏见似乎并不妨碍他们参与（或想要参与）对气候变化采取应对措施。
事实上，在许多具有高度表现力的党派倾向的情况下，情况可能恰恰相反。 相反，担忧更多地基于其他因素，例如成本和风险。 只要这些问题得到适当解决，就可以说，高度表达的共和党人可能比以前假设的更愿意参与减缓气候变化，尽管需要进一步的研究才能确定。 这并不是说消极的党派偏见是不必要的/应该完全根除。 与富有表现力的民主党人相比，支持更消极党派关系的民主党人被发现更支持气候变化政策，以改善地球并“击败”反对派（即共和党人）。 因此，美国民主党可以利用消极的党派关系来鼓励和支持气候变化政策。 根据程度的不同，消极的党派关系可以（并且已经）导致任一方向的重大转变。
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