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编者按：针对2023年以来一些国际主流媒体对中央集中统一领导金融工作政策导向的误读，11月27日，中国人民大学重阳金融研究院研究员李珊珊在香港《南华早报》发表评论文章，分析了在中国当前国情下党中央对金融工作集中统一领导的必要性、影响及效果。现将文章中英文版发布如下：2017年举行的中国第五次全国金融工作会议首次强调“要坚持党中央对金融工作集中统一领导”。2023年的中央金融工作会议进一步指出，“加强党中央对金融工作的集中统一领导，是做好金融工作的根本保证。”
2023年以来，中国的金融监管改革动向在主流国际媒体引发了广泛讨论。有观点认为，加强集中监管和强调金融业的政治性，会通过对资本和信贷配置的干预加大金融不稳定，因为如果市场参与者都遵循中央认可的行为模式采取统一行动，可能加大顺周期性风险，催生泡沫。还有观点认为，中国已经明确将金融体系的功能定位为公用事业，而非市场导向的商业机构。
这些观点虽然提供了一些宝贵洞见，但由于缺乏对这一监管理念背后复杂国情的深入理解，并不全面客观。
“集中统一领导”的监管方法深深植根于中国特有的治理架构。“准财政联邦”是中国政府的基本治理架构，对中国模式的理解必须置于这一治理框架下。中国式“准财政联邦”并非真正的联邦制，而是政治集权与财政半分权的结合。中国地方政府在地方经济决策中具有较大自主权，但又没有破产机制。很多地方金融机构的实控人又有地方政府背景，与地方政府有着紧密关联，增加了金融业治理的复杂性。近年来中国政府一直致力于优化央地权力结构，降低扭曲市场行为的政府隐性担保。然而，鉴于中国巨大的经济体量，不均衡的区域发展格局和日益复杂的国内外环境，这一改革过程必然是渐进的。
这一治理模式在金融领域导致的核心问题是风险分担的不对称性。在一个理想的公司治理架构中，股东承担首要风险，同时获得相匹配的回报，是企业价值上升的最大潜在受益者。而在中国的这一治理架构下，中央政府是金融风险和金融稳定责任的最终承担者，收益和风险严重不对等，地方政府和金融机构缺少足够的动机管控金融风险，进而决定了中国金融业鲜明的政治性特征。
事实上，权责一致原则一直位于中国改革议程的核心，财政分权改革是改革开放以来提升经济活力，实现持续高增长的重要驱动之一早已成为政界和学界共识。金融领域的持续改革同样带来了金融监管、风险管理、金融科技创新能力的显著提升，但在这一过程中，教训也是相当惨重的。中国过去二十多年的金融改革在摸索中谨慎前行，主要是学习西方发达国家，尤其是美国模式，并结合自身国情进行了一定的优化调整。尽管中国金融监管机构在这一进程中竭力取长补短，并努力平衡市场和监管的关系，在监管指标体系的构建上成效尤为突出，但由于国家治理模式的特殊性，无先例可循，仍未避免金融治理薄弱、监管不足、监管盲点和地方政府财政软约束等问题，导致近年来腐败案件触目惊心，地方债务风险加大，中小金融机构频繁爆雷。在这一背景下，金融监管集中化的必要性凸显，“加强党中央对金融工作的集中统一领导”反映了中国强化金融监管和改善金融风险管理的努力。
尽管可能引发影响效率的担忧，但“集中统一领导”是中国在波动加大的国内外环境中致力于维护金融稳定的一种务实策略。中国区域发展不平衡，漫长的边境线上民族和外交关系复杂，使得在维护社会和经济稳定发展问题上，中央的统一协调非常关键。中国数千年历史也表明，社会稳定是中国经济发展的关键条件之一，而由于中国金融业独有的政治性特征，金融稳定与社会稳定又密不可分。
近年来，随着国内经济压力上升和地缘政治风险升级，金融稳定变得至关重要。金融治理结构的缺陷，金融体系的道德风险和风险管理不善，对中国的金融稳定构成了最为紧迫的威胁，亟需通过“集中统一领导”尽快“止血”。
“集中统一领导”对金融风险防范和处置能力的提升在改革效果中占据主导地位。虽然集中化可能在一定程度上会拉长监管链条，削弱金融机构的灵活性和效率，但其主要目的是避免监督分散和监管盲点，确保各级政府之间更有效的合作，加强对地方当局和金融实体的监督。至关重要的是，并无明显证据显示中国政府强化了对个体金融机构信贷投向和经营决策的干预。在近年的现实环境下，其更为主要的效应在于对金融监管层和金融机构管理层道德风险的缓释，及对金融风险事前防控和事后处置能力的提升作用。
在这一层面，“集中统一领导”在应对中国金融体系面临的最紧迫挑战方面已被证明是有效的。中国金融监管层发布的数据显示，2023年全国高风险机构数量有所下降，2017年以来影子银行风险也显著收敛，地方政府债的风险处置也在中央统筹下有序推进，金融风险呈现总体可控趋势。虽然行业整体财务数据显示，近年看金融机构盈利能力逐步下行，但其中更多源自国内外宏观大环境的影响。
更为重要的是要认识到，“集中统一领导”是实现目标的一种手段，而非终极目标，也并不代表中国金融治理的根本转变，而是朝着更可控、更高效的监管体系迈出的关键一步。最终目标不是简单的集中权力，而是建立一个更具凝聚力的框架，以适应进一步有序的权力下放。在此基础上，金融监管机构一直在通过加强央地合作来推进分权改革，改革还涉及优化和简化两个层面的组织框架。随着国内外经济政治环境日益复杂，中国必将以一种适合其独特政治经济背景的方式稳健不懈地深化金融改革。
China’s move to centralise oversight of financial sector shouldn’t be feared
In 2017, at its highest-level financial work conference, China stressed the need for the country’s financial affairs to be under centralised and unified party leadership. This was reaffirmed at the five-yearly conference last year, which spoke of strengthening party leadership over the financial sector.Since last year, China’s evolving financial regulatory reform has sparked widespread debate in the international media. Critics warn that heightened centralisation and political oversight could, through interventions in capital and credit allocation, exacerbate financial instability.They argue that uniform adherence to centrally approved guidelines could lead to synchronised market behaviour, amplifying procyclical risks and inflating asset bubbles. Others contend that China’s reforms represent a fundamental reorientation of its financial system, with a focus on financial institutions as utilities rather than as market-driven entities.But these critiques often fall short of fully capturing the complexity and broader context of China’s regulatory approach.China’s approach of “centralised and unified leadership” is deeply rooted in its governance structure, which blends political centralisation with partial fiscal decentralisation. This arrangement, often described as a “quasi-fiscal federalism”, grants local governments much autonomy in economic decision-making, but without formal bankruptcy mechanisms. Many local financial institutions maintain close ties with local governments, adding complexity to the financial landscape.Beijing has worked to recalibrate the balance of power between central and local governments and to mitigate implicit guarantees that distort market behaviour. Yet, given China’s size and the growing complexity of domestic and international environments, these reforms necessarily proceed gradually.At the heart of this governance model is the asymmetry in risk-sharing. In a sound corporate governance system, shareholders bear the primary risks and receive matching returns. In China, however, the central government is the de facto guarantor of financial stability.The asymmetry leaves local governments and financial institutions with insufficient incentives to prudently manage financial risks. This is the political distinctiveness of China’s financial system.The principle of aligning responsibilities and rights lies at the core of China’s financial reform agenda. Since China began reforms and opening up, much progress has been made in financial regulation, risk management and technological innovation.The past two decades of financial reforms have largely been modelled on Western economies but adapted to domestic realities. While China tried to balance marketisation with regulatory oversight, the regulatory framework has still revealed critical governance and regulatory gaps, especially in small and medium-sized institutions, compounded by regulatory blind spots and the failure of local governments to enforce fiscal discipline.The corruption cases, escalation in local debt and risk exposure from small financial institutions underscore the need for a more centralised regulatory framework. The emphasis on centralised and unified leadership is thus a response to these systemic challenges, and a reflection of China’s efforts to strengthen financial oversight and risk management.Despite inefficiency concerns, China’s emphasis on centralised leadership reflects a pragmatic strategy to maintain financial stability in a volatile environment. The country’s uneven regional development and complex ethnic and diplomatic relations, particularly along its extensive borders, make central coordination critical.History has shown that stability is a critical condition of China’s economic progress, with financial stability inextricably linked to social stability due to its political nature.As China grapples with rising domestic economic pressures and escalating international risks in recent years, financial stability has become paramount. While fiscal decentralisation has fuelled local-level economic dynamism in past decades, it has also contributed to moral hazard and risk mismanagement, pressing threats to China’s financial stability.The absence of a formal bankruptcy mechanism, combined with the entanglement of local governments and financial institutions, has created a precarious system, making centralised and unified leadership necessary to staunch the bleeding.The enhancement of financial risk prevention and resolution capabilities is a major effect of the reform. While centralisation may stretch the regulatory chain and undermine the flexibility and efficiency of financial institutions, it is aimed primarily at avoiding fragmented oversight and regulatory blind spots, ensuring more effective collaboration across various levels of government, and strengthening the oversight of local authorities and financial entities.Crucially, there is no significant evidence the central government has intensified direct intervention in the operational decisions of financial institutions. Even though it may amplify procyclical risk and reduce operational efficiency, its primary effect is to mitigate moral hazard at the regulatory and managerial levels, while managing systemic risks.In this regard, the central leadership has proved effective in addressing the most pressing challenges facing China’s financial system. Regulatory data shows a marked reduction in high-risk institutions last year, a notable decline in shadow banking risks since 2017, and progress in local government debt resolution – all signs of a more controlled risk landscape.While recent industry-wide financial data suggests a gradual decline in the operational efficiency of financial institutions, this is largely a reflection of broader macroeconomic conditions, domestic and global.It is important to recognise that centralised and unified leadership is a means to an end. It does not represent a fundamental shift in China’s financial governance but a crucial step towards a more controlled and efficient regulatory system.The ultimate goal is not to centralise power but to establish a more cohesive framework to accommodate further orderly decentralisation. On this basis, financial regulators have been advancing the decentralisation reform through enhancing central-local collaboration. The reforms also involve optimising and streamlining the organisational framework at both levels.As China navigates an increasingly complex global landscape, its financial reforms are expected to evolve in a manner that aligns with its unique political and economic context.重要！重要！重要！
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中国人民大学重阳金融研究院（人大重阳）成立于2013年1月19日，是重阳投资向中国人民大学捐赠并设立教育基金运营的主要资助项目。
作为中国特色新型智库，人大重阳聘请了全球数十位前政要、银行家、知名学者为高级研究员，旨在关注现实、建言国家、服务人民。目前，人大重阳下设7个部门、运营管理4个中心(生态金融研究中心、全球治理研究中心、中美人文交流研究中心、中俄人文交流研究中心)。近年来，人大重阳在金融发展、全球治理、大国关系、宏观政策等研究领域在国内外均具有较高认可度。
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